Plugin Name	Easy Author Image
Type of Vulnerability	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
CVE Number	CVE-2026-1373
Urgency	Medium
CVE Publish Date	2026-02-23
Source URL	CVE-2026-1373

Vulnerability Alert: Stored XSS in Easy Author Image Plugin (≤ 1.7) — What You Need to Know and How WP‑Firewall Protects You

Published: 23 Feb 2026
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5) — CVE-2026-1373

As the team behind WP‑Firewall, we monitor the WordPress ecosystem closely and work to protect thousands of sites from active threats. This advisory covers a recently disclosed vulnerability in the Easy Author Image plugin (versions ≤ 1.7) where an authenticated user with Subscriber-level privileges can store a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) payload via the profile picture URL field in their profile. That stored payload can be rendered in contexts that lead to script execution for other users, including administrators, depending on site configuration and theme/template usage.

Below we break down the issue in practical terms, explain exploitation paths and risk, provide concrete detection and containment steps, and share two types of mitigation you can apply immediately — one at the plugin/site level and one using WP‑Firewall (our managed WAF and security platform) to virtually patch the issue while you evaluate a safe remediation route.

This article is written for site owners, administrators, and developers who want straight answers and actionable steps rather than marketing-speak.

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Executive summary

• What: Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) in Easy Author Image plugin (≤ 1.7) — user-supplied profile picture URL is not properly sanitized before being stored and displayed.
• Who can trigger it: Any authenticated user with the Subscriber role can submit a crafted profile picture URL containing a malicious payload.
• Impact: Stored XSS — when the payload is rendered in a page or admin screen that displays the profile image/URL (front-end author boxes, admin user lists, comment author previews, etc.), the script can execute in the context of the victim’s browser. This can lead to session theft, privilege escalation (via social engineering), unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or malware delivery.
• CVE: CVE-2026-1373
• CVSS: 6.5 (medium)
• Official patch: At the time of publication there is no official patched release available for all affected sites.
• Immediate mitigation: Disable or remove the plugin (if feasible), restrict Subscriber profile editing, or apply virtual patching with WP‑Firewall WAF rules to block attempted exploitation.

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Why this matters — attack scenarios

Stored XSS is dangerous because the malicious script is persisted on the server and can affect many users without further interaction from the attacker. A few realistic scenarios:

1. An attacker (with a Subscriber account or a compromised low‑privilege account) sets their profile picture URL to a payload that contains JavaScript. When an administrator views the Users list or any admin page that displays the user’s image or link, the stored script runs in the admin’s browser. That can lead to session theft (cookie/token exfiltration) or perform actions via the admin session.
2. The payload is displayed on the public-facing site (author bio or post author widget). Visitors and logged-in users with elevated privileges may execute the payload, leading to site compromise, defacement, or redirecting visitors to phishing/malicious pages.
3. The attacker places a payload that uses DOM-based techniques to inject additional malicious content or to silently change admin settings (for example, point site to malicious DNS, create admin accounts via AJAX endpoints accessible to admin role).

Because the vulnerability is in an input field commonly visible in multiple contexts, the payoff for an attacker can be high even though the attacker only needs Subscriber access.

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Technical overview

At a high level the plugin stores and later renders the “profile picture URL” provided by users. The vulnerability arises when:

• The plugin fails to properly sanitize or validate the URL field.
• Stored data is later output into HTML without correct escaping or proper HTML attribute context sanitization.
• The rendering context does not neutralize JavaScript contexts (for example, when injected into an attribute, attribute value isn’t escaped and allows payloads like “javascript:…” or HTML with <script> tags).

Typical unsafe patterns we see:

• Using echo / print of a stored meta value directly into markup without esc_url/esc_attr/esc_html.
• Allowing rich inputs (data URIs, javascript: URIs or embedded HTML) to be saved and later rendered.

Proof-of-concept (high-level) payloads (do NOT test on production or third‑party sites you don’t own):

• Simple payload in the profile picture URL field:
  • javascript: — if the app uses the URL directly as an anchor or image src without checks (some browsers block javascript: in image src but errors exist).
• Attribute injection:
  • "/onerror=" — if the value ends up in an attribute like src or href without proper quoting/escaping.
• Inline HTML injection:
  • <img src=x onerror=> — if the stored value is inserted without escaping into an HTML context.

The vulnerability is classified as stored XSS because the attack is saved in the site database and executed later when the stored field is rendered.

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How an attacker might obtain Subscriber access

This vulnerability assumes the attacker already controls a Subscriber account on your site. Subscriber accounts are commonly available on many WordPress sites via:

• Public registration (if registration is allowed).
• Comment system that auto-creates accounts (rare but possible with customizations).
• Compromised credentials or weak password reuse.
• Social login or third-party registration systems.

