Critical Local File Inclusion in Creta Testimonial//Published on 2025-11-17//CVE-2025-10686

WP-FIREWALL SECURITY TEAM

Creta Testimonial Showcase CVE-2025-10686

Plugin Name Creta Testimonial Showcase
Type of Vulnerability Local File Inclusion
CVE Number CVE-2025-10686
Urgency Low
CVE Publish Date 2025-11-17
Source URL CVE-2025-10686

CVE-2025-10686 — Creta Testimonial Showcase (< 1.2.4) Editor Local File Inclusion: What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now

Date: 2025-11-14
Author: WP-Firewall Security Team

TL;DR

A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability (CVE-2025-10686) was discovered in the Creta Testimonial Showcase WordPress plugin affecting versions earlier than 1.2.4. The issue allows an attacker with Editor-level privileges to include local files from the web server and render their contents via the plugin, which can lead to disclosure of secrets (for example wp-config.php, backup files or other sensitive files) and — in certain configurations — full database compromise.

If you run this plugin on your site, update immediately to version 1.2.4 or later. If you cannot update right away, follow the mitigation steps below: remove or deactivate the plugin, restrict Editor privileges, disable file editing, and apply virtual patches with a Web Application Firewall (WAF) until the plugin is updated.

This advisory explains the technical details, real-world impact, detection indicators, short-term mitigations and long-term defenses with practical guidance for WordPress administrators, developers and hosting providers.


Who should read this

  • Site owners running Creta Testimonial Showcase on any WordPress install
  • Administrators who manage Editor-level accounts (authors, content editors)
  • Hosting providers and managed WordPress services
  • Security teams responsible for vulnerability response and incident handling

Background and summary of the vulnerability

  • Identifier: CVE-2025-10686
  • Software: Creta Testimonial Showcase (WordPress plugin)
  • Affected versions: any release prior to 1.2.4
  • Vulnerability class: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
  • Required privilege: Editor
  • Reported by: security researcher (credit in public advisory)
  • Fix: plugin updated to version 1.2.4

Local File Inclusion occurs when an application accepts user-supplied input and uses it to construct a local filesystem path that is subsequently included, read, or executed by server-side code without proper validation or sanitization. In this case, a plugin endpoint accepts a parameter controllable by an Editor account that influences which file is loaded. Due to insufficient validation and normalization, a malicious Editor can traverse directories (e.g., using ../ sequences) or use other constructs to force the plugin to include files outside the intended directory.

When successfully exploited, the attacker can cause the webserver to read files containing sensitive configuration, credentials, or application logic and present them via the web response. In some environments, carefully crafted payloads and special file contents can lead to code execution, but the primary and immediate impact is unauthorized disclosure of local files.


Why this matters: impact, attack surface and risk explanation

  1. Sensitive Data Disclosure
    Files frequently stored on web servers include wp-config.php, .env files, backups, log files and private keys. Disclosure of wp-config.php alone can reveal database credentials and authentication salts — enabling full database access and user account compromises.
  2. Privilege requirement: Editor
    The attacker must control an Editor account on the target site. That makes the vulnerability less trivial to exploit than an unauthenticated bug, but Editor accounts are common on many sites (freelance editors, marketing teams, compromised accounts). Where Editor privileges are shared or easily obtained, the risk escalates.
  3. Potential for lateral escalation
    If an Editor account can be obtained through credential stuffing, weak passwords, or reused credentials, the attacker has a stepping stone to perform the LFI and then escalate (database compromise, persistence backdoors, or full site takeover).
  4. Automated exploitation potential
    Attackers frequently automate exploitation of known LFI bugs to scan and pull wp-config.php or other high-value files. Once an exploit script is public, exploitation can be rapid and broad.
  5. CVSS nuance
    The advisory lists a CVSS score of 7.2. CVSS attempts to quantify risk but doesn’t always capture the nuance of CMS privilege models. While the score highlights significant impact potential, actual exploitation feasibility depends on the presence of Editor accounts and the server configuration.

