Authenticated Contributors Can Exploit OSM Map XSS//Published on 2025-08-28//CVE-2025-8619

Tên plugin	OSM Map Widget for Elementor
Type of Vulnerability	Tấn công xuyên trang web (XSS)
CVE Number	CVE-2025-8619
Tính cấp bách	Thấp
CVE Publish Date	2025-08-28
Source URL	CVE-2025-8619

TL;DR — Quick summary

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability (CVE-2025-8619) was disclosed for the “OSM Map Widget for Elementor” plugin, affecting versions ≤ 1.3.0. An attacker with Contributor-level access (or higher) can persist malicious script payloads via the plugin’s “button URL” field. The malicious content is stored and later rendered in the page output, allowing script execution in the context of visitors, editors, or admins who view the affected page. There is no official patch available at the time of disclosure.

If you run the plugin and have Contributor or higher users on your site, treat this as a high-priority risk for data leakage, session theft, unauthorized redirects, or further escalation. This post explains technical details, detection methods, short-term mitigations, long-term fixes, and recommended coding safeguards — from the perspective of an experienced WordPress security team.

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Why this matters

• Stored XSS is dangerous because the attacker injects content that persists on the site (in the database or widget settings) and executes every time an affected page or admin screen is rendered.
• Contributor-level access is common on busy WordPress sites (guest authors, content teams, community contributors). If contributors can inject scripts, they don’t need to escalate to higher roles to cause site-wide damage.
• The vulnerability allows actions ranging from defacement and advertising injections to stealthy session theft, CSRF against privileged users, or pivoting into server-side compromise.
• There is currently no official plugin update available to remediate the issue, so owners must take immediate mitigation steps.

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Vulnerability summary (technical)

• Affected plugin: OSM Map Widget for Elementor (versions ≤ 1.3.0).
• Type: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
• Required privilege: Contributor (authenticated user) or higher.
• CVE: CVE-2025-8619
• CVSS: 6.5 (as reported)
• Root cause: Insufficient input sanitization/validation on the “button URL” field in a widget setting or map marker configuration. The plugin stores the raw value and outputs it into HTML attributes without proper scheme validation or encoding, allowing a crafted URL that includes JavaScript or HTML to execute in a user’s browser when the widget is rendered.
• Official patch: Not yet available at disclosure time.

Note: The exact saving and rendering code path varies by plugin implementation, but the core issue is the failure to treat the button URL as untrusted user input: it was allowed to contain malicious payloads and later output to pages without required escaping and validation.

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Realistic attack scenarios

1. Malicious contributor injecting a payload
   An authenticated user with Contributor permissions logs in, creates or edits a piece of content (or a widget instance) and sets the widget’s button URL to a crafted string (for example a javascript: payload or intentionally malformed HTML containing event handlers).
   The plugin stores that value. When an editor or admin views the page (or the frontend visitor clicks/views the widget), the malicious script executes in their browser.
   The attacker can (depending on payload) grab the session cookie, send stolen tokens to their server, perform CSRF requests with the privileged user’s session, or display malicious content.
2. Targeting admins via preview or editor screens
   Many privileged users preview pages in the admin area or open Elementor editor panels where widgets get rendered. If the stored payload executes in the WP Admin context, it may have greater impact (access to admin-only endpoints, media upload screens, plugin editors).
3. Chain with social engineering
   The attacker first uses the XSS to inject a social-engineering prompt or a hidden form that creates an administrative account, then uses that account to perform further malicious actions.
4. SEO/hosting repercussions
   Injected redirects or spam content can lead to SEO penalties and hosting abuse complaints.

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How to detect whether you’re affected

You should check both for plugin version and whether your database contains suspicious entries in places where this plugin stores widget settings (commonly postmeta, options, or custom tables). If you run the plugin and cannot immediately update to a safe version (none available), you need to detect malicious payloads.

Search for suspicious strings and common XSS indicators:

• Tìm kiếm javascript:, data:, <script, onerror=, onload=, onclick=, hoặc đánh giá( in the plugin storage areas.
• Search for occurrences in postmeta where the meta_key relates to OSM/Map/Elementor widget settings.

