Nome do plugin	WordPress Automatic Plugin
Type of Vulnerability	XSS armazenado
CVE Number	CVE-2025-6247
Urgência	Baixo
CVE Publish Date	2025-08-25
Source URL	CVE-2025-6247

Urgent: CVE-2025-6247 — WordPress Automatic Plugin (<= 3.118.0) CSRF → Stored XSS — What Site Owners Must Do Now

Technical analysis, risk assessment, and mitigation steps for the WordPress Automatic plugin vulnerability (CVE-2025-6247). Practical remediation for site owners, plugin developers, and security teams — including recommended WAF rules, hardening steps, and incident response guidance.

Autor: WP-Firewall Research Team

Etiquetas: WordPress, WAF, vulnerability, CVE-2025-6247, plugin security, XSS, CSRF

Summary: A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability that leads to stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) affects WordPress Automatic plugin versions <= 3.118.0. The issue is fixed in 3.119.0 (CVE-2025-6247). If you run this plugin, treat this as urgent: update, verify your site integrity, and deploy WAF protections where immediate patching isn’t possible.

Executive summary

On 25 August 2025 a vulnerability affecting the WordPress Automatic plugin (versions <= 3.118.0) was disclosed and assigned CVE-2025-6247. The vulnerability is described as a CSRF that enables stored XSS. While the public severity rating in some sources is presented as “low” on patch priority, the practical risk to websites can be significant because it combines two classes