Technical analysis (what goes wrong)

  • The plugin exposes an endpoint or admin UI that uses an input parameter (for example, a filename or template selector).
  • The plugin fails to properly canonicalize and sanitize this input. It directly uses it to build a local path and include() or readfile() it, without checking:
    • If an absolute path is being supplied.
    • If path traversal sequences (../) are present.
    • If the requested file is within an allowed directory.
  • Because PHP file inclusion and reading functions (include, require, readfile, file_get_contents) will accept relative paths, the attacker can traverse out of the plugin directory and access protected files.
  • Example unsafe pattern (conceptual; not an exploit):
    $file = $_GET['template']; 
    include( plugin_dir_path(__FILE__) . 'templates/' . $file );

    If $file is "../wp-config.php", it results in include('/.../plugins/creta/templates/../wp-config.php') → resolves to '/.../wp-config.php'.

The patch in 1.2.4 addresses the issue by introducing strict validation: whitelisting template names, refusing traversal sequences, and ensuring any included path is inside the plugin’s allowed directory. The fixed code performs canonicalization (realpath) and comparisons to enforce boundaries.


Exploitation scenarios (what an attacker would attempt)

I won’t provide step-by-step exploit code, but here are realistic scenarios to help you prioritize and mitigate:

  • An attacker with Editor credentials navigates to the plugin’s template or preview endpoint and supplies traversal patterns to retrieve wp-config.php. They then extract DB credentials and access the database remotely (if accessible) or via other vectors.
  • A compromised Editor account controlled by an external user or attacker is used to exfiltrate backups stored under wp-content/uploads or plugin-specific backup directories.
  • Automated scanners identify the plugin version and attempt common traversal payloads to identify vulnerable sites at scale.

Detection indicators (what to look for in logs and monitoring)

Look for unusual or suspicious requests in your webserver and application logs:

  • Requests to plugin files that include common traversal patterns:
    • ../
    • %2e%2e%2f (encoded traversal)
    • /etc/passwd, wp-config.php, .env, database.sql or other filenames in query strings or POST bodies
  • Unexpected 200 responses when requesting paths that should not be public
  • Requests from authenticated Editor accounts to plugin endpoints that normal editors don’t use
  • Rapid sequential requests targeting many different local files (scanning behavior)
  • Base64-encoded response bodies returned to an Editor-level session — may indicate exfiltration attempts
  • Unusual spikes in requests from a single IP to the plugin path

Set up alerts for any request that includes path traversal characters plus references to sensitive files.


Immediate mitigation steps (what to do right now)

If you are responsible for a WordPress site with this plugin, do the following immediately:

  1. Update the plugin to version 1.2.4 or later
    The vendor has released a fix. This is the preferred resolution.
  2. If you cannot update immediately:
    • Deactivate the plugin until you can apply the update.
    • OR remove the plugin files from your server (FTP, SSH), which prevents the vulnerable code from being reachable.
  3. Restrict Editor accounts
    Audit all Editor-level users. Remove or downgrade any accounts that are not strictly necessary.
    Force password resets for Editors if there is any suspicion of compromise.
    Enforce strong passwords and enable two-factor authentication where possible.
  4. Disable file editing in WordPress
    Add this to wp-config.php:
    define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);
    This prevents access to theme and plugin editors in wp-admin and reduces the risk of code being injected by authenticated users.
  5. Tighten uploads and backup storage
    Move backups and sensitive files out of webroot or ensure they are inaccessible via HTTP.
    Use proper server permissions (owner: www-data, not writeable by webserver in user-writable places).
  6. Scan for signs of exploitation
    Run a full malware scan for suspicious files or webshells.
    Check recent changes to wp-config.php, .htaccess, and any PHP files in wp-content for unauthorized modifications.
    Check database for new admin users or suspicious entries.
  7. Application-layer mitigation: add WAF rules
    If you use a WAF, block requests that contain traversal sequences with references to sensitive filenames.
    See the WAF rule examples below.

