Имя плагина	AutomatorWP
Type of Vulnerability	Remote Code Execution (RCE)
CVE Number	CVE-2025-9539
Срочность	Высокий
CVE Publish Date	2025-09-08
Source URL	CVE-2025-9539

Urgent: AutomatorWP <= 5.3.6 — Subscriber-Level Missing Authorization Leading to Remote Code Execution (CVE-2025-9539)

Technical breakdown, risk assessment, detection guidance and step-by-step mitigation for AutomatorWP plugin vulnerability (<= 5.3.6). Includes WAF/virtual-patch options and hardening recommendations from a WP-Firewall security perspective.

Автор: WP-Firewall Security Team

Опубликовано: 2025-09-08

Теги: WordPress, Vulnerability, AutomatorWP, RCE, WAF, Security

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Executive summary

A high-severity vulnerability has been disclosed in the AutomatorWP WordPress plugin (CVE-2025-9539). Versions up to and including 5.3.6 are vulnerable. The issue is described as a missing authorization check that allows authenticated users with the Subscriber role (or higher) to create malicious automations — enabling remote code execution (RCE) when an attacker constructs and triggers an automation with dangerous actions.

This vulnerability is high risk for two reasons:

• The minimum required privilege is the Subscriber role, which is commonly present for registered users, commentors, customers and many membership implementations.
• Automations can be complex and can include actions/triggers that escalate from user-provided input to code execution, meaning an attacker can get server-side code execution by abusing the plugin functionality.

A security update fixing the issue is available in AutomatorWP 5.3.7. Administrators should treat this as urgent: patch immediately, and if you cannot immediately update, apply the recommended mitigations below (virtual patching, access restrictions, detection & response).

This article is written from the WP-Firewall security team’s perspective and contains practical guidance for defenders — detection indicators, quick mitigations, configuration examples for WAF virtual patching, and full incident response steps.

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Quick facts

• Vulnerability: Missing authorization to authenticated (Subscriber+) → Remote Code Execution (RCE)
• Affected versions: AutomatorWP <= 5.3.6
• Fixed in: 5.3.7
• CVE: CVE-2025-9539
• CVSS: 8.0 (High)
• Required privilege: Subscriber (authenticated account)
• Reporter/credit: security researcher (publicly acknowledged)
• Exploitation: Not limited to admins — low privilege accounts can weaponize automations

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Why this matters (real-world impact)

WordPress sites often expose registration, membership, or commerce flows where ordinary users hold Subscriber or similar low-privilege roles. Attackers can:

• Create a malicious automation that runs server-side code, or that manipulates plugin features into executing arbitrary code.
• Trigger the automation to execute immediately (or later) and gain command execution on the server.
• Use execution to implant backdoors, pivot to other sites on the host, or inject malicious content.

Because the vulnerability can be abused by low-privileged accounts, automated exploitation at scale is likely. Webmasters should assume attackers will scan for vulnerable sites and attempt automated compromise.

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High-level attack flow (safe-to-read, non-exploitative)

1. Attacker registers or uses an existing account with Subscriber-level access (or any authenticated user with at least that role).
2. Using the plugin’s automation creation functionality (web UI, AJAX endpoints or REST endpoints), the attacker creates an automation whose actions include data that will be processed in a privileged context (for example, an action that evaluates code or writes files).
3. The plugin, due to a missing authorization check, accepts and stores the automation. The stored automation contains attacker-controlled payloads.
4. The attacker triggers the automation (immediately, or waits for a scheduled trigger). The plugin executes the action in a context that allows server-side code execution.
5. The attacker obtains command execution and proceeds to escalate or persist access.

Note: This description intentionally omits specific exploit payloads. The goal is to help defenders understand the sequence and stop it.

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Detection & indicators of compromise (IoCs)

If you administer WordPress sites running AutomatorWP (<=5.3.6), look for the following signs — both pre- and post-exploitation.

