插件名称	PagBank / PagSeguro Connect
漏洞类型	SQL注入
CVE 编号	CVE-2025-10142
急	低的
CVE 发布日期	2025-09-09
源网址	CVE-2025-10142

PagBank / PagSeguro Connect (<= 4.44.3) — Authenticated Shop Manager SQL Injection (CVE-2025-10142)

As WordPress security practitioners at WP‑Firewall, we follow disclosures closely so site owners and developers can act fast. A SQL Injection vulnerability affecting the PagBank / PagSeguro Connect plugin for WooCommerce (versions <= 4.44.3) was publicly documented and assigned CVE‑2025‑10142. The flaw requires an authenticated user with Shop Manager (or higher) privileges to exploit, but because Shop Manager roles are commonly given to store staff, the vulnerability still presents a high-impact risk for e‑commerce sites.

This post explains what the vulnerability means, how attackers could abuse it in practice, detection and mitigation steps you can implement immediately, developer fixes and secure coding guidance, incident response steps, and how WP‑Firewall helps protect sites while you patch.

TL;DR
– Affected plugin: PagBank / PagSeguro Connect for WooCommerce <= 4.44.3

– Vulnerability: Authenticated SQL Injection (requires Shop Manager+) — CVE‑2025‑10142

– Fixed in: 4.44.4 — update immediately where possible

– If you cannot update immediately: disable the plugin, restrict Shop Manager accounts, and apply virtual patching / WAF rules to block exploit traffic

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Why this matters (plain language)

SQL Injection (SQLi) is an injection flaw where an application constructs SQL queries using untrusted input. When successful, SQLi lets attackers read, modify or delete data from the site database. On WordPress sites that can mean exposure of user credentials, order records, payment metadata, and in some cases the ability to escalate to full site takeover if attacker-controlled input can be turned into destructive queries.

This particular issue is “authenticated” — an attacker already needs to be a Shop Manager (or have the same capabilities) to exploit it. That requirement reduces the immediate risk compared to a fully unauthenticated SQLi, but many stores give Shop Manager access to third-party staff, contractors, or plugins, and accounts are often targeted by credential stuffing and phishing. If an attacker has or can obtain a Shop Manager account, they can exploit this flaw to interact with your database in unintended ways.

CVSS for this issue is reported at 7.6, which reflects high impact when the preconditions (authenticated Shop Manager) are met. The practical impact depends on the plugin’s query context and the privileges of the compromised account on your site.

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The likely root cause (technical summary)

Based on the public advisory and typical patterns in plugin SQL injection bugs, this vulnerability stems from unsafe SQL query construction — user-supplied data being concatenated into SQL statements without proper parameterization or validation.

Common mistakes that lead to SQLi in WordPress plugins:

• Using raw string concatenation to build queries with $wpdb (e.g., “WHERE id = $id”) instead of $wpdb->prepare.
• Failing to validate or cast parameters (expecting an integer but accepting anything).
• Trusting admin-provided values from forms, AJAX actions or request parameters without sanitization.
• Missing capability checks or CSRF/nonces around admin AJAX endpoints (though this issue required Shop Manager privilege, so the capability check may have been present but insufficient sanitization remained).

The actionable result: an attacker with Shop Manager capabilities crafts a value placed into a query in such a way that malicious SQL tokens are executed by the database.

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How an attacker could abuse it (high-level, no exploit code)

• Acquire or compromise a Shop Manager account (credential theft, phishing, reused passwords).
• Log in to the WordPress admin or trigger a vulnerable plugin endpoint that accepts input (for example, a plugin settings page, AJAX action, or order-related function).
• Send a specially-crafted request value to the vulnerable parameter to alter the SQL query sent to MySQL, forcing the database to return data beyond the intended scope or to modify data.
• Extract sensitive data (user emails, hashed passwords, order/payment metadata) or manipulate orders/settings.
• Optionally use stolen data to escalate (use leaked email + password pairs to access other accounts, pivot to server access if credentials are reused, or create new admin accounts).

Because the exploit requires authentication, the attacker path often goes through account compromise rather than direct unauthenticated exploitation. But once a Shop Manager account is in attacker hands, the consequences can be severe.

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Immediate steps for site owners (0–24 hours)

If you manage WooCommerce stores, take these steps immediately.