WAF / virtual patching guidance

A properly configured WAF (virtual patch) can block exploit attempts until you apply the vendor fix. Below are conceptual rule patterns you can use. These are examples and should be adapted for your WAF product syntax (ModSecurity, Nginx, Cloud WAF, etc.).

Important: Do not rely on a single rule — combine checks for traversal patterns, sensitive filenames, and the plugin’s specific endpoints.

Example detection signatures (conceptual):

  • Block if a request to any plugin path contains path traversal plus a sensitive filename:

    Condition: URI contains '/plugins/creta-testimonial-showcase' AND (ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_URI contains '../' OR '%2e%2e%2f') AND (ARGS|ARGS_NAMES contains 'wp-config.php' OR '.env' OR 'wp-content' OR 'database' OR '/etc/passwd')
  • Block if a logged-in Editor account makes a request to plugin file with traversal sequence:

    Condition: Cookie / Authorization indicates logged-in user with Editor capability AND request contains '../' sequences to plugin path
  • Generic traversal detection:

    Rule: Block requests where REQUEST_URI or args contain \.\./ or %2e%2e% or \\..\\
  • Block file scheme:

    Rule: Block requests containing file://

Sample ModSecurity style rule (conceptual):
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_URI "(?:\.\./|%2e%2e%2f|%2e%2e/)" "id:100001,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Path traversal attempt blocked'"

Note: Ensure rules are not overly broad to avoid false positives. Monitor logs after enabling rules and refine patterns to target the plugin’s endpoints.


Hardening and long-term prevention

  1. Principle of least privilege
    Only grant Editor or Administrator roles to trusted users.
    Use role separation: content creation vs site maintenance.
  2. Restrict plugin and theme management
    Disable plugin/theme editors as above.
    Limit access to plugin update and activation to Administrators only.
  3. Isolate sensitive files
    Store backups outside webroot or in protected storage (S3 with restricted access).
    Use server-side access controls (deny from all for certain directories).
  4. Normalize and validate user input in plugins
    Plugin developers: always canonicalize (realpath) included files and check that the canonical path sits inside an allowed directory.
    Use whitelists (allowed template names) rather than blacklists.
    Avoid including files by user-controlled input whenever possible.
  5. Secure deployment and configuration
    PHP settings: disable allow_url_include and ensure open_basedir restrictions where appropriate.
    Limit file permissions and run processes with minimal privileges.
  6. Continuous vulnerability management
    Track plugin updates and security advisories.
    Apply security patches and test in staging before production rollout.
    Consider virtual patching via a trusted WAF vendor for zero-day windows.

Incident response checklist (if you suspect exploitation)

  1. Contain
    Take the site offline if you suspect active exfiltration or pivoting (put site in maintenance mode).
    Revoke Editor accounts or change their passwords.
    Deactivate the vulnerable plugin immediately.
  2. Collect evidence
    Preserve webserver logs, application logs, and database backups.
    Snapshot the filesystem for forensic analysis.
  3. Eradicate
    Remove any webshells or suspicious PHP files.
    Replace modified files with clean versions from backups or fresh plugin/theme packages.
  4. Recover
    Update the plugin to the patched version (1.2.4+).
    Restore from a known-good backup if necessary.
    Rotate all secrets: database credentials, API keys, salts.
  5. Review and harden
    Investigate entry vector and apply recommended hardening.
    Re-evaluate user roles and lock down Editor permissions.
    Enable 2FA and enforce stronger password policies.
  6. Report
    Inform affected stakeholders and, in cases where data was exfiltrated, follow any legal or contractual obligations for disclosure.

Detection patterns and sample SIEM queries

Below are conceptual queries to help you hunt for suspicious activity. Adapt these to your logging platform (ELK, Splunk, Datadog, etc.).