Detection signals to check right now:

• New or recently modified AutomatorWP automations you did not create. Check AutomatorWP’s automations list in wp-admin.
• Unexpected scheduled tasks or cron entries (wp-cron events) tied to AutomatorWP automations.
• Unexpected admin-ajax or REST API requests from authenticated users that create automations. Look for POST requests to automation creation endpoints coming from non-admin accounts.
• Files added or modified in writable plugin or theme directories (suspicious PHP files, obfuscated content).
• Webshell-like patterns and base64, eval, system, exec, passthru usage in files created recently.
• Suspicious database entries: look for serialized plugin settings or automation meta that includes code-like content.
• Outbound network connections from the web server that are unusual (to IPs/domains you don’t recognize).
• Unexpected logins, account creation, or privilege changes, especially for subscriber users.

Logs to inspect:

• Web server access logs for POST requests to AutomatorWP endpoints originating from low-privileged accounts.
• WordPress debug.log if enabled (for plugin errors or unusual behavior).
• Recent changes in the WordPress database (wp_posts, wp_postmeta where plugin stores automations).
• Host-level logs and process lists if you suspect active code execution.

Suggested quick search queries (database / filesystem):

• Search plugin storage for suspicious strings like “eval(“, “create_function(“, “base64_decode(” — but be cautious: many false positives exist, and you should not delete without verification.
• List files changed in the last 7–14 days in wp-content: find . -type f -mtime -14 -ls

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Immediate mitigations (apply now if you cannot patch immediately)

1. Update AutomatorWP to version 5.3.7 or later (preferred and simplest fix).
2. If immediate update is not possible, temporarily disable the plugin:
   • Using WP-Admin: Plugins → Deactivate AutomatorWP
   • Using WP-CLI: wp plugin deactivate automatorwp
3. Restrict automation creation endpoints using a firewall:
   • Block unauthenticated access to endpoints that create automations.
   • Block requests that look like automation creation attempts from Subscriber-level accounts (see WAF guidance below).
4. Harden user registrations and remove/lock suspicious subscriber accounts:
   • Require manual approval for new users.
   • Force password resets for existing accounts if compromise suspected.
   • Remove unused Subscriber accounts and disable user registration until the site is secure.
5. Tighten capability mappings:
   • Ensure that only roles that truly need automation creation capability have it.
6. Remove or quarantine suspicious automations:
   • Export automations for analysis, then delete ones you didn’t create.
7. Increase monitoring:
   • Watch for new admin-level users, new files added to the server, or unusual outbound traffic.

If you must keep the plugin enabled and cannot immediately patch, WP-Firewall customers can apply a virtual patch rule (see the “Virtual-patching and WAF rules” section below) that blocks automation creation requests from low-privileged accounts.

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How a web application firewall (WAF) helps — virtual patching

A WAF can block exploit attempts while you’re scheduling maintenance or waiting for all sites to update. Virtual patching is a practical stop-gap: instead of modifying plugin code on every site, the site firewall blocks the malicious request patterns that would use the vulnerability.

Key virtual-patch goals for this issue:

• Block requests that attempt to create automations from non-admin contexts.
• Block suspicious payloads (e.g., strings that contain encoded payloads, or that attempt to set actions that execute code).
• Rate limit or deny automation creation endpoints from accounts that only need limited interaction.

Important: Virtual patches are shields — they reduce risk but don’t replace the upstream plugin fix. Apply the official update as soon as possible.

Example WAF defensive patterns (conceptual; adapt to your WAF):

• Block POST requests to endpoints responsible for automation creation when the authenticated request user role is Subscriber (or check referer and session cookies).
• Block requests that include known dangerous keys in submitted automation payloads (for example, fields indicating execution of PHP code or remote commands).
• Rate-limit authenticated requests that create automations to prevent mass automation creation.

Below are safe-to-read, vendor-neutral sample rule patterns you can use as a template for ModSecurity / WAF. These are defensive patterns only and avoid providing exploit payloads.

# Deny automation creation POSTs from users that are not admin-level
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "chain,deny,msg:'Block AutomatorWP automation creation by low-privilege accounts'"
  SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" "chain"
  SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS "*automation*" "chain"
  SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Cookie "@contains wordpress_logged_in_" "t:none"

Notes:

• The above is illustrative. Your WAF must be configured to correlate WordPress session cookie value to a role or rely on other heuristics (IP reputation, request frequency, parameter inspection).
• Do not block legitimate admin activity; test rules in a monitoring mode before full deny.