If your site allows open registration or you have low-cost user onboarding, treat Subscriber-level inputs as untrusted.

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Immediate detection — signs your site may be attacked

Look for the following indicators:

• New or modified user profiles where the profile picture URL contains unexpected characters: <, >, javascript:, data:, onerror=, or encoded equivalents.
• Browser console errors or unexpected behavior when loading users list or author archives.
• Unusual outgoing requests from admin browsers or admin accounts performing unexpected actions.
• HTTP logs showing POST requests to user profile endpoints with payloads containing script tags or URL scheme injections.
• WAF logs indicating blocked attempts that match script injection patterns on user profile update endpoints.

Search examples (use after taking backups and in a staging copy, not on live DB without backups):

• Database query (MySQL):
  SELECT ID, user_login, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_key LIKE '%profile%' AND meta_value LIKE '%<script%';
• WP‑CLI:
  wp user meta list <user_id> --format=json | jq . | grep -i "<script"

If you find evidence of a stored payload, treat it as active compromise and follow the incident response steps below.

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Containment and immediate mitigation (fast, practical steps)

If you cannot immediately remove the plugin, follow these steps to reduce exposure quickly:

1. Restrict user editing
   • Temporarily disable profile editing for Subscribers using a capability filter or a small plugin that prevents subscribers from updating profile fields.
   • Example snippet to prevent subscribers from editing their profile picture URL (add to a site-specific plugin or mu-plugin):

   add_action('admin_init', function() {
       if (!current_user_can('edit_users') && !current_user_can('manage_options')) {
           remove_action('show_user_profile', 'your_plugin_profile_fields_callback');
           remove_action('edit_user_profile', 'your_plugin_profile_fields_callback');
       }
   });
   

   Note: Replace the callback name with the plugin-specific hook if known. If unsure, disable the plugin until a safe patch is available.

2. Disable the plugin entirely
   • If it’s feasible (no business dependency), deactivate Easy Author Image until the developer releases a secure version. This is the simplest fail-safe approach.
3. Remove/clean suspicious profile values
   • For each user, examine and remove suspicious profile picture URL values (sanitize or set to an empty string).
   • Backup your database first. Then update via WP‑CLI or SQL.
4. Restrict registration & remove spam accounts
   • If your site allows public registration, consider turning it off while you assess risk.
   • Delete or reset any low‑activity accounts that look suspicious.
5. Monitor logs and admin activity
   • Watch for suspicious logins, unusual admin actions, or additional user profile changes.
6. Block exploit attempts with WP‑Firewall (virtual patch)
   • Deploy WAF rules that specifically inspect POSTs to user profile update endpoints and reject suspicious inputs (see our suggested rules below).

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WP‑Firewall mitigation (virtual patch and recommended WAF rules)

While the ideal fix is to upgrade to a patched plugin release or remove the plugin, a virtual patch via WP‑Firewall gives you immediate protection. Our virtual patch approach considers both the attack vector and context:

• Block requests attempting to write script tags, suspicious URL schemes (javascript:, data:), or attribute patterns into profile picture fields.
• Limit requests to the profile update endpoint based on expected input format (only allow http/https URLs with whitelist of domains if possible).
• Add logging and correlation rules to detect repeated attempts from the same IP/user agent.

Below are example rules you can use as a starting point. These are generic patterns — tune them to your site and test in staging first.

Example ModSecurity-style rule (block script tags and onerror/onload attributes in POST body fields):

# Block obvious script tag injections in form inputs
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "chain,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Possible stored XSS in profile photo URL - blocking request'"
  SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS "(profile|profile_picture|picture|user_meta|avatar|photo)" "chain"
    SecRule ARGS "(?i)(<\s*script|onerror\s*=|onload\s*=|javascript:|data:text/html|data:image/svg\+xml|<svg)" "t:none,t:lowercase"

Regex to detect javascript: or data: schemes in a URL field:

(?i)^\s*(javascript:|data:|vbscript:)

A safer allowlist rule to only allow http(s) and typical image file extensions:

# Allow only http(s) URLs that end in common image extensions
SecRule ARGS:get_avatar|ARGS:profile_picture|ARGS:avatar "(?i)^(https?://[^\s'\"<>]+(\.jpg|\.jpeg|\.png|\.gif|\.webp)(\?.*)?)$" "allow,log,msg:'Valid avatar URL'"
SecRule ARGS:get_avatar|ARGS:profile_picture|ARGS:avatar "." "deny,log,msg:'Avatar URL invalid or potentially harmful'"

Notes and best practices when using firewall rules:

• Start in monitoring/logging mode first before enabling active blocking, so you can tune false positives.
• Target only the profile update endpoints and fields to avoid breaking unrelated functionality.
• Ensure you do not block legitimate admin workflows or integrations that use non-image URLs for avatars (gravatar URLs for example).
• Log blocked requests with payload snippets and user IDs to support incident response.

