Tên plugin	Dynamic AJAX Product Filters for WooCommerce
Type of Vulnerability	Stored Cross Site Scripting
CVE Number	CVE-2025-8073
Tính cấp bách	Thấp
CVE Publish Date	2025-08-28
Source URL	CVE-2025-8073

Dynamic AJAX Product Filters for WooCommerce (≤1.3.7) — Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS (CVE-2025-8073): What Site Owners and Developers Must Know

Đã xuất bản: 28 August 2025
Các phiên bản bị ảnh hưởng: ≤ 1.3.7
Đã sửa trong: 1.3.8
CVE: CVE-2025-8073
Reported by: Peter Thaleikis

This post is written from the perspective of WP-Firewall’s WordPress security team. I’ll walk you through what this stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability is, how it can be abused, why it matters even if the attacker only needs a Contributor-level account, and—most importantly—how you can protect your WooCommerce store and WordPress installation. I’ll include actionable developer remediation, detection steps, response procedures, and guidance on using a managed firewall plus virtual-patching approaches to protect sites until you can apply the vendor patch.

Note: The fastest and safest fix is to update the plugin to version 1.3.8 (or later). If you cannot update immediately, I outline mitigation and remediation steps below.

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Executive summary (quick facts)

• Vulnerability type: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via the name tham số.
• Privilege required: Contributor (authenticated).
• Impact: Stored payloads persist in the site data and execute in the browser of any user who views the affected admin or public page — this can lead to account takeover, privilege escalation, cookie theft, unauthorized changes, content injection, and supply-chain abuse via modified storefront content.
• CVE: CVE-2025-8073
• Fix available: Update the plugin to 1.3.8.
• Immediate mitigation: Disable the plugin or restrict Contributor access to the plugin UI; deploy WAF rule(s) that block malicious input patterns; sanitize or remove suspect stored data.

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What happened (technical overview)

The Dynamic AJAX Product Filters for WooCommerce plugin exposed a stored XSS vulnerability in a parameter named name. An authenticated user with Contributor-level privileges can submit crafted input through the plugin’s UI or AJAX endpoints. Because the plugin stored that input without sufficient sanitization and later rendered it on pages (frontend or backend) without proper escaping, the malicious script is stored in the database and executed in the browsers of administrators, editors, or visitors who view the affected pages. That makes it a stored XSS — one of the more dangerous XSS flavors because the payload persists.

Why Contributor matters: Contributor accounts are often used for content editors and can submit inputs in the admin. A Contributor with malicious intent or a compromised Contributor account can inject the payload. Many sites have broader access for Contributors than intended (for example, in multisite setups or when custom roles/capabilities have been modified), increasing exposure.

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Attack flow (high level — defensive focus)

1. Attacker obtains a Contributor account on a target site (compromised credentials, social engineering, or a lax registration process).
2. Attacker locates the plugin UI or AJAX endpoint that accepts a name parameter (often used for naming filters, labels, or saved configurations).
3. Attacker submits crafted input that includes HTML/JavaScript or event handlers.
4. Plugin code stores the injected value in the database without stripping or validating dangerous markup.
5. The plugin later outputs the stored value into HTML without escaping (e.g., echoing directly into a page, or rendering it inside attributes).
6. When an administrator, editor, or a visitor views the page where the stored value is rendered, the browser executes the malicious script in the context of the site (same-origin).
7. Consequences can include stolen session cookies, forged admin actions via CSRF-like behavior, redirection to phishing pages, or escalation to a full site compromise.

I will not provide exploit code or payloads here. The purpose of this blog is to help you understand the vulnerability and remediate it safely.

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Why stored XSS is serious even if the CVSS shows a moderate score

Stored XSS can be used to:

• Hijack admin sessions (steal cookies or authentication tokens).
• Create, edit, or delete content or product listings.
• Add an admin user via AJAX calls if admin commands are executed from an admin context.
• Install backdoors or additional malware in themes, plugins, or the filesystem.
• Conduct targeted phishing attacks using the website’s domain.
• Move laterally inside a hosting account (if the session token grants additional privileges).

A vulnerability that requires only Contributor access means a low-cost entry barrier for an attacker: many sites allow comments, user registration, or have users with that role. Therefore even if direct exploitation depends on a specific role, the real-world risk is material.

