Authenticated Contributor Cross Site Scripting in SuperSearch//Published on 2025-08-20//CVE-2025-8064

플러그인 이름	Bible SuperSearch
Type of Vulnerability	크로스 사이트 스크립팅(XSS)
CVE Number	CVE-2025-8064
긴급	낮은
CVE Publish Date	2025-08-20
Source URL	CVE-2025-8064

TL;DR

A stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the WordPress plugin “Bible SuperSearch” (versions <= 6.0.1) has been disclosed (CVE‑2025‑8064). An authenticated user with Contributor privileges or higher can inject a payload through the plugin’s selector_height parameter that becomes stored and later executed in the context of an administrator or site visitor. The issue is fixed in version 6.1.0.

Key actions for site owners

• Update Bible SuperSearch to 6.1.0 (or later) immediately.
• If you cannot update right now, restrict or audit Contributor+ accounts, and apply WAF rules to block exploitation attempts.
• Scan your site for suspicious stored payloads containing selector_height or script tags, and remove or clean them.
• Use the free WP‑Firewall plan for immediate managed firewall and WAF protection if you want quick mitigation without waiting to patch.

This guide explains the risk, realistic attack scenarios, detection, containment, fixes for site owners and plugin developers, and recommended WAF signatures and monitoring practices.

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Overview: what happened and why it matters

On 20 August 2025 a stored XSS vulnerability (CVE‑2025‑8064) in Bible SuperSearch versions up to and including 6.0.1 was publicly disclosed. The vulnerability lets an authenticated user with Contributor privileges (or above) supply malicious input via a parameter named selector_height. Because the plugin persisted that value and later rendered it into a page without proper sanitization/escaping, the input could include HTML/JavaScript that executes in the browser of an admin, editor, or public visitor — depending on where and how the plugin outputs it.

Stored XSS is especially dangerous because the payload is saved server‑side and executed every time the vulnerable page/widget/interface is viewed — increasing the attack surface and the chances of administrative compromise, session theft, or content manipulation.

Although this issue has been scored as medium/low severity (CVSS 6.5) — partly because it requires a Contributor or higher to exploit — it’s important to assume that accounts can be compromised or misused. Many sites allow multiple authors/contributors and managing those accounts centrally is hard. Attackers frequently target lower‑privileged accounts as footholds.

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Which versions are affected and where it was fixed

• Affected versions: Bible SuperSearch <= 6.0.1
• Fixed in: 6.1.0
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑8064
• Required privilege for exploitation: Contributor

If you run Bible SuperSearch on your site, update the plugin to 6.1.0 or later as your first step.

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How the vulnerability works — technical summary (non‑vendor)

Based on the public advisory details, the high level is:

• The plugin accepts a parameter selector_height (likely from a widget, shortcode attributes, or an AJAX/admin form).
• That parameter is stored into the database (postmeta, options, widget settings, or plugin configuration) without sufficient input validation and sanitization.
• Later, the stored value is rendered into a page or admin UI without proper escaping (for example, outputting raw HTML into an attribute or content area).
• Because HTML/JavaScript can be persisted, an attacker supplies a payload such as <img src="x" onerror="..."> 또는 <script>...</script> inside the selector_height value. When an admin/editor loads the page that includes the stored widget/setting view, the browser executes the injected script in the target user’s session context.
• With stored XSS, the real risk is takeover of privileged accounts, persistent defacement, redirecting traffic, or site malware distribution.

Note: the vulnerability requires authenticated access at the Contributor role or higher. That lowers the immediate risk compared to unauthenticated RCEs, but it still has a meaningful impact because Contributor accounts are common and credentials can be phished or reused.

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Realistic exploitation scenarios

1. Malicious insider/compromised Contributor account
   • A site Contributor intentionally or accidentally injects a payload into a plugin setting (e.g., widget or shortcode configuration). When an Editor or Administrator views the affected page or plugin settings, the injected script executes and can do things such as create admin users, change plugin/theme files, or exfiltrate cookies/token values.
2. Guest posting or editorial submission workflows
   • Sites that allow Contributor submissions may rely on a workflow where Editors publish posts. If the plugin stores selector_height into user-visible components of a post or a widget, a malicious Contributor could hide a payload that triggers when Editors preview editorial content — compromising the editor session.
3. Supply chain / mass exploitation
   • If an attacker can create many Contributor accounts (e.g., via weak signup processes or site misconfiguration), they could persist many different payloads. Each time administrators load plugin settings or pages with the widget, these payloads execute — enabling widespread phishing or persistent access.
4. Automated scanners and bots
   • Attackers scanning the web for this plugin and vulnerable versions may attempt to programmatically inject payloads into the selector_height field wherever forms are exposed. If left unprotected, this can cascade to many sites.