WP‑Firewall customers can request an immediate virtual patch from our team — we will implement tuned signatures on your account to block exploit attempts while minimizing false positives.

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Hardening the WordPress site (beyond WAF)

Treat the plugin vulnerability as an opportunity to strengthen your site in ways that reduce the impact of similar issues in the future:

• Principle of least privilege
  Limit the ability of low-privilege roles to change profile fields. Remove unnecessary capabilities from Subscriber role.
• Sanitize user-provided data at input and escape at output
  Use esc_url_raw()/esc_url() and esc_attr() when saving and rendering URLs and attributes.
• Disable open user registration if not needed
  Turn off “Anyone can register” in Settings > General unless you explicitly need it.
• User account hygiene
  Enforce strong passwords, disable default or unused accounts, and use multi-factor authentication (MFA) for admin accounts.
• Review theme and template output
  Ensure your theme uses WordPress escaping functions whenever displaying user metadata — themes are often the place where stored XSS becomes effective.
• Audit installed plugins and plugin authors
  Remove unused plugins and replace plugins that have a history of security issues.
• Logging and monitoring
  Integrate admin activity logs for changes to user profiles and critical options. Use file integrity monitoring for unexpected changes.

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Incident response — what to do if you find evidence of exploitation

1. Isolate:
   • Temporarily deactivate the vulnerable plugin.
   • Consider taking the site offline (maintenance mode) if the incident is severe.
2. Contain:
   • Remove the malicious stored values from the database.
   • Reset passwords for admin accounts and any accounts that may be affected.
   • Terminate active sessions for all users (WordPress provides session management functions you can call).
3. Investigate:
   • Review access logs, admin action logs, and WAF logs for the timeframe of the injection.
   • Look for signs of lateral movement (new admin users, changed plugins, modified files).
4. Remediate:
   • Apply patches, remove or replace the vulnerable plugin, and harden inputs on templates.
   • Restore from a clean backup if necessary.
5. Notify:
   • Notify impacted users and stakeholders if user data was exposed or if privileged accounts were affected. Follow applicable disclosure laws in your region.
6. Review and learn:
   • Perform a post-incident review and implement any additional controls (MFA, stricter role capabilities, WAF rules, better patching cadence).

If you need professional incident response help, WP‑Firewall offers managed services and recovery assistance to help triage and remediate active incidents.

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Recommendations — short checklist

• If possible, immediately deactivate the Easy Author Image plugin until you have a confirmed safe update from the plugin author.
• If deactivation is not possible, restrict Subscribers from editing profile fields and sanitize existing profile picture URL values.
• Apply WAF rules to block suspicious inputs to profile update endpoints (we provide virtual patching for customers).
• Audit registration and remove unneeded or suspicious Subscriber accounts.
• Search your database for <script> or other suspicious tokens stored in profile fields and remove them after review.
• Ensure admins use MFA and rotate credentials if you believe an admin session was compromised.
• Monitor logs for repeated attempts from the same IP, user agent, or account.

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Example detection queries and remediation commands

Database check for suspicious values:

SELECT user_id, meta_key, meta_value
FROM wp_usermeta
WHERE meta_key LIKE '%avatar%' OR meta_key LIKE '%picture%' OR meta_key LIKE '%profile%';

Search for script tags:

SELECT * FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';

WP‑CLI replace (dangerous — use with backups):

# This example replaces <script occurrences in usermeta with an empty string (test in staging)
wp db query "UPDATE wp_usermeta SET meta_value = REPLACE(meta_value, '<script', '') WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"

Always backup before performing mass updates.

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Why virtual patching is important while you wait for an official fix

• Plugin vendors take time to reproduce, fix, test, and publish patches. During that window your sites remain at risk.
• Virtual patching via the WAF allows you to block exploit attempts at the perimeter without changing site code or risking functional regressions.
• A WAF adds an additional verification layer that’s especially useful for stored XSS where payloads can be complex and encoded.
• Virtual patches are not a replacement for code fixes — they reduce immediate risk and give you time to plan safe remediation.

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Developer notes: safe output patterns

If you are a developer maintaining a theme or custom plugin that displays author images or profile URLs, follow these rules:

• Always escape output according to context:
  • HTML text node: esc_html()
  • HTML attribute: esc_attr()
  • URL: esc_url()
• Validate URLs before saving: use wp_http_validate_url() or esc_url_raw() and restrict to allowed schemes (http, https).
• Strip HTML tags on profile URL fields: wp_kses() with a strict allowed list.
• Prefer get_avatar() and WordPress functions that handle escaping and filters.