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Immediate actions for site owners (step-by-step)

1. Update plugin (recommended)
   • Update Dynamic AJAX Product Filters for WooCommerce to version 1.3.8 or later immediately.
   • After update, verify the plugin changelog and test filter functionality on a staging site before rolling to production.
2. If you cannot update now
   • Temporarily disable the plugin until you can patch.
   • Restrict Contributor-level users from accessing plugin UI pages: restrict access via capability checks, or temporarily downgrade Contributor privileges.
   • Implement a WAF rule to block or sanitize suspicious requests to the plugin endpoint (details below).
   • Force re-authentication for all admin-level users (rotate passwords).
3. Check for evidence of exploitation
   • Search the database for unescaped script tags in plugin-related tables or common stores (options, postmeta, termmeta).
   • Check access logs and admin action logs for unexpected actions around the plugin endpoints.
   • Review users with Contributor and higher roles and look for unknown accounts.
4. Recover and harden
   • If any signs of compromise are found, restore from a clean backup made prior to the exploit, rotate credentials, and re-scan for persistence.
   • Enable multi-factor authentication for all users with elevated privileges.
   • Harden user registration and role assignment workflows.

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Detection: how to look for signs of stored XSS injection

Search for script or event handler markers in the database — example defensive queries (adjust table prefixes if not wp_):

Using WP-CLI to search for script markers in common storage locations:

wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';"
wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"
wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_options WHERE option_value LIKE '%<script%';"

Search term/termmeta or plugin-specific tables that may store filter names:

wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_termmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"
wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_terms WHERE name LIKE '%<script%';"

– If you have a large site, search for onerror=, onload=, javascript: in stored values as these often indicate active vector use.

– Review access logs for POST requests to admin-ajax.php or to plugin-specific endpoints from suspicious IPs or patterns.

– Check page output in browsers using “View Source” or developer tools for unexpected inline scripts or DOM modifications.

– Review recently created or modified items by Contributor accounts (posts, filters, saved items).

Important: False positives happen; scripts can be present legitimately in some contexts. Focus on plugin-owned fields, filter names, or areas where HTML is not expected.

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Developer remediation — best practices and example hardening code

Two guiding rules:

• Sanitize input before storing if you don’t want HTML stored.
• Escape output always when rendering data in HTML context.

If a field is intended to be plain text (names, labels, slugs), strip all HTML on input and store sanitized text. If the field is intended to accept limited HTML, use a whitelist via wp_kses and then escape appropriately for the rendering context.

Defensive PHP examples:

– Strict sanitize on save (plain text):

if ( isset( $_POST['name'] ) ) {
    // Strip tags and sanitize as text before saving
    $name = sanitize_text_field( wp_strip_all_tags( wp_unslash( $_POST['name'] ) ) );
    // Save $name to the DB using update_option / update_post_meta etc.
}

– If limited HTML is required (whitelist):

$allowed_tags = array(
    'a' => array( 'href' => array(), 'title' => array(), 'rel' => array() ),
    'strong' => array(),
    'em' => array(),
    'span' => array( 'class' => array() ),
);

if ( isset( $_POST['name'] ) ) {
    $name_raw = wp_unslash( $_POST['name'] );
    $name = wp_kses( $name_raw, $allowed_tags );
    // Save $name safely
}

– When outputting in HTML, always escape for the context:

// For HTML element content
echo esc_html( $name );

// For HTML attribute (e.g., value="")
echo esc_attr( $name );

// If intentionally allowing HTML (and sanitized with wp_kses above), output safely
echo $name; // Only if $name was processed with wp_kses and you are sure it is safe

– Capability and nonce checks for AJAX endpoints:

add_action( 'wp_ajax_my_plugin_save_filter', 'my_plugin_save_filter' );
function my_plugin_save_filter() {
    // Check capability — Contributor may need to be disallowed
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_posts' ) ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Insufficient privileges' );
    }

    // Check nonce
    if ( ! isset( $_POST['nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['nonce'], 'my_plugin_nonce' ) ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid nonce' );
    }

    // Sanitize input and save (use sanitize_text_field or wp_kses as described)
}

If the plugin exposes Contributor-editable UI for naming configuration objects, consider raising the capability required (e.g., to Editor or custom capability) for creating or editing plugin configuration, or add an admin approval step.