WP-Firewall customers: If you run our managed WAF, we can deploy a safe virtual patch rule across your sites that blocks automation creation attempts from non-privileged users and filters payloads that look like server-execution attempts. This buys time for patching without site disruption.

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Step-by-step remediation checklist

1. Patch the plugin immediately
   • Update the AutomatorWP plugin to 5.3.7 or later via your WordPress dashboard or WP-CLI (wp plugin update automatorwp).
2. Confirm plugin health
   • After patching, verify automations still function as expected under admin accounts.
3. Audit automations
   • Review all automations created prior to the patch. Disable and inspect ones you did not create.
4. Replace compromised credentials
   • Reset passwords for all administrator and editorial accounts.
   • Force password reset for active subscribers if you have any sign of compromise.
5. Check for persistence
   • Scan for webshells, new PHP files in uploads, themes or plugin directories.
   • Look for cron tasks or scheduled events created by AutomatorWP that you didn’t add.
6. Review logs and activity
   • Inspect access logs for suspicious POSTs to admin-ajax.php or REST endpoints tied to AutomatorWP.
7. Revoke and reissue credentials where needed
   • Revoke compromised API keys or tokens created by AutomatorWP automations.
8. Harden user registration & roles
   • Temporarily disable open registration if it’s not required.
9. Implement preventive controls
   • Enforce least privilege, enable two-factor for admins, enable strong password policies.
10. Consider professional incident response if RCE is confirmed
    • If you find evidence of arbitrary code execution, a full host-level forensic analysis is necessary.

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Recommended long-term hardening and best practices

1. Principle of least privilege
   • Review capabilities granted to each role. Avoid giving non-administrative roles any capability that can trigger code execution or write to filesystem.
2. Plugin risk assessment before installation
   • Only install plugins with clear development and disclosure policies. Keep the number of plugins as low as possible.
3. Automatic updates for critical security patches
   • Enable automated minor updates for plugins, or manage updates centrally.
4. WAF + virtual patching
   • Maintain a WAF with virtual patching capability that can block exploit attempts as soon as vulnerabilities are public.
5. Monitoring & alerting
   • Centralized logging and alerting for unusual plugin activity, file changes, and outbound network connections.
6. Malware scanning and removal
   • Regularly run malware scans and keep backups outside the primary hosting environment.
7. Incident response plan
   • Predefine roles and steps for containment (isolate site), eradication (remove webshells), and recovery (restore from clean backups).
8. Regular backups and test restores
   • Backups are essential. Validate backups by periodically restoring into a staging environment.
9. Network segmentation
   • Where possible, isolate web servers from sensitive internal networks and limit outbound network access.

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How to inspect AutomatorWP automations safely

• Export automations (if the plugin provides an export facility) and analyze the exported configuration in a staging environment — do not open suspicious content on production.
• If you must inspect an automation in-place, check all action fields. Look for any action fields that reference PHP execution, file writes, remote command execution, or include encoded data.
• Disable suspicious automations and test the rest in a controlled environment.

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Sample incident response playbook (concise)

1. Обнаружение
   • Identify suspicious automation creation, unexpected cron jobs, or new files.
2. Containment
   • Deactivate the AutomatorWP plugin if RCE is suspected.
   • Restrict network egress from the server (block outbound traffic).
   • Rotate admin passwords and revoke sessions.
3. Eradication
   • Remove webshells and malicious files.
   • Rebuild compromised components from clean copies if necessary.
4. Восстановление
   • Restore from a clean backup if required.
   • Patch AutomatorWP to 5.3.7 and all other vulnerable plugins/themes.
   • Re-enable services carefully with increased monitoring.
5. Lessons learned
   • Analyze root cause, patch process, and update defenses to prevent recurrence.

If you are uncertain about the scope of compromise or find evidence indicating active RCE (unexpected processes, new scheduled tasks running arbitrary code), consider bringing in professional incident responders to perform a full host-level forensic analysis.

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Practical WAF rule examples (neutral templates)

Below are neutral, non-exploitable rule templates you can adapt. Test thoroughly in a staging environment before enforcing them on production.