Example SQL queries to find suspicious values (run in a safe, read-only manner):

Search postmeta:

SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value
FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%osm%' -- adjust keyword
  AND (meta_value LIKE '%<script%' OR meta_value LIKE '%javascript:%' OR meta_value LIKE '%onerror=%' OR meta_value LIKE '%onclick=%')
LIMIT 100;

Search options:

SELECT option_name, option_value
FROM wp_options
WHERE option_value LIKE '%javascript:%'
   OR option_value LIKE '%<script%'
   OR option_value LIKE '%onerror=%'
LIMIT 100;

More targeted search for the plugin:

SELECT post_id, meta_key
FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%osm_map%' OR meta_value LIKE '%osm_map_widget%'

If you find suspicious entries, treat them as indicators of compromise and follow the incident response steps below.

Also monitor your web logs for suspicious outbound connections or POSTs triggered by user-agents you don’t recognize.

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Immediate mitigations (what to do now, step-by-step)

Follow this checklist immediately if you use the plugin and have Contributor+ users:

1. Restrict contributor access temporarily
   Limit Contributor accounts from editing the plugin widget or from using the page builder until the site is secured.
   Use role managers to remove editing capabilities or set contributors to a “Draft-only” workflow.
2. Disable the plugin (if feasible)
   If the plugin is not essential, deactivate it immediately to remove the attack surface.
   If deactivation breaks site functionality and you must keep it active, take alternative mitigations (WAF rules, sanitize on save).
3. Harden user accounts
   Force password resets for users who may have published content as contributors recently.
   Enforce two-factor authentication for admin/editor users.
4. Scan and clean stored data
   Use the SQL queries above to find and manually inspect suspicious widget settings.
   Remove or sanitize any suspicious meta values. Prefer manual removal if you’re not sure about automated replace tools.
5. Block in-bound malicious patterns at the edge (WAF)
   If you use a web application firewall (server, reverse proxy, or application-level firewall), create rules to block requests that contain:
     – javascript: scheme in URL fields
     – <script> tags or event handler attributes in POST payloads
     – suspicious encoding patterns (encoded <script> hoặc onerror=)

   Example pseudo-rule patterns:
     – Block request bodies with regex: (?i)<\s*script\b|javascript:|data:.*text/html|on\w+\s*=
     – Reject requests with button_url parameter containing javascript:.

6. Monitor admin preview and edit screens
   Restrict who is allowed to preview or edit pages that include the plugin’s widgets.
   Monitor logs for JavaScript-originated requests from admin pages.
7. Backups and snapshots
   Take a full site backup (files + DB) for forensic analysis before performing destructive cleanup.
   Snapshot server for later review.
8. Notify your team and hosting provider
   Inform hosting provider if you suspect broader compromise.
   If you’re a site on a hosted platform, they may have additional tooling to scan and isolate the issue.

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Virtual patching and WAF strategies (detailed)

When an official vendor patch is not available, the next-best option is virtual patching: block the malicious payloads at the web application perimeter.

WAF rules you can deploy quickly (adjust to your WAF syntax):

1. Block javascript: scheme in input fields
   Condition: Request parameter contains javascript: (case-insensitive).
   Action: Block or sanitize the request.
2. Block inline script tags in POST bodies
   Condition: Request body contains <script hoặc </script>.
   Action: Block.
3. Block event handler attributes in input fields
   Condition: onload=|onerror=|onclick=|onmouseover=|onfocus= present in request data.
   Action: Block.
4. Restrict allowed URL schemes for button fields
   Condition: For parameters named button_url, allow only http Và https. If not matching, block.
5. Rate-limit or require authentication for requests that create or update widgets
   Condition: POST to Elementor/widget endpoints from accounts lacking editor/editorial capabilities should be restricted.
   Action: Block or require additional verification.

Notes:

• These rules should be carefully tested in a staging environment to avoid false positives.
• Avoid overbroad rules that block legitimate content (e.g., encoded HTML inside some legitimate fields). Start in “log” mode to monitor hits, then move to block.

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Code-level mitigations you can implement immediately

If you can run a small code snippet on your site (via a mu-plugin or site-specific plugin) you can sanitize plugin input on save or sanitize output on render. The goal is to normalize and validate URLs and to encode output.

Important: these are stop-gap measures until a vendor update is released. Use them with care and test.