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Impact and what an attacker can do

With stored XSS an attacker can:

• Steal cookie/session identifiers and attempt takeover of admin/editor accounts.
• Perform actions on behalf of the administrator (CSRF-style actions from the admin browser).
• Plant backdoors in themes/plugins by sending requests via the admin session.
• Inject spam, advertisements, or malicious redirects to third‑party sites.
• Load external malware or cryptominer scripts in visitor browsers.

Because the vulnerability is stored, it can remain for a long time and be triggered repeatedly by site administrators or visitors, amplifying its effects.

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Detection and indicators of compromise (IoCs)

Look for the following signs on your site:

• Unusual <script>, onerror, 클릭 시, javascript: or suspicious HTML in plugin configuration values, widget options, postmeta or wp_options entries.
• Widget settings or plugin options that contain characters or substrings not expected for numeric inputs — e.g., tags <, >, script, onerror.
• Unexpected admin behavior: redirects when opening plugin settings pages, alerts popping up when viewing pages or editing content.
• Newly created administrator users, changed plugin/theme files, or suspicious scheduled tasks (wp_cron entries).
• Web server logs showing POST requests to plugin endpoints with parameters named selector_height 또는 유사한 것.

Suggested WordPress database search queries (backup DB first):

Find occurrences in postmeta:

SELECT * FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%selector_height%'
   OR meta_value LIKE '%<script>%'
   OR meta_value LIKE '%onerror=%'
LIMIT 100;

Find occurrences in options:

SELECT * FROM wp_options
WHERE option_value LIKE '%selector_height%'
   OR option_value LIKE '%<script>%'
   OR option_value LIKE '%onerror=%'
LIMIT 100;

Find any selector_height in raw database:

SELECT table_name, column_name
FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE column_name LIKE '%selector_height%';

Search plugin files for output points (use grep):

# from site root
grep -R "selector_height" wp-content/plugins/bible-supersearch -n

If you find suspicious data, isolate it and remove/clean it after confirming it’s malicious.

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Immediate containment steps for site owners

1. Update the plugin to 6.1.0+ immediately.
   This is the only permanent fix from the plugin author.
2. If you cannot update right now:
   • Temporarily disable the Bible SuperSearch plugin.
   • Or restrict Contributor and lower roles until you can apply the patch:
     • Remove unnecessary Contributor accounts
     • Change Contributor passwords or force password resets
     • Disable account registrations if not needed
   • Block common exploitation patterns at the firewall/WAF level (see rule examples below).
3. Scan for backdoors or injected scripts
   • Run a full malware scan on your site (files and database).
   • Check recently modified files inside themes and plugins.
   • Inspect wp_options, wp_postmeta, and widget settings for injected HTML/JS.
4. Rotate secrets and tokens
   • If you suspect admin session compromise, change admin passwords and invalidate sessions by forcing a password reset for site admins.
   • Rotate any API keys or tokens stored on the site.
5. Audit logs
   • Check web server access logs for POST requests to plugin endpoints or admin pages at suspicious times.
   • Check user activity logs if available for changes made by Contributors.

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WAF / WP‑Firewall mitigation rules (practical examples)

If you run a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or the WP‑Firewall managed WAF, setting a virtual patch to block the exploiters’ request patterns is an effective short‑term mitigation. Below are example rule signatures and heuristics you can use.

Generic WAF rule to block suspicious HTML inside selector_height 매개변수 (rule language depends on your WAF):

• Match: POST or GET requests containing parameter name selector_height with value containing <script 또는 onerror=
• Action: Block and log

Example ModSecurity-style rule (illustrative):

SecRule ARGS:selector_height "@rx (<script|onerror=|javascript:|<img)" 
  "id:1001001,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Block suspicious selector_height XSS payload'"

Generic regex to detect attributes that are not numeric:

• If selector_height is supposed to be numeric, block alphabetic characters or angle brackets:

/<|>|onerror=|javascript:|<script|%3Cscript/i

If your WAF supports conditionals, only trigger the rule for requests that originate from authenticated areas (your admin panel) or for endpoints that update plugin settings.

