插件名称	OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client)
漏洞类型	CSRF
CVE 编号	CVE-2025-10752
急	低的
CVE 发布日期	2025-09-25
源网址	CVE-2025-10752

Urgent: How the OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) Plugin CSRF (CVE-2025-10752) Affects Your WordPress Site — and What You Must Do Now

發表： 25 September 2025
嚴重程度： Low (CVSS 4.3)
易受攻擊的版本： <= 6.26.12
已修復： 6.26.13
CVE: CVE-2025-10752

We’re writing this as a practical guide from the WP-Firewall security team. If you run WordPress and use the OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) plugin, you need to understand what this Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) issue means for your site, how it could be abused, and exactly how to mitigate it — immediately.

Below we unpack the vulnerability, explain realistic attack scenarios, list detection signals, provide step‑by‑step remediation, and offer concrete WAF/virtual-patch rules you can apply if you cannot update right away.

Note: This post is written for site owners, administrators, and security-conscious developers. We keep the technical detail actionable and responsible — enough to secure your environment without handing attackers a ready-made exploit.

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Executive summary (short)

• The OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) plugin versions up to and including 6.26.12 are affected by a CSRF vulnerability (CVE-2025-10752).
• The vulnerability allows an attacker to trigger state-changing plugin actions by tricking a logged-in administrative user into visiting a malicious page.
• Asset owners should update immediately to version 6.26.13 or later.
• If you cannot update immediately, apply WAF/virtual-patch protections and follow an incident response checklist (instructions included).
• WP-Firewall customers can enable managed WAF rules and virtual patching to block exploit attempts automatically.

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What exactly is wrong? (technical overview)

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a broad class of vulnerabilities that occurs when a web application performs state-changing operations without sufficiently verifying that the request was intentionally issued by the authenticated user. In WordPress, such protections are normally implemented with nonces and same-origin checks.

In the reported OAuth SSO plugin vulnerability, certain plugin actions that modify settings or perform privileged changes do not validate expected CSRF protections (for example, missing or improperly validated nonces and/or referer/origin checks). This omission means that when an administrative user (or any user with the required privileges) is logged into the WordPress dashboard, an attacker can cause the user’s browser to submit crafted requests — via an attacker-controlled page — that invoke plugin behavior on the site while the user’s session cookie authenticates the request.

Key points:

• Exploitation requires a privileged user (typically an admin) to be authenticated and to visit or load content from the attacker-controlled site.
• The vulnerability is classified with a low CVSS score (4.3) because of the prerequisite that a privileged user must be tricked into visiting a malicious page and because the specific impact varies by configuration.
• Fixed in plugin release 6.26.13 (update recommended).

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Realistic attack scenarios

Understanding how attackers could exploit this will help you prioritize protections:

1. Administration change-out:
   An attacker crafts a hidden HTML form or a JavaScript request that targets the plugin’s settings action and sets malicious redirect URIs, alters OAuth client IDs/secrets, or disables security checks. When an admin loads the attacker page while authenticated, the request executes in the admin context and changes plugin configuration.
2. Account linking / unauthorized session creation:
   If the plugin accepts incoming OAuth callbacks or links external accounts, an attacker could manipulate parameters to link external identities to existing accounts or to modify behavior that indirectly weakens authentication flows.
3. Privilege escalation via secondary functionality:
   The plugin may provide endpoints that, when manipulated, create or elevate user capabilities. A CSRF request could, in specific setups, alter permissions or create new accounts with elevated privileges — particularly dangerous if the target site has weak role management.
4. Persistence changes and backdoor placement:
   An attacker could alter plugin settings to enable insecure logging, change endpoints, or provide attacker-controlled callbacks that may be later abused by other automated attacks.

Although exploitation requires an authenticated admin to visit a malicious page, real-world attacks use social engineering (phishing emails, malicious help desk tickets, or embedded content) to lure admins. Because WordPress sites are often managed by a small set of admins, even a single successful lure can be disastrous.

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How to check if you are vulnerable (quick checklist)

1. Identify plugin version:
   • Admin dashboard → Plugins → find “OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client)”.
   • If version is <= 6.26.12, you are vulnerable. Any site running 6.26.13 or later should have the fix.
2. Confirm exposure vectors:
   • Does the site run REST endpoints, admin-post.php actions, or admin-ajax calls from the plugin that alter configuration? These are common places where CSRF protections are needed.
   • Are there publicly reachable pages or forms that an unauthenticated user can POST to which perform state changes? If yes, risk is higher.
3. Search logs for suspicious POST/GET calls:
   • Look for requests targeting plugin paths or admin endpoints in the days before and after patch release.
   • Search for odd referers, unusual user agents, and requests arriving from unexpected IPs targeting plugin parameters.
4. Check user activity:
   • Review admin users’ recent activity and last login times. If an admin visited an unknown page, cross-check with site logs.