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WAF / virtual patching guidance (temporary protection)

If you cannot update immediately, a web application firewall can provide a virtual patch. Below are defensive rule concepts—not precise exploit patterns—intended for use by administrators who can deploy WAF rules in a testable environment.

1. Block or sanitize incoming requests to the plugin’s AJAX endpoints that include script tags or suspicious event handlers in the name tham số:
   • Block requests where name contains <script, </script>, javascript:, onerror=, onload=, tài liệu.cookie, hoặc innerHTML.
   • Implement rate limits on POST requests to the plugin endpoints to reduce brute-force abuse.
2. Example (conceptual) WAF match conditions:
   • If POST to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php với action=dynamic_filter_save (or plugin action name) AND name parameter matches regex (script|onerror|onload|javascript:|document\.cookie) then block or sanitize.
   • If POST to plugin-specific URL AND name contains < hoặc > characters, return error or strip tags.
3. Monitor and alert on blocked attempts to the plugin endpoints. Log the raw request, IP, user agent, and user account.
4. Virtual patch caveat: WAF mitigations reduce risk but do not replace patching. Ensure rules are tested to avoid blocking legitimate traffic.

If you run WP-Firewall managed protections, our WAF and virtual-patching engine can automatically detect this vulnerability pattern and apply a tight rule that targets the plugin endpoint and suspicious payload markers for name. If you self-manage WAF rules, test in logging mode first.

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How to search the site for stored payloads and clean them

1. Create backups first (database and files).
2. Search for suspicious strings (script tags and event handlers) in DB tables:
   • Posts and postmeta: wp_posts.post_content, wp_postmeta.meta_value
   • Terms and termmeta: wp_terms.name, wp_termmeta.meta_value
   • Options: wp_options.option_value
   • Plugin tables: check plugin-specific tables that may store filter names, e.g., wp_pluginprefix_filters (plugin table names vary).
3. Defensive WP-CLI example to list matches:

   # Search postmeta
   wp db query "SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"
   
   # Search wp_terms
   wp db query "SELECT term_id, name FROM wp_terms WHERE name LIKE '%<script%';"
   
   # Search wp_options
   wp db query "SELECT option_name FROM wp_options WHERE option_value LIKE '%<script%';"
   

4. Remove or sanitize matches:
   • If the field should be plain text, remove tags with wp_strip_all_tags() and update the entry.
   • For large sites, you may script cleanup using WP-CLI or a safe PHP script executed with WP-CLI.
5. Re-scan file system for modified files (look for new files, changed timestamps) and scan for webshells.
6. Rotate credentials for accounts with elevated permission and any service accounts (API keys).
7. If you find evidence of an active compromise (files dropped or backdoors), consider a clean restore from pre-exploitation backup and perform a thorough incident response.

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Incident response checklist (if you suspect exploitation)

• Isolate the site:
  • Put site under maintenance mode or take it temporarily offline if compromise is severe.
• Preserve evidence:
  • Collect logs (web server, access, error), database snapshots, and plugin logs for analysis.
• Restore:
  • Restore from a known-good backup (before the earliest malicious activity).
• Rebuild credentials:
  • Reset passwords for all admins, editors, and other privileged accounts.
  • Rotate API keys and OAuth tokens.
• Reassess user roles:
  • Review Contributor accounts and remove stale/unused accounts.
  • Require account verification for newly created Contributor users.
• Patch:
  • Update the plugin to 1.3.8 or later.
• Harden:
  • Enable 2FA for all elevated accounts.
  • Enforce stronger password policies.
  • Limit or review plugin access capabilities.
• Post-incident:
  • Confirm that backdoors are removed and that the site is clean.
  • Consider a third-party security audit if the compromise is deep.
  • Communicate with stakeholders and customers if data or storefront integrity was affected.