1. Update the plugin
   – The vendor released version 4.44.4, which fixes the vulnerability. Updating to 4.44.4 (or later) is the primary fix. Perform the update during a low-traffic window and test checkout flows after updating.
2. If you cannot update immediately:
   – Deactivate the PagBank / PagSeguro Connect plugin until you can apply the patch. This removes the vulnerable code from execution.
   – If the plugin is critical for transactions and cannot be disabled, restrict access to the admin area and plugin endpoints as much as possible (IP restrictions, temporary downtime for admin users).
   – Remove or temporarily disable non-essential Shop Manager accounts.
3. Enforce password hygiene
   – Reset passwords for Shop Manager and Administrator accounts.
   – Force password reset for all users with high privileges or at least audit accounts.
4. Enable 2‑Factor Authentication (2FA)
   – Add 2FA for all accounts with elevated privileges to reduce the chance of account takeover.
5. Audit for suspicious activity
   – Check for new admin accounts, unexpected plugin settings changes, unusual database activity, or data exfiltration evidence (see indicators below).
6. Backups
   – Take a fresh full backup (files + database) for forensics and rollback if needed. Preserve copies offline.
7. Inform your team
   – Let any staff with elevated access know about the issue, update passwords, and temporarily suspend third‑party access until the plugin is patched.

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Detection: what to look for (indicators of compromise)

Search logs and the site for these signs:

• Unusual admin actions by Shop Manager accounts outside normal hours.
• New users with elevated roles or unexpected modifications to user roles.
• Error logs that contain SQL error messages mentioning SQL syntax, “You have an error in your SQL syntax”, or truncated query strings.
• Web server access logs showing admin POST requests containing SQL keywords like SELECT, UNION, OR 1=1 in parameters (these are red flags).
• Database rows with altered values (orders, product meta, settings).
• Suspicious outbound traffic (exfiltration to external hosts).
• Repeated failed login attempts followed by successful login from the same IP or user agent.

Useful commands to run (example):

• Grep access logs for suspicious patterns:
  grep -Ei "union|select|information_schema|sleep\(|or 1=1" /var/log/nginx/access.log
• Examine recent user registrations and role assignments using WP‑CLI:
  wp user list --role=shop_manager --format=csv
wp user get <username> --field=roles

Note: Be careful when scanning logs for SQL keywords to avoid false positives — many legitimate admin pages include these terms. Look for unusual context, repeated attempts, or requests with encoded payloads.

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Incident response: if you suspect compromise

1. Isolate the site
   – Temporarily take the site offline (maintenance mode) or restrict access to the admin to known IPs while investigating.
2. Preserve evidence
   – Export and store logs, DB snapshots, and relevant files. Do not overwrite logs; retain originals for forensic work.
3. Reset credentials and secrets
   – Rotate all admin and Shop Manager passwords.
   – Rotate API keys and payment gateway secrets that may have been stored in plugin settings.
   – Rotate any database credentials if you suspect server-level breach.
4. Scan for backdoors and malware
   – Use malware scanners and manual code review to search for added PHP files, obfuscated code, or cron jobs that persist after a cleanup.
5. If you find compromised data
   – Comply with privacy/regulatory requirements: notify affected users/customers and report per applicable laws.
6. Engage professional help
   – If you don’t have in-house expertise, use a trusted incident response professional familiar with WordPress and WooCommerce.

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Developer guidance: fixing the code (recommended secure patterns)

If you are a plugin or theme developer, use these secure coding practices to prevent SQL Injection:

1. Always use $wpdb->prepare when constructing SQL with user input
   Example (unsafe):

   $result = $wpdb->get_results("SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}pg_transactions WHERE id = $id");

   Secure version:

   $result = $wpdb->get_results( $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}pg_transactions WHERE id = %d", intval( $id ) ) );

2. Cast and validate input explicitly
   For integers: use intval() or absint(). For known enumerations, whitelist values.
   For strings: use sanitize_text_field() or esc_sql for safe escaping (but prefer parameterized queries).
3. Use capability checks and nonces for admin actions
   Verify the current user has the expected capability:

   if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_woocommerce' ) ) { wp_die( 'Unauthorized' ); }

   Verify nonces for state-changing actions:

   check_admin_referer( 'pg_connect_action' );