Example safe rendering:

<?php
$avatar_url = get_user_meta( $user_id, 'profile_picture', true );
$avatar_url = esc_url( $avatar_url ); // ensures it's a safe URL
echo '<img src="' . esc_attr( $avatar_url ) . '" alt="' . esc_attr( $user_display_name ) . '">';
?>

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Frequently asked questions

Q: Is this vulnerability exploitable by anonymous visitors?
A: No — the vulnerability requires an authenticated user with Subscriber privileges to store the payload. However, once stored it can affect anonymous visitors when the payload is rendered.

Q: Will disabling user registration fully protect me?
A: Disabling registration reduces the risk of new accounts being used to exploit the vulnerability. However, existing Subscriber accounts or compromised accounts remain a risk.

Q: What if I use a custom author box?
A: Check your author box code and theme templates to ensure proper escaping. The plugin vulnerability may be more or less impactful depending on how author images/URLs are rendered.

Q: Should I delete all subscribers?
A: Not necessarily. Audit and remove suspicious accounts; reset passwords and enforce stronger authentication (MFA) for admin users.

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Timeline and credits

• Discovery: Reported by security researcher Nabil Irawan (Heroes Cyber Security).
• Published: 23 Feb 2026.
• CVE: CVE-2026-1373
• WP‑Firewall publishing: this notice to help customers and the broader community take immediate steps to protect sites.

(If you are the plugin author or responsible maintainer and want to coordinate disclosure or provide a vendor response, contact our triage team for remediation advice and coordinated mitigation options.)

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Practical examples — rule templates you can copy

1) Minimal blocking rule (block javascript: scheme in avatar URL):

SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS "(avatar|profile_picture|picture|photo)" "chain,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Block avatar field javascript: scheme'"
  SecRule ARGS "(?i)^\s*javascript:"

2) Block encoded script tags:

SecRule REQUEST_BODY "(?i)(%3Cscript%3E|%3C%2Fscript%3E|%3Csvg|%3Conerror%3D|%3Cimg%20src%3D)" "deny,log,status:403,msg:'Encoded script tag in POST body detected'"

3) Enforce only http/https and image file extensions (example):

SecRule ARGS|get_avatar|ARGS:profile_picture "(?i)^(https?://[^\s'\"<>]+(\.jpg|\.jpeg|\.png|\.gif|\.webp)(\?.*)?)$" "id:1001,allow"
SecRule ARGS|get_avatar|ARGS:profile_picture "." "id:1002,deny,log,msg:'Avatar URL denied — only http/https image URLs allowed'"

Remember: tune rules against your site traffic to avoid disrupting legitimate flows.

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Secure Your Site Now — Try WP‑Firewall Free Plan

We understand not every site owner can immediately remove a plugin or apply code changes. That’s why we offer a free tier of WP‑Firewall that gives essential protection right away:

• Basic (Free): essential protection including a managed firewall, unlimited bandwidth, full WAF coverage, malware scanner, and mitigation for OWASP Top 10 risks.
• Standard ($50/year): adds automatic malware removal and limited IP blacklist/whitelist control.
• Pro ($299/year): adds monthly security reports, auto vulnerability virtual patching, and premium support and managed services.

If you want immediate perimeter protection and virtual patching for this specific issue and others, sign up for the Free plan and let us apply tuned rules to block exploit attempts while you plan remediation: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

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Closing thoughts from WP‑Firewall engineers

Stored XSS remains one of the most frequently exploited web vulnerabilities because it’s relatively easy for attackers and can produce high-impact results when rendered in admin or high-privilege contexts. This particular issue — profile picture URL injection by a Subscriber account — is a textbook example of how user-supplied strings must be validated and escaped at both input and output.

If you manage WordPress sites, treat all user-editable fields as potentially hostile. Use defense-in-depth: minimize attack surface by limiting unnecessary user capabilities, harden output in themes and plugins, and deploy a managed WAF with virtual patching capability so you’re protected even when a patch is not yet available.

If you need help implementing any of the steps in this guide, or want WP‑Firewall to deploy an immediate virtual patch and protect your site, our team is ready to help. We can deploy tuned rules, monitor traffic for suspicious patterns, and assist with cleanup if you find signs of exploitation.

Stay safe,
— The WP‑Firewall Security Team

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Appendix: Useful references and further reading

• CVE-2026-1373 (refer to authoritative CVE listings for details)
• WordPress developer handbook: data validation and escaping
• Best practice guides for WAF rule tuning and incident response

(End of advisory)