Sanitize on save: enforce allowed URL schemes and remove anything suspicious:

<?php
// mu-plugin: wp-firewall-osm-map-sanitize.php
add_filter( 'update_postmeta', 'wpfw_osm_sanitize_button_url', 10, 4 );

function wpfw_osm_sanitize_button_url( $check, $object_id, $meta_key, $meta_value ) {
    // Adjust meta_key pattern to match the plugin's meta_key for button URL.
    if ( strpos( $meta_key, 'osm_map' ) !== false && strpos( $meta_key, 'button_url' ) !== false ) {
        // Force a string
        $raw = (string) $meta_value;

        // Remove HTML tags and NUL bytes
        $raw = wp_kses( $raw, array() );

        // Only allow http(s)
        $allowed = wp_http_validate_url( $raw );
        if ( $allowed === false ) {
            // Reject and empty it
            return ''; // or return sanitize_text_field($raw) depending on business logic
        }

        // Additional scheme check
        $parts = wp_parse_url( $raw );
        if ( empty( $parts['scheme'] ) || ! in_array( strtolower( $parts['scheme'] ), array( 'http', 'https' ), true ) ) {
            return '';
        }

        return esc_url_raw( $raw );
    }

    return $check;
}

If update_postmeta filter isn’t an ideal hook in your environment, use the plugin’s widget update hook or elementor/widget/…/update hook if available. Modify the meta_key matching to suit the plugin.

Sanitize on output (escape attributes):

<?php
// When rendering the button URL in templates, ensure escaping is used:
//
// Instead of: echo $button_url;
// Use:
echo esc_url( $button_url ); // safe for href attributes
// And for HTML attributes:
printf( '<a href="/vi/%s/" class="osm-btn">%s</a>', esc_url( $button_url ), esc_html( $button_text ) );

Key functions:

• esc_url_raw(): sanitize before saving to DB (server-side normalization).
• esc_url(): escape for output in attributes (safe on echo).
• esc_html(), esc_attr(): encode values for HTML contexts.
• wp_kses(): allow only a safe subset of HTML if you must allow markup.

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Secure coding checklist for plugin developers

If you are a developer or responsible for code review, ensure:

1. Validate and sanitize user input before storage
   If a value is a URL: use esc_url_raw and enforce allowed schemes (http/https).
   If a value must not contain HTML: apply wp_kses with an empty allowed list or sanitize_text_field.
2. Escape on output based on context
   HTML attribute: esc_attr, esc_url for URLs.
   HTML body: esc_html hoặc wp_kses_post for rich content.
3. Don’t trust capability checks on client-side only
   Enforce permission checks on server-side update functions.
   Sử dụng người dùng hiện tại có thể() with specific capabilities, not fragile role names.
4. Use nonces and capability checks on form submissions
   Verify nonce and check for user capability before saving settings.
5. Whitelist allowed URL schemes
   Reject javascript:, data:, vbscript: schemes explicitly.
   Sử dụng wp_http_validate_url Và wp_allowed_protocols for policy.
6. Limit widget configuration to trusted roles
   If a widget contains sensitive attributes that could contain JS, restrict who can edit them.
7. Sanitize serialized data
   Be careful with serialized arrays saved in meta. Sanitize each element before serialization.

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Detection and forensics: what to look for after compromise

• Check for unexpected admin accounts, odd user role changes, or new privileges granted.
• Search for webshells or modified core/plugin files. Check file modification dates.
• Look at wp_tùy_chọn Và wp_postmeta for unexpected payloads, and collect those entries for analysis.
• Check server logs around suspect dates for POST requests to Elementor/widget endpoints or suspicious parameter values.
• Examine the browser-facing pages for unauthorized scripts, external calls to attacker-controlled domains, or injected iframe content.
• If session cookies may have been stolen, invalidate sessions (see next section).

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Cleanup and recovery actions

1. Quarantine:
   Temporarily take the site offline (maintenance mode) while cleaning to prevent further infection.
2. Restore:
   Restore from backups created before the malicious changes if feasible and confirmed clean.
3. Remove payloads:
   Manually remove malicious meta values or use scripts to sanitize them.
4. Rotate secrets and sessions:
   Force password resets for all high-privilege users.
   Invalidate sessions: for WordPress, you can force password changes to invalidate cookies, or use plugins to destroy sessions.
5. Hardening:
   Apply the immediate mitigations above and deploy WAF rules.
6. Post-incident monitoring:
   Monitor logs for repeated attempts, identify attack IPs, and block them.
   Watch for reappearance of the same payloads.
7. Document and learn:
   Keep a clear incident log: dates, actions taken, backups used, who informed.
   Apply internal processes to prevent similar issues (strict code reviews, least privilege policies).