Log and alert any blocked attempts so you can investigate the source IPs and payloads.

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How to clean up stored payloads

If you discover stored malicious payloads:

1. Identify all locations where the plugin stores selector_height (postmeta, options, widget_data).
2. Replace unsafe values either manually from the WordPress admin UI or using SQL/CLI if many rows are affected.
3. Sanitize or delete the affected entries; do not blindly run mass deletes without backup.

Example: remove tags from relevant postmeta using SQL (backup DB first):

UPDATE wp_postmeta
SET meta_value = REGEXP_REPLACE(meta_value, '<[^>]*>', '')
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%selector_height%'
  AND (meta_value LIKE '%<script>%'
       OR meta_value LIKE '%onerror=%');

Note: REGEXP_REPLACE is available in newer MySQL/MariaDB versions — otherwise export/import or use PHP scripts to sanitize.

Alternatively, use a curated cleanup plugin or run a small WP‑CLI/PHP script that loads values through WordPress functions and sanitizes with wp_kses() 또는 텍스트 필드 삭제().

Example WP‑CLI/PHP snippet (conceptual):

<?php
// Run this carefully in a plugin or WP-CLI script
$meta_rows = $wpdb->get_results("
  SELECT meta_id, meta_value FROM {$wpdb->postmeta}
  WHERE meta_value LIKE '%selector_height%'
");
foreach ($meta_rows as $row) {
  $clean = wp_kses( $row->meta_value, array() ); // remove all tags
  $wpdb->update( $wpdb->postmeta, array('meta_value' => $clean), array('meta_id' => $row->meta_id) );
}
?>

Always take complete backups before running automated remediation against the database.

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Fix for developers and plugin authors (recommended hardening)

If you maintain a plugin or theme, you should adopt a defensive approach to inputs and outputs — especially when inputs come from lower‑privileged users.

• Validate inputs strictly
  • If selector_height is meant to be numeric (e.g., CSS height in pixels), use intval(), absint(), floatval() 또는 filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_INT) to convert and validate. Reject invalid values.
  • If free text is allowed, limit length and allowed characters (e.g., only digits and px, or a whitelist of CSS values).
• Sanitize before storing
  • 사용 텍스트 필드 삭제() for simple text inputs, or wp_kses() with an allowlist of permitted tags if HTML is allowed.
  • Do not store raw HTML unless there is a clear need and you have a secure sanitize policy.
• Escape on output
  • 사용 esc_attr() for attribute output and esc_html() 또는 wp_kses_post() for content areas.
  • Never echo user input without escaping for the correct context (HTML attribute vs HTML body vs JavaScript string vs CSS).
• Capability checks and nonces
  • Ensure that any request that changes plugin settings verifies the user has a proper capability (e.g., manage_options or another appropriate capability) and a WordPress nonce.
  • Contributors often should not be able to modify global plugin settings or options that affect other users. Restrict settings UI accordingly.
• Audit plugin admin pages
  • Keep admin forms and AJAX endpoints limited to the expected capability and ensure they do not accept arbitrary parameters that can produce stored output.
• Logging and alerts
  • Log unexpected input patterns and alert administrators when a Contributor supplies data that contains special characters or markup.

Example safe handling (PHP conceptual):

<?php
// Suppose selector_height should be an integer
if ( isset($_POST['selector_height']) ) {
    // Capability check - should be appropriate for what is being changed
    if ( ! current_user_can('edit_posts') ) {
        wp_die('Insufficient privileges');
    }
    // Nonce check
    if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['_wpnonce'], 'bible_supersearch_save' ) ) {
        wp_die('Invalid request');
    }

    $height = intval( $_POST['selector_height'] ); // force integer
    update_option( 'bss_selector_height', $height );
}

// When outputting:
$height = intval( get_option( 'bss_selector_height', 300 ) );
echo 'style="height:' . esc_attr( $height ) . 'px;"';
?>

Encourage plugin authors to adopt an input‑first validation policy: validate → sanitize → store → escape on output.