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Immediate remediation — what to do now (step-by-step)

Follow these prioritized steps. If you manage many sites, perform steps 1–3 immediately across all sites and schedule step 4 for the next maintenance window.

1. Update plugin (primary fix — do this now)
   In WordPress admin: Plugins → Update to OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) 6.26.13 or later.
   If you have staging, test update quickly and push to production. This is the definitive fix.
2. Apply virtual-patch / WAF rules if you cannot update immediately
   WP-Firewall customers: enable our virtual patching ruleset for “OAuth SSO CSRF” — we will block known exploitation patterns automatically.
   For manual WAFs, see the suggested rules below.
3. Force re-authentication and rotate keys if you suspect compromise
   Invalidate all active admin sessions and cookies: instruct admins to log out and log back in.
   Rotate any OAuth client secrets, tokens, or API keys used by the plugin and reconfigure authoritative OAuth clients if needed.
4. Audit for unauthorized changes (post-check)
   Review plugin settings and OAuth redirect URIs.
   Search for unexpected admin-level user accounts or modified user roles/capabilities.
   Check for newly injected code or suspicious files (e.g., files modified under wp-content/uploads or plugin directories).
5. Monitor and alert
   Add monitoring to alert when administrative settings are changed.
   Tighten logging — capture admin POST/GET payloads for a rolling window if possible.
6. Communicate and document
   Inform site stakeholders, especially those with admin rights, about the vulnerability and the need to avoid visiting unknown sites while logged in.
   Document what actions you took and when — useful for future audits.

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Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and detection tactics

• Unexpected changes to OAuth redirect URIs, client IDs, or client secrets in plugin settings.
• Unauthorized admin user additions or role changes.
• POST requests to plugin-related endpoints triggered by external referers (unknown domains) in server logs.
• Admin activity timestamps correlated with suspicious external requests.
• Presence of suspicious WP cron tasks added after the suspected timeframe.

Log sources to inspect:

• Web server access logs (nginx/apache) — look for POSTs to admin endpoints, especially admin-post.php and admin-ajax.php.
• WordPress audit logs (if you have an activity logging plugin).
• PHP error logs — sometimes plugin changes trigger new warnings.
• Hosting control panel logs for file changes.

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Suggested WAF / virtual-patching rules (examples you can adapt)

Below are example ModSecurity-style rule ideas and general WAF strategies that block typical CSRF exploitation without relying on plugin updates. These are not a guarantee but help reduce risk until you update.

Important: adapt these to your environment and test on staging. Overly broad rules can break legitimate functionality.

1. Block requests missing a valid WordPress admin referer/origin for state-changing endpoints:

   # Pseudocode ModSecurity rule
   SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" "chain,phase:2,deny,id:100001,log,msg:'Block suspicious POST without referer'
     SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx (wp-admin/admin-post.php|wp-admin/admin-ajax.php|/wp-json/.*oauth.*|/wp-content/plugins/.*oauth.*)""
     SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@gt 0" "chain"
     SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "!@rx ^https?://(yourdomain\.com|www\.yourdomain\.com)/" 
       

   This blocks POST requests to admin endpoints when the Referer header is absent or not from your domain. Note: some clients legitimately strip Referer — test carefully.

2. Enforce presence of WP nonces in relevant parameters (generic):

   # Block requests lacking a nonce parameter when hitting suspected plugin endpoints
   SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /wp-admin/admin-post.php.*(action=oauth|action=sso|plugin_action)" "phase:2,chain,deny,id:100002,log,msg:'Missing nonce on OAuth plugin action'"
     SecRule REQUEST_ARGS "!@contains _wpnonce"
       

3. Rate-limit suspicious requests that attempt to change settings:
   • Limit requests to plugin endpoints by IP and/or session.
   • If an IP sends multiple POSTs to admin endpoints targeting plugin parameters, block for an interval.
4. Block suspicious Content-Type or cross-site POSTs:
   • Block cross-site posts with content types typically used by exploit scripts (application/x-www-form-urlencoded is normal; validate POST sizes and patterns).
5. Signature rules for known exploit payloads:
   • If a reliable pattern from PoCs is available (parameters names, specific combinations), add a targeted rule to block those parameter combinations.

WP-Firewall can deploy such rules centrally (virtual patching), so if you’re managing multiple sites our managed rules remove the operational burden — and you won’t need to wait to update every site.

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Sample non-malicious CSRF illustration (safe, educational)

This is a generic, sanitized example to illustrate the CSRF pattern (not a PoC of the real plugin). It demonstrates how a malicious page might submit a form on behalf of an authenticated admin.