4. Avoid building SQL fragments with unchecked strings
   Don’t do:

   $sql .= " AND status = '".$_POST['status']."'";

   Instead whitelist:

   $allowed = array( 'new', 'processing', 'completed' );
   $status = in_array( $_POST['status'], $allowed, true ) ? $_POST['status'] : 'new';
   $sql = $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM ... WHERE status = %s", $status );

5. Limit database user privileges
   Run WordPress with a DB user that has only the privileges it needs (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE). Avoid granting SUPER or FILE privileges to the DB user.
6. Use prepared statements for all queries, including those in AJAX handlers and admin pages.
7. Perform code reviews and static analysis
   Regular peer review and automated code checks help catch unsafe patterns before release.

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Example: secure $wpdb usage patterns

Secure parameterized query for retrieving an order row by ID:

global $wpdb;
$order_id = isset( $_POST['order_id'] ) ? absint( $_POST['order_id'] ) : 0;

if ( $order_id <= 0 ) {
    wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid order ID', 400 );
}

$sql = $wpdb->prepare(
    "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}posts WHERE ID = %d AND post_type = %s",
    $order_id,
    'shop_order'
);

$order = $wpdb->get_row( $sql );

Secure AJAX admin handler skeleton:

add_action( 'wp_ajax_my_plugin_action', 'my_plugin_action_handler' );

function my_plugin_action_handler() {
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_woocommerce' ) ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Insufficient privileges', 403 );
    }

    check_admin_referer( 'my_plugin_nonce_action' );

    $param = isset( $_POST['param'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['param'] ) ) : '';

    // Whitelist expected values or validate length/format
    if ( strlen( $param ) > 255 ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid input', 400 );
    }

    // Use $wpdb->prepare for any DB interaction
    // ...
    wp_send_json_success( array( 'ok' => true ) );
}

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Virtual patching and WAF rules — examples you can apply immediately

If you cannot update immediately, a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or virtual patch can block typical exploit patterns. Virtual patching is a temporary, defensive measure that inspects incoming requests and blocks malicious payloads before they reach vulnerable code.

Below are non-exhaustive examples of rule concepts — tailor them to your environment to avoid false positives.

1. Block suspicious payloads to specific plugin endpoints
   – If you know the plugin exposes a particular admin-ajax action or admin page, create a rule blocking requests to that endpoint containing SQL keywords or suspicious syntax.
2. Generic SQLi regex (use with caution to reduce false positives)
   – Look for common SQLi tokens in parameters: union, select, information_schema, or boolean tautologies. Example regex to detect encoded or plain SQL keywords (case-insensitive, check both GET and POST payloads):
   (?i:(?:\bunion\b|\bselect\b|\binformation_schema\b|\bconcat\b|\bsleep\(|\bbenchmark\())
   – Place this behind targeted endpoint matching to avoid blocking normal application flows across your site.
3. A sample mod_security rule (conceptual)
   
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" "chain,deny,log,msg:'Blocking suspected SQLi to admin-ajax for PagBank',id:1234561"
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx (?i:(?:union|select|information_schema|concat|sleep\(|benchmark\())" "chain"
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@contains pagbank|pagseguro|pg_connect_action"

4. Block requests from suspicious IPs and rate-limit admin endpoints
   – Use rate limiting on admin POST endpoints and enforce login throttling.

重要： WAF rules can break legitimate behavior. Start with rules scoped to the plugin’s URLs or to authenticated Shop Manager requests, test thoroughly, and monitor logs.

WP‑Firewall provides managed WAF signatures and virtual patching that can be deployed to block exploit traffic with minimal tuning while you apply the official plugin update.

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Hardening and preventative recommendations

1. Least privilege principle
   – Only grant Shop Manager role to trusted personnel. Use granular roles or custom capabilities where appropriate.
2. Harden admin access
   – Limit admin dashboard access by IP (when possible), use an access gateway for admin routes, and enable 2FA for all privileged accounts.
3. Monitor logs, use alerts
   – Watch for anomalous admin actions, failed logins, and suspicious requests to plugin endpoints.
4. Keep plugins up to date
   – Subscribe to plugin security updates. Where feasible, enable auto-updates for non-critical plugins after validating compatibility.
5. Staging and testing
   – Test updates and patches on staging before production rollout.
6. Inventory and minimize plugins
   – Maintain an inventory of WooCommerce extensions and remove unused plugins.
7. Security code reviews
   – Perform periodic reviews of custom plugins and third-party extensions for unsafe database access patterns.