1) Block automation creation attempts unless request originates from an admin IP

# Template: Block AutomatorWP automation creation unless IP is trusted
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "chain,phase:1,deny,status:403,msg:'Block automator creation - not from trusted IP'"
  SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" "chain"
  SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS "automation|create_automation" "chain"
  SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "!@ipMatch 203.0.113.0/24 198.51.100.17"

2) Rate-limit authenticated automation creation requests

# Template: Rate limiting automation creation attempts
SecAction "phase:1,pass,nolog,initcol:ip=%{REMOTE_ADDR},setvar:ip.automator_count=+0"
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "phase:2,chain,pass,id:10001"
  SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /(admin-ajax\.php|wp-json/automatorwp)" "chain"
  SecRule IP:AUTOMATOR_COUNT "@gt 3" "phase:2,deny,status:429,msg:'Too many automations created from this IP'"
  SecAction "phase:2,pass,setvar:ip.automator_count=+1"

3) Block payloads that include obvious server-execution patterns (example)

# Template: Block suspicious encoded/execution patterns in POST bodies
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (eval\(|base64_decode\(|system\(|exec\(|passthru\()" "phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'Possible server execution pattern in request body'"

These templates are starting points — a production rule needs to be carefully tailored to your environment, and they must be tested to avoid false positives.

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Audit and monitoring checklist for the next 30 days

• Day 0: Patch AutomatorWP to 5.3.7 or deactivate plugin immediately.
• Day 0–2: Scan filesystem for newly added PHP files, review access logs for suspicious POSTs.
• Day 0–7: Review all automations and scheduled tasks created in the last 30 days.
• Day 3–14: Implement WAF virtual patching for automation creation endpoints and monitor for blocked requests.
• Day 7–30: Review user accounts and force password resets for high-risk accounts. Monitor outbound connections and anomalous activity.

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Why you should prioritize this over routine updates

Because:

• The exploitability is high (low privilege requirement).
• The impact is severe (RCE).
• Automated attacks often target sites with common vulnerable plugins — the window for exploitation is typically immediate after public disclosure.

Delaying increases likelihood of compromise. Treat this update as a security emergency, not routine maintenance.

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For multi-site and managed environments

• If you manage many WordPress instances, prioritize patching on:
  • Sites with user registration enabled.
  • E-commerce or membership sites.
  • Sites with shared hosting where compromise could propagate.
• Use centralized update orchestration and test updates in a staging cluster before wide rollout.
• Deploy virtual patching centrally through your network WAF when possible.

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Communications: what to tell stakeholders

Prepare a short statement for non-technical stakeholders:

“A high-severity security issue was found in the AutomatorWP plugin that could allow low-privileged users to execute code on the server. We have patched all affected systems / are applying mitigations right now. We are auditing systems and will inform you if any data was impacted.”

For technical stakeholders, provide the timeline, remediation actions, and confirmation once patching and investigation are complete.

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Frequently asked questions (concise)

Q: Can a logged-out visitor exploit this?
A: No — the vulnerability requires an authenticated account with at least the Subscriber role.

Q: Will restoring from backup avoid the problem?
A: Restoring to a pre-compromise clean backup is effective only if you ensure the backup is clean and you patch AutomatorWP (and other vulnerabilities) before bringing the site online.

Q: Is disabling AutomatorWP enough?
A: Yes, disabling the plugin removes the attack surface. But if you suspect a past compromise, you must also investigate for persistence and remove any backdoors.

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Protect your site right now — start with WP-Firewall Basic (Free)

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Closing notes from the WP-Firewall security team

This AutomatorWP vulnerability is a timely reminder: plugin features that allow users to define automation often expose powerful actions that, if insufficiently authorized, can be weaponized. The fix is straightforward — update to the patched plugin — but defenses should be multi-layered: least privilege, WAF/virtual patching, active monitoring, and a practiced incident response plan.

If you need assistance assessing exposure across multiple sites, deploying virtual patches, or conducting an incident response, the WP-Firewall team can help guide you through remediation and recovery. Security is a continuous process — the quicker you act, the lower the potential impact.

Stay safe, patch fast, and monitor closely.

— WP-Firewall Security Team