<!-- Educational-only example: attacker-controlled page sends a POST to the target site -->
<html>
  <body>
    <form id="csrfForm" method="POST" action="https://target-site.example/wp-admin/admin-post.php?action=update_oauth_settings">
      <input type="hidden" name="client_id" value="attacker-client-id">
      <input type="hidden" name="redirect_uri" value="https://attacker.example/cb">
    </form>
    <script>
      // If an admin is logged in to target-site.example and visits this page,
      // the browser will submit the form using the admin session cookie.
      document.getElementById('csrfForm').submit();
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

This code is purely demonstrative to show how browsers can be used to submit authenticated requests without the user’s intent. The fix is to require a nonce or CSRF token that is tied to the user session and validated server-side.

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Post-exploitation checks — what to inspect after a suspected incident

If you suspect a site was targeted and an admin visited a malicious page, follow this checklist:

1. Export and preserve logs immediately (access logs, audit logs).
2. Check plugin settings: OAuth redirect URIs, client IDs/secrets, and enabled providers.
3. Verify WordPress users:
   • Look for new admin or editor users.
   • Check suspicious changes to roles or capabilities.
4. Scan the file system:
   • Look for recently modified files under wp-content and plugin directories.
   • Check for PHP files in uploads or unexpected locations.
5. Verify active sessions:
   • Invalidate all admin sessions and force re-login for privileged users.
6. Rotate secrets:
   • Generate new OAuth client secrets and re-register with providers.
   • Rotate API keys connected to the WordPress instance.
7. Evaluate potential exfiltration:
   • Check for outgoing connections or scheduled tasks created by an attacker.

If you find evidence of abuse beyond configuration changes — code injection, web shells, or persistent backdoors — treat it as a full compromise and initiate incident response with file integrity scans and professional help.

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Long-term hardening recommendations

• Principle of least privilege: Ensure admin accounts are limited and only used for administration. Use separate accounts for day-to-day content editing.
• Reduce attack surface: Remove or disable plugins you don’t actively use. Fewer plugins = fewer vulnerabilities.
• Enforce strong authentication: Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) for admin accounts and any privileged users.
• Keep everything updated: WordPress core, themes, and plugins should be updated regularly or automatically where safe to do so.
• Use activity logging and alerts: Track admin actions and set alerts for setting changes, new admin accounts, or credential rotations.
• Isolate environments: Use staging for plugin updates and test before pushing to production.
• Use a managed WAF: A properly configured Web Application Firewall will block common exploit patterns and can provide virtual-patching for new issues.

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How WP-Firewall protects your site (what we do differently)

As the WP-Firewall team, our approach focuses on fast, managed, and practical protection for WordPress sites:

• Managed WAF rules: We maintain a curated ruleset for WordPress-specific threats and quickly create targeted rules when new vulnerabilities are disclosed. Virtual patching allows us to block exploit attempts even before you can update every site.
• Malware scanning: Continuous scanning for suspicious files, newly modified PHP, and indicators of compromise.
• Low false-positive posture: Our rules are tuned to minimize disruption to legitimate site operations.
• Minimal latency: Our firewall runs with negligible performance impact while protecting admin interfaces and REST endpoints that attackers target.

If you operate multiple sites, these protections reduce operational overhead and allow you to defer non-urgent updates to scheduled windows while staying protected.

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Practical timeline of actions (recommended tempo)

• Within 30 minutes:
  • Check plugin version across sites. Update any site that can be updated immediately.
  • If you can’t update, enable WAF protections or virtual patching.
• Within 2 hours:
  • Force logout for privileged users and advise admins to avoid logging in from untrusted networks.
  • Rotate OAuth client secrets if you suspect configuration changes.
• Within 24 hours:
  • Complete updates across all sites; perform a full scan and configuration audit.
  • Implement monitoring rules to detect future changes to OAuth settings.
• Ongoing:
  • Keep logs for at least 90 days when feasible.
  • Review permissions and accounts monthly.

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Final notes from WP-Firewall security team

CVE-2025-10752 is a reminder that CSRF remains a practical and effective technique for attackers when developers forget to validate intent on state-changing requests. The good news is this vulnerability has an available fix (update to 6.26.13). The best defense is a combination of timely patching, minimizing privileged user exposure, and enabling proactive WAF/virtual-patching protections.

If you need help triaging, we can assist with rapid deployment of rules or an incident triage checklist tailored to your environment. Our free plan provides immediate baseline protections and is a fast, no-cost step to reduce risk while you patch.

Stay safe, and if you need help implementing the steps above, our team is ready to assist.

— WP-Firewall Security Team

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Resources & references

• CVE: CVE-2025-10752 (vulnerability ID for tracking)
• OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) plugin — check plugin changelog for version 6.26.13
• WordPress developer handbook: Nonces and CSRF protection (for plugin authors)
• Server logs, WP audit logs, and file integrity monitoring — follow standard incident response procedures

(If you want an exportable checklist or a pre-configured WAF ruleset for rapid deployment, contact our support team via the WP-Firewall dashboard.)