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Long-term security recommendations

• Keep everything updated: WordPress core, themes, and plugins. Subscribe to vendor release notes.
• Principle of least privilege: Minimize the number of users with editing or contributor capabilities. Use granular role management or custom capabilities for plugin-specific actions.
• Test patches in staging: Deploy updates in a staging environment and test before production rollout.
• Use a managed firewall and virtual patching: These provide protection between discovery and patch availability.
• Continuous monitoring:
  • File integrity monitoring (detect unexpected file changes).
  • Log shipping and SIEM (centralized logs and alerting).
  • Behavior-based detection (unexpected admin actions).
• Implement Content Security Policy (CSP): CSP can limit the damage from XSS by restricting script execution sources. It’s not a replacement for sanitization/escaping, but it raises the bar.
• Regular security scans: Schedule scans for malware and known vulnerability signatures. Maintain an up-to-date threat intelligence feed.

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Developer checklist to prevent similar issues

• Sanitize on input; escape on output.
• Use capability checks and nonces for all AJAX endpoints.
• Don’t store raw HTML in fields that should be plain text.
• Where HTML is allowed, use a strict whitelist (wp_kses) and encode attributes.
• Avoid using tiếng vọng on raw user-supplied data.
• Automate security tests: unit tests and integration tests for plugin inputs and outputs.
• Employ code reviews and security-focused static analysis during development.

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Example remediation PR notes for plugin maintainers

If you are a plugin developer preparing a fix, document in your PR:

• Which endpoints were affected and why (describe the name parameter and storage points).
• The exact sanitization and escaping functions you added (sanitize_text_field, wp_strip_all_tags, hoặc wp_kses).
• Any changes to capability requirements (e.g., raising the required capability for creating filters).
• Added nonces and capability checks on AJAX handlers.
• Tests added to ensure malicious inputs are neutralized and no regression occurs.
• Notes about backward compatibility, data migration (if cleaning DB entries), and upgrade path for existing installations.

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How WP-Firewall helps protect your site

As the team behind WP-Firewall, our security approach focuses on prevention, detection, and rapid mitigation:

• Managed WAF with near-real-time signature updates that can apply virtual patches to zero-day and disclosed vulnerabilities.
• Malware scanning and cleanup options (automatic or manual).
• OWASP Top 10 mitigations built into our rule sets.
• Automated monitoring for suspicious admin activity and plugin endpoints.
• Support for custom blocking rules and staged rollouts for testing before enforcement.

If you run our free protection, you get the essential managed firewall and malware scanning; see details and upgrade options below.

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(Free plan highlights: Essential protection — managed firewall, unlimited bandwidth, WAF, malware scanner, OWASP Top 10 mitigations.)

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Frequently asked questions

Q: Should I rely on a WAF instead of updating the plugin?
A: No. A WAF provides important temporary protection and can block exploit attempts, but the only true fix is to update to the patched plugin version (1.3.8 or later) or remove the vulnerable plugin.

Q: Does Contributor really matter? Aren’t Contributors low-privilege?
A: While Contributor is a lower role than Editor/Admin, Contributor users can still interact with admin interfaces in many setups. Moreover, compromised Contributor accounts are a common entry point for persistent attacks. Treat any authenticated account with scrutiny and apply least privilege.

Q: How can I verify the plugin is safe after update?
A: Update to 1.3.8, then scan your database for leftover malicious content, audit recently created/modified items, verify file integrity, and check access logs for anomalies.

Q: What if my site is compromised and I don’t have a clean backup?
A: Engage a professional incident response service or your hosting provider’s security team. They can help identify persistence mechanisms, remove backdoors, and harden your site to prevent recurrence.

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Closing thoughts

This vulnerability is a reminder that stored XSS remains one of the most frequently seen issues in plugin ecosystems. The good news is the plugin author released a fix in version 1.3.8. The bad news is that stored XSS can be very impactful, especially when inputs rendered to admin pages are affected. If you manage a WooCommerce store, prioritize patching, scan for signs of injection, and, where possible, enforce a security stack that includes managed firewall protection and rapid virtual patching while you apply updates.

If you need help rolling out the patch safely, cleaning up stored payloads, or implementing virtual patches to reduce risk during the update window, WP-Firewall’s free Basic plan gives you the core protection you need to reduce exposure while you take the remedial steps above. Sign up here: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

Stay safe. If you’d like, we can walk through your specific site configuration and provide tailored remediation steps — open a support request and we’ll help you prioritize steps based on your risk profile.