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Long-term risk reduction — operational advice

• Apply the principle of least privilege: contributors should only be able to create drafts and not edit widgets or global content unless explicitly required.
• Introduce an editorial workflow where contributor content is reviewed by an editor before publish.
• Keep an inventory of plugins and the privileges they expose in the admin area (which roles can access what).
• Use automated monitoring and alerting for key changes (new admin users, plugin/theme file changes, suspicious postmeta writes).
• Periodic scanning: schedule regular site scans and database inspections for XSS signatures and common IOCs.
• Regularly test WAF rules in a staging environment and maintain a library of safe virtual patches for common issues.

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Example detection signatures (for analysts)

• These are non-executable detection heuristics you can use to create scanner checks:
• Any DB field with javascript: not preceded by an allowed context and not percent-encoded.
• Any DB field with <script tag or on[a-z]+= attributes.
• Values in widget configuration that include <script or other encoded script tags.
• Long base64 blobs in widget settings — could hide payloads or webshells.

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Communication, disclosure, and coordination

• Follow responsible disclosure best practices if you find additional flaws: coordinate with the plugin author and provide details privately first.
• Share incident summaries with your internal stakeholders: what happened, who was affected, and steps taken.
• Notify users if their data may have been exposed as a result of exploitation.

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Example remediation patch (for plugin authors)

Plugin authors can implement the following minimal safe handling for button URL fields:

• Validate on save:
• Ensure the scheme is http or https.
• Reject or sanitize all other schemes and HTML content.
• Escape on output with esc_url() hoặc esc_attr().

Pseudocode:

<?php
$raw_url = isset( $input['button_url'] ) ? (string) $input['button_url'] : '';

$raw_url = wp_kses( $raw_url, array() ); // strip any HTML
$validated = wp_http_validate_url( $raw_url );
if ( $validated && in_array( wp_parse_url( $validated )['scheme'], array( 'http', 'https' ), true ) ) {
    $safe = esc_url_raw( $validated );
} else {
    $safe = '';
}
$widget_instance['button_url'] = $safe;

When rendering:

printf( '<a href="/vi/%s/" rel="noopener noreferrer" class="osm-btn">%s</a>',
    esc_url( $widget_instance['button_url'] ),
    esc_html( $widget_instance['button_text'] )
);

Authors should also add server-side capability checks and nonces around widget settings endpoints.

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Testing and verification

• After applying fixes or adding WAF rules, test both in staging and production with:
  • Attempts to save javascript: Và <script> payloads into the plugin settings — ensure they’re blocked or sanitized.
  • Functional tests to ensure legitimate http(s) links still work.
• Use a content security policy (CSP) as an extra defense in depth: restricting inline scripts reduces the impact of any residual XSS.

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Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q: Can an unauthenticated attacker exploit this?
A: No — this report specifies Contributor-level authenticated access.

Q: Does this require a user to click anything?
A: No — stored XSS executes when the vulnerable page or admin view is rendered. However, some payloads rely on user interactions to trigger payloads.

Q: Will disabling the plugin remove the stored data?
A: Deactivating prevents the plugin code from outputting the widget, which mitigates the risk of execution. The stored malicious entries may remain in the database and will re-activate if the plugin is re-enabled.

Q: How urgent is this?
A: High if you have Contributor-like user accounts and the plugin active. Even though the vulnerability requires authenticated access, many sites allow contributor access widely.

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Security checklist (short actionable list for site owners)

• Identify whether OSM Map Widget for Elementor is installed and its version.
• If installed and version ≤ 1.3.0, limit contributor/editor privileges immediately.
• Disable plugin if possible; if not, deploy WAF rules to block javascript: Và <script> patterns.
• Search DB for suspicious entries and remove or sanitize them.
• Force password resets and review user accounts.
• Implement the code-level safeguards above (if you have developer resources).
• Monitor site logs and admin activity for suspicious behavior.

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Final thoughts from WP-Firewall Security Team

Stored XSS in UI fields — especially those editable by Contributor-level users — is a recurring pattern in plugin vulnerabilities. The combination of persistent storage and rendering in mixed contexts (frontend and admin) makes this class of bug particularly effective for attackers with modest access.

The right approach combines immediate perimeter controls (WAF / virtual patching), targeted DB cleanup, temporary privilege reductions, and a developer-side fix that enforces strict validation and escaping. Until the plugin vendor ships a trusted update, defensive layers are your best protection.

If you need assistance implementing WAF rules, writing a safe mu-plugin for sanitization, or conducting a full incident response, our security team at WP-Firewall helps WordPress site owners with triage, virtual patching, and recovery guidance. Stay vigilant — attack surfaces are often smaller than they appear, and a single unchecked input can lead to disproportionate harm.