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If you are using paid integrations or third-party staff

• Revoke access credentials for third-party vendors who don’t need ongoing access.
• Rotate API keys and integration secrets after an incident.
• Evaluate whether third‑party staff should have lower-privilege accounts for routine tasks.

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Indicators you may have been exploited via this vulnerability

Look for:

• SQL error messages in site logs.
• Database rows extracted or modified (orders, customer data).
• Sudden increase of exported CSVs or admin exports.
• Evidence of data exfiltration: outbound connections or uploads.
• New or altered admin users, or posts/pages created by Shop Manager accounts without explanation.

If you find evidence of compromise, follow the incident response steps above and consider a full forensic engagement.

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Why patches and virtual patches both matter

• Official patch (plugin update) is the definitive fix because it corrects the underlying code. Always update as soon as you can.
• Virtual patching (WAF rules) protects sites in the interim when an immediate code update is not possible (business-critical plugin, compatibility issues, etc.). Virtual patches are not a substitute for updating — they are a pragmatic stopgap that reduces risk while you prepare a safe upgrade window.

WP‑Firewall offers both managed virtual patching and an easy upgrade path to keep stores protected with minimal operational disruption.

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经常问的问题

Q: Is this vulnerability exploitable remotely?
A: The flaw is authenticated and requires Shop Manager privileges on the WordPress site. It is not an unauthenticated remote SQLi. However, because Shop Manager accounts can be compromised via credential reuse, phishing or vulnerable 3rd-party integrations, the practical risk remains meaningful.

Q: Will an attacker be able to run arbitrary commands on my server via the SQLi?
A: SQLi primarily targets the database. In many WordPress environments, exposure of hashed passwords, API keys or stored credentials can escalate to higher impact outcomes. Arbitrary command execution on the server is less common from SQLi alone but becomes possible if the attacker can store a PHP backdoor in the database and trigger it later. Treat any confirmed SQLi as critical and investigate fully.

Q: I updated the plugin. Do I still need to scan?
A: Yes — updating prevents future exploitation via this specific bug, but you should still scan for signs that the vulnerability was exploited before the update and confirm no malicious files were left behind.

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Recommended checklists (actionable)

Immediate (within hours):

• Update PagBank / PagSeguro Connect to 4.44.4 or later.
• If you cannot update: deactivate the plugin or apply targeted WAF rules.
• Rotate passwords for Shop Manager and Administrator accounts.
• Enable 2FA for all privileged accounts.

Short-term (1–3 days):

• Audit user accounts and remove unnecessary Shop Manager roles.
• Run a full malware/indicator scan of files and the database.
• Take and store secure backups (separate from the main hosting environment).
• Apply rate limiting and access restrictions to admin endpoints.

Medium-term (1–4 weeks):

• Review plugin inventory and remove unused extensions.
• Enforce password policies and enable organization-wide 2FA.
• Schedule regular code reviews for custom plugins and extensions.
• Enroll in an automated protection service with virtual patching capabilities.

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Closing thoughts

SQL Injection vulnerabilities remain one of the most dangerous classes of flaws because they touch directly on data confidentiality and integrity. Even when a vulnerability requires authentication, the real-world risk can be high: accounts get compromised, privileged roles are granted to staff and vendors, and automated attacks probe for anything they can exploit.

If you manage WooCommerce stores, treat this PagBank / PagSeguro Connect issue as urgent: update to 4.44.4 immediately. If you need more time, use virtual patching and hardening measures described above to reduce exposure. And if you don’t yet have baseline protection in place, consider the WP‑Firewall Basic plan to get managed WAF and malware scanning in front of your site while you catch up on updates and audits.

Stay safe, keep plugins current, and apply the least privilege principle everywhere.

— The WP‑Firewall Team

References and further reading

• CVE: CVE‑2025‑10142 (public advisory)
• Vendor/fix: PagBank / PagSeguro Connect — update to 4.44.4
• Secure WordPress development: use $wpdb->prepare, capability checks and nonces, and whitelist inputs