  • Search for traversal attempts:

    field:request_uri OR field:args contains "../" OR "%2e%2e%2f"
  • Look for Editor users accessing plugin endpoints:

    Join wp_users metadata and web logs where user role = 'editor' and request_path contains 'creta'
  • Find references to wp-config.php in logs:

    field:request_uri OR field:args contains "wp-config.php" OR ".env" OR "database.sql"
  • Identify unusual outgoing DB connections after suspected LFI:

    Monitor for new external IPs connecting to your DB server or unexpected DB queries.

How developers should fix this class of vulnerability

If you are a developer responsible for a plugin or theme:

  • Never include or require files directly with user-supplied input.
  • Use explicit whitelists for filenames or IDs (e.g., only allow a pre-defined set of template names).
  • Use realpath() and ensure that the resolved path begins with the expected directory:
    $base = realpath( plugin_dir_path(__FILE__) . 'templates' );
    $path = realpath( $base . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $candidate );
    if (strpos($path, $base) !== 0) { reject }
  • Sanitize and validate all user input, and use capability checks:

    Ensure only users with the minimum required capability can access sensitive endpoints.
  • Write unit and integration tests simulating traversal and path input to prevent regressions.

For hosting providers and managed WordPress services

  • Scan client sites for the plugin and notify customers if they’re running an affected version.
  • Temporarily apply server-level controls (WAF rules, deny access to plugin path) for customers who cannot immediately patch.
  • Offer support to reset Editor passwords and reconfigure credential policies.
  • Provide hardened PHP configurations and isolate customer files with appropriate chroot/open_basedir restrictions.

Final recommendations (prioritized)

  1. Update Creta Testimonial Showcase to 1.2.4 or later — do this first.
  2. If update cannot be applied immediately, deactivate or remove the plugin.
  3. Audit all Editor accounts and enforce stronger authentication and least privilege.
  4. Enable DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT in wp-config.php.
  5. Use a WAF to block path traversal and sensitive-file access patterns until the fix is deployed.
  6. Scan your site for indicators of compromise, and follow an incident response workflow if you find evidence of exploitation.

Example: What we block at the WAF layer (conceptual)

We focus on targeted and low-false-positive rules, for example:

  • Block any request to /wp-admin/* or /wp-content/plugins/creta-testimonial-showcase/* that contains ../ or encoded traversal patterns.
  • Block requests to plugin endpoints where arguments contain names of sensitive files.
  • Log and alert when Editor accounts make unusual requests to plugin paths.

These virtual patches give you breathing room to update and fully remediate.


About WP-Firewall’s protection options

At WP-Firewall we protect WordPress sites with multiple layers of defense designed to stop the kind of attacks exploited by this vulnerability:

  • Managed Web Application Firewall with custom rule sets that detect and block path traversal and local file inclusion attempts.
  • Malware scanner that inspects filesystem changes and finds injected webshells or exfiltration artifacts.
  • OWASP Top-10 mitigations pre-configured to catch common injection classes, including file inclusion and path traversal.
  • Virtual patching for emergency protection when a plugin or theme has a known vulnerability and customers cannot immediately update.

We recommend combining these protections with the plugin update and the hardening steps above.


New: Free protection to get you secure immediately

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Closing thoughts

Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities are dangerous because they allow an attacker to read files that contain the keys to your site — database credentials, API keys and other secrets. Although this specific bug requires Editor privileges, Editor accounts are a common and legitimate part of many WordPress sites, which increases real-world exploitability.

Your first line of defense is a timely plugin update. Your second is a defense-in-depth approach: least privilege, host-level hardening, continuous monitoring, and an application-level WAF that can virtually patch exploitation attempts while you remediate. If you need help assessing exposure, deploying virtual patches, or performing a forensic check after a suspected incident, reach out to your security team or a qualified WordPress security service.

Stay safe and prioritize updates. If you want hands-on support and immediate protection while you perform these steps, consider applying an emergency WAF policy and malware scan — it can buy you the time necessary to perform a safe upgrade and full audit.


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