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Monitoring and longer‑term risk reduction

• Implement user account hygiene:
  • Limit the number of Contributor accounts and audit their activity regularly.
  • Use strong password policies and two‑factor authentication (2FA) for higher privileged accounts.
• Implement content moderation:
  • Add an editorial preview workflow that prevents Contributor-submitted content from being rendered publicly until approved by an Editor.
• Use virtual patching while patches are applied:
  • Virtual patching at the WAF level (as described above) helps block exploitation attempts quickly while you schedule updates and cleanup.
• Automate file and database integrity checks:
  • Monitor for unexpected file changes and scan the database for new HTML tags where they shouldn’t exist (e.g., in numeric values).
  • Set up alerts for added admin users or changed plugin/theme files.
• Logging and SIEM:
  • Forward WAF and server logs to a SIEM so you can pivot from blocked requests to investigation of related events.

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For incident responders: steps to investigate a compromise

1. Identify the scope:
   • Find all instances where selector_height or similar plugin fields are stored and check for injected HTML/JS.
   • Look for evidence of additional malicious changes (new admin users, altered theme/plugin files, scheduled tasks).
2. Quarantine and containment:
   • Temporarily deactivate affected plugin(s) or restrict access to the admin area.
   • Block suspicious attacker IPs at the firewall.
3. Clean and restore:
   • Remove stored XSS payloads from affected database entries (using the cleanup approach above).
   • Restore modified files from a known good backup or reinstall affected plugins/themes from official sources.
4. Credentials and sessions:
   • Force password resets for administrators and other high‑privilege accounts.
   • Revoke compromised API keys and regenerate secrets.
5. Rebuild trust:
   • After cleanup, monitor closely for reappearance of the payloads or other suspicious activity.
   • Consider rotating hosting control panel credentials and SSH keys if file modifications were present.

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Recommended WAF rule checklist (quick reference)

• Block request where parameter name selector_height contains < 또는 > 또는 script.
• If selector_height should be numeric, block if it contains ANY non-digit characters (except allowed units like px if used).
• Log all blocked events and alert administrators if a single source triggers multiple events.
• Temporarily block or rate limit anonymous users attempting to access plugin admin endpoints.
• Geo-block or throttle IPs with suspicious behavior if appropriate for your site.

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Developer checklist to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future

• Always validate field types server‑side, never rely only on client JS.
• Sanitize inputs on entry, escape on output.
• Use WordPress capabilities and nonces for any state‑changing endpoint.
• Prefer numeric conversions for values that represent numbers.
• Unit test and fuzz-test form fields and outputs for malicious payloads.
• Use Content Security Policy (CSP) headers to make exploitation harder in the browser.
• Offer plugin settings read-only to lower roles unless strictly necessary.

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Example response templates you can use internally

Sample message to editorial contributors if remediation is in progress:

We’re applying an urgent security update to a third‑party plugin that may affect some of your draft content. Please do not publish new posts or upload widgets until IT confirms the update is complete. If you notice any unusual behavior in your editor panel (popups, redirects), log out immediately and change your password.

Sample message to site administrators after cleanup:

The Bible SuperSearch plugin was updated to 6.1.0 to address a stored XSS vulnerability. We’ve scanned for and removed suspicious payloads and rotated administrative sessions. Please reset your password and enable two‑factor authentication if you haven’t already. We continue to monitor the site for anomalies.

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Final recommendations — fast priorities

1. Update Bible SuperSearch to 6.1.0 or later immediately.
2. If you cannot update now, deactivate the plugin or use the WP‑Firewall free plan to block exploit attempts.
3. Audit Contributor and other lower‑privileged accounts — remove or lock down unnecessary users.
4. Search and clean your database for stored payloads; inspect plugin settings, widget data, postmeta, and wp_options.
5. Harden your site with strict input validation, escaping on output, and strong access controls.
6. Maintain continuous monitoring with file integrity checks, WAF logs, and periodic malware scans.

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If you need help with the update, a WAF rule created specifically for this vulnerability, or a guided cleanup process, the WP‑Firewall team can assist — our free plan offers immediate managed protection while you handle the permanent fix. Visit https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/ 시작하려면 클릭하세요.

안전히 계세요,
The WP‑Firewall Security Team