Plugin Name	WooCommerce Checkout Manager
Type of Vulnerability	Arbitrary Deletion
CVE Number	CVE-2025-13930
Urgency	High
CVE Publish Date	2026-02-19
Source URL	CVE-2025-13930

Urgent: Arbitrary Content Deletion Vulnerability in WooCommerce Checkout Manager (<= 7.8.5) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now

Date: 19 Feb, 2026
CVE: CVE-2025-13930
Affected plugin: WooCommerce Checkout Manager (Checkout Field Manager / Checkout Manager) — versions <= 7.8.5
Patched in: 7.8.6
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5) — Unauthenticated arbitrary attachment deletion

As the team behind WP-Firewall, we’re publishing this advisory to help WordPress site owners, developers and hosting teams quickly understand the risk posed by CVE-2025-13930, prioritize actions, and implement short-term mitigations and long-term hardening to prevent data loss and service disruption.

This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to delete attachments (media library items) from a WordPress site running the vulnerable plugin. That means photos, PDFs, images used on pages, product images, and other media assets can be removed remotely without logging in — a destructive capability that can lead to damaged storefronts, broken pages, lost content and reputational damage for e‑commerce sites.

Below you’ll find a plain-English technical summary, a prioritized mitigation plan you can execute immediately, suggested Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules and virtual patches, incident response steps and recovery guidance, and concrete configuration and code-level recommendations developers can use to ensure this class of issue does not happen again.

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Short technical summary (high level)

• The plugin exposed a server endpoint (an AJAX or REST action) that accepts a request to delete an attachment (a media item) identified by an ID or filename.
• The endpoint did not perform proper authorization and capability checks — it accepted unauthenticated requests and performed deletion operations.
• An attacker could call that endpoint (for example, via POST or GET to the plugin’s route), provide an attachment identifier, and cause the plugin to call WordPress functions that remove the media item (or remove it from the database and file system).
• Because attachments can include product images, marketing assets and documents, this behavior results in arbitrary content deletion for any site running the vulnerable versions.

The plugin author released a patch in version 7.8.6 that corrects the missing authorization checks. If you use this plugin, updating immediately is the correct long-term fix.

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Why this vulnerability is especially dangerous for WooCommerce stores

• Product images and downloadable product files may be removed, rendering product listings unusable and leading to lost sales and angry customers.
• SEO and user experience suffer immediately when images and media are removed from pages; recovery can require rebuilding content or restoring backups.
• Attackers can combine deletion with follow‑on attacks to create havoc (remove trust indicators, images, invoices, etc.), causing manual investigation and brand damage.
• Unauthenticated exploitation means widespread automated scans can find and exploit sites quickly, so risk escalates rapidly once details are public.

Given the nature of the vulnerability, we assess this is likely to be weaponized quickly by opportunistic attackers and automated scanners unless sites apply mitigations.

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Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) — what to look for now

If you run the affected plugin (<=7.8.5) you should review your site for signs of deletion and suspicious requests:

• Missing images or “broken image” icons in product pages and posts.
• Media files present in wp_posts (post_type = ‘attachment’) but files missing from the /wp-content/uploads/ folder.
• Recently deleted attachments in the Trash (if the site was configured to move attachments to Trash rather than immediate deletion).
• Unexpected HTTP requests to plugin paths (check access logs) or to admin-ajax.php / wp-json endpoints that reference deletion actions, parameters like attachment IDs, or suspicious user agents and IP addresses.
• Unusually high numbers of POST requests without authenticated cookies to endpoints that suggest action=… or route names matching the plugin.

Helpful log queries (run from shell or through your host’s control panel logs):

• Search webserver logs for likely deletion calls (example grep patterns — adapt to your environment):
  • access_log: grep -i “delete.*attachment” /var/log/nginx/*access*.log
  • access_log: grep -E “wp-content/plugins/.*/(delete|remove|ajax).*” /var/log/apache2/*access*.log
• Query the DB for recent attachments and suspicious dates:
  • SELECT ID, post_title, post_date, post_status FROM wp_posts WHERE post_type = 'attachment' ORDER BY post_date DESC LIMIT 200;

If you discover deletions you did not initiate, treat this as an active incident and follow the incident response checklist below.

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Immediate priority actions (what to do in the next 60–90 minutes)

1. Back up right now
   Create a full snapshot of the site (files + database). Use your host or backup plugin. This preserves a forensic image in case of ongoing exploitation.
2. Update the plugin to 7.8.6 (or later)
   This is the upstream fix and the best permanent solution. If possible, enable automatic updates for this plugin after you confirm compatibility.
3. If you cannot update immediately, apply virtual patching via your firewall/WAF
   Block requests matching the plugin’s deletion endpoint (see WAF suggestions below).
   In practice, block unauthenticated POST/GET to the plugin path and any calls without a valid WordPress nonce or Referrer header.
4. Temporarily disable the plugin if the site is actively under attack or you have no immediate way to protect it
   Deactivation prevents the endpoint from being reachable. If deactivation breaks critical functionality, rely on WAF/host protections while you update.
5. Check media library and restore missing files from backups
   If attachments were removed, you can restore files from your most recent clean backup.
6. Scan and review logs for exploitation attempts
   Identify attackers’ IPs and patterns so you can block them and check if there’s persistence (webshells, admin accounts created, etc.).

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Recommended WAF / virtual patch rules (practical, implementable)

As WP-Firewall, we have created and deployed virtual patch rules for this issue. If you manage your own WAF (or can configure mod_security / host firewall), implement rules like the following concepts immediately to block common exploitation vectors:

1. Block requests to known plugin paths used for deletion:
   • Deny requests to URLs matching:
     • /wp-content/plugins/woocommerce-checkout-manager/*delete*
     • /wp-content/plugins/woocommerce-checkout-manager/*ajax*
     • Any REST route names or admin-ajax actions associated with the plugin’s deletion functionality (inspect the plugin files to confirm names).
2. Require presence of a valid WP nonce or authenticated cookie for deletion endpoints:
   • Block requests that attempt deletion actions and either:
     • lack the WordPress logged-in cookie (wordpress_logged_in_*), or
     • lack a valid nonce parameter (typically _wpnonce), or
     • have suspicious Content-Type (e.g., application/x-www-form-urlencoded requests without referrer or user-agent).
3. Rate-limiting and IP blocking:
   • If you see many deletion attempts from a small range of IPs, throttle or temporary block those sources for a period.
   • Apply per-IP rate limits on POST/DELETE requests for the plugin endpoints.
4. Block common exploitation patterns:
   • Deny requests where a deletion parameter is numeric and points to low-number IDs (e.g., id=1..500) combined with no authentication — many automated probes will try lists of IDs.
   • Deny requests with suspicious user-agents or missing headers (no referer, no origin on POSTs to admin-ajax endpoints).
5. Strict method enforcement:
   • If the plugin incorrectly allowed GET to delete resources, enforce blocking of any GET requests that include deletion parameters; deletion should be POST with verified nonce.
6. Restrict access to admin-ajax and REST routes
   • Where possible, require authentication to use critical admin-ajax actions; the WAF can block anonymous calls to admin-ajax.php that include plugin-specific action parameters.

If you use WP-Firewall, our team has published a virtual patch to block exploit attempts for this vulnerability immediately. These rules are purpose-built to stop unauthenticated deletion attempts without impacting normal site behavior.

Important: Virtual patching is a stopgap. Updating the plugin is the long-term fix.

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Practical code-level guidance for developers / plugin authors (how this should be implemented)

If you are a plugin author or responsible for custom code, follow these implementation patterns to prevent this class of vulnerability:

1. Never perform destructive operations in endpoints that can be reached by unauthenticated users. Always validate the request origin and user capability.
2. For admin-ajax actions:
   • Use authentication checks like:
     • check_ajax_referer( 'your_nonce_action', '_wpnonce' );
     • if ( ! current_user_can( 'delete_post', $attachment_id ) ) { wp_send_json_error( 'Unauthorized', 403 ); }
   • Validate and sanitize all incoming parameters:
     • $attachment_id = intval( $_POST['attachment_id'] ?? 0 );
     • if ( $attachment_id <= 0 ) { wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid ID', 400 ); }
3. For REST API endpoints (recommended approach):
   • Register routes with a permission_callback:

     register_rest_route( 'wc-checkout-manager/v1', '/attachment/(?P<id>\d+)', array(
       'methods' => 'DELETE',
       'callback' => 'my_delete_attachment',
       'permission_callback' => function ( $request ) {
           $id = (int) $request['id'];
           return current_user_can( 'delete_post', $id );
       }
     ) );

   • Never return success to unauthenticated callers for destructive routes.
4. Always sanitize and check ownership or parent relationships:
   • Confirm that the attachment belongs to the expected site or product:

     $post = get_post( $attachment_id );
     if ( ! $post || $post->post_type !== 'attachment' ) { return error; }

5. Logging:
   • Log deletion events (user ID, IP, time, attachment ID) to aid auditing.

Example safe deletion snippet (conceptual):

function safe_delete_attachment_handler() {
    check_ajax_referer( 'wccm_nonce', '_wpnonce' );
    $attachment_id = isset( $_POST['attachment_id'] ) ? intval( $_POST['attachment_id'] ) : 0;

    if ( $attachment_id <= 0 ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid attachment ID', 400 );
    }

    if ( ! is_user_logged_in() || ! current_user_can( 'delete_post', $attachment_id ) ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Unauthorized', 403 );
    }

    // Optional: confirm attachment exists
    $attachment = get_post( $attachment_id );
    if ( ! $attachment || $attachment->post_type !== 'attachment' ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Attachment not found', 404 );
    }

    // Perform delete
    $deleted = wp_delete_attachment( $attachment_id, true ); // true = delete files
    if ( $deleted ) {
        wp_send_json_success( 'Attachment deleted' );
    } else {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Deletion failed', 500 );
    }
}
add_action( 'wp_ajax_wc_delete_attachment', 'safe_delete_attachment_handler' );

Note: The above is conceptual and demonstrates how to require authentication and capability checks.

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Incident response checklist — step-by-step recovery and containment

If you believe your site has been targeted or content removed, follow these steps in order:

1. Isolate and snapshot
   Take a full backup (files + DB) immediately and store it offline. Keep copies for forensics.
2. Update or disable
   Update plugin to 7.8.6. If you cannot do that safely right away, deactivate the plugin.
3. Virtual patching
   Apply WAF rules to block exploit patterns — deny access to the plugin’s endpoints for unauthenticated users.
4. Identify scope
   Check how many attachments were deleted and when; compare current media library with recent backup.
   Run the DB query for recent attachments:
   SELECT ID, post_title, post_date FROM wp_posts WHERE post_type = 'attachment' ORDER BY post_date DESC;
   Inspect webserver logs for time windows when deletion calls occurred.
5. Restore missing media
   If backups exist, restore the media files to /wp-content/uploads/ and ensure corresponding wp_posts entries exist.
   If images were in Trash, recover through the Media Library.
6. Check for persistence
   Look for newly created admin users, suspicious plugins, file modifications (especially webroot PHP files), unknown cron jobs, and webshells.
   Consider running a malware scanner and, if in doubt, engage a security specialist.
7. Rotate credentials and secrets
   Rotate WordPress admin passwords, API keys, FTP/SFTP and hosting control panel credentials if you suspect compromise.
8. Monitor and harden
   Increase logging, set alerting on deletion events and file changes, apply file‑integrity monitoring.
   Keep all plugins, core and themes updated. Remove unused plugins.
9. Communicate
   If customer data or product artifacts were affected, inform stakeholders and, where required by law or policy, customers.

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Long-term hardening & best practices to avoid similar risks

• Follow the principle of least privilege: only grant delete capabilities to roles that genuinely need them.
• Review plugin code for all destructive endpoints. If an endpoint can delete or modify content, ensure it requires authentication and a capability check.
• Use the REST API with a permission_callback instead of exposing bespoke AJAX actions without checks.
• Establish a rapid update policy for plugins on production sites; keep a staging test environment and schedule updates.
• Automate backups and test restores regularly. A backup is only useful if you can restore from it quickly.
• Add file integrity monitoring and alert on deleted/missing files in wp-content/uploads.
• Limit accessibility to plugin files using server-level rules when possible (for example, avoiding exposing internal plugin utilities that shouldn’t be web-accessible).
• Ensure you have a WAF with the ability to virtual patch new vulnerabilities while you plan and deploy fixes.

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For hosts and managed WordPress teams — operational guidance

• Implement host-level virtual patching to block exploit traffic to the plugin path across all customers until updates are applied.
• Notify customers quickly with concise instructions: back up, update plugin to 7.8.6, and report any content loss.
• Provide restore / rollback assistance and ensure logs are preserved for forensics.
• If attacks are detected in the wild, place an emergency mitigation rule that denies deletion attempts to the plugin for unauthenticated users.

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How WP-Firewall protects your site from this kind of threat

As a firewall vendor that specializes in WordPress, our protections and recommendations are built around the attack patterns we see in the wild:

• Rapid virtual patching: when vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-13930 are disclosed, we create and deploy rules that block exploit attempts targeting the vulnerable endpoints. That stops unauthenticated deletion attempts in minutes across protected sites.
• Behavioral blocking: instead of relying only on static signatures, we detect anomalous behavior such as unauthenticated deletion attempts, suspicious parameter patterns, or requests lacking valid nonces and block those attempts.
• Rate limiting and automated IP reputation checks: to prevent brute force and mass exploitation attempts, we throttle or block abusive IPs and networks.
• Granular endpoint controls: we can block specific plugin REST/ AJAX endpoints on demand, while minimizing collateral impact to legitimate traffic.
• Detailed logging and alerting: we provide visibility into blocked exploit attempts and suspicious flows so site teams can investigate and remediate fully.

These protections are designed to work while you apply the upstream fix — they are complementary, not a substitute for updating code.

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Practical detection queries and recovery snippets

• Find missing files referenced by posts (simple approach — fail if file is missing):

  SELECT p.ID, p.post_title, p.guid
  FROM wp_posts p
  WHERE p.post_type = 'attachment'
  AND NOT EXISTS (
    SELECT 1 FROM wp_postmeta pm WHERE pm.post_id = p.ID AND pm.meta_key = '_wp_attached_file'
  );

  Note: The GUID is often the file URL; check if that file exists on disk.

• Find recent deletion windows:
  • Search your webserver logs for wp_delete_attachment, plugin route names, or admin-ajax actions:

    grep -i "wp_delete_attachment" /var/log/nginx/*access*.log

• If files are missing but DB still references them, restore files from backup and then run a plugin or WP CLI command to regenerate any metadata:

  wp media regenerate --yes

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Recommended timeline for teams

• T+0 to T+1 hour: Back up site, apply WAF/virtual patch, if necessary disable plugin.
• T+1 to T+6 hours: Update plugin to 7.8.6 (test on staging first if possible), scan for deleted content, restore from backup.
• T+6 to T+24 hours: Rotate credentials, check for signs of persistence, monitor for further exploit attempts.
• T+24 to T+72 hours: Harden site, implement file integrity monitoring, and schedule future updates/maintenance processes.

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Developer checklist to prevent similar vulnerabilities

• Audit every endpoint you expose — label them read-only or destructive and require appropriate checks for destructive actions.
• Use WordPress nonces and capability checks consistently.
• Prefer REST API routes with explicit permission_callback over ad-hoc GET/POST handlers that might be accidentally reachable.
• Validate input strictly — no blind acceptance of IDs or filenames coming from the client.
• Add server-side logging and alerts for destructive operations (deletes, file removals, DB changes) to detect abuse quickly.
• Add tests that assert that endpoints return 401/403 for unauthenticated users on destructive operations.

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Closing thoughts and recommendations

This vulnerability (CVE-2025-13930) underscores a persistent class of risk in WordPress plugin development: destructive actions exposed without proper authorization. For site owners, the path forward is clear:

1. Update the plugin to 7.8.6 now.
2. If you cannot update immediately, deploy virtual patches via a WAF or temporarily deactivate the plugin.
3. Confirm backups are intact and restore deleted assets where necessary.
4. Harden your site with principle-of-least-privilege and logging for destructive endpoints.

If you manage multiple WordPress sites, prioritize this plugin across your fleet and apply host-level mitigations to reduce the blast radius. If you want quick managed protection that includes virtual patching and continuous WAF rule updates while you maintain or upgrade plugins, consider using WP‑Firewall’s Basic (Free) plan to get started and then evaluate Standard and Pro options for extra automation and support.

We’ll continue to monitor the situation and publish further actionable guidance if exploitation trends change. If you need help implementing the mitigations described here or restoring deleted content, our incident response team at WP‑Firewall can assist.

Stay safe,
The WP‑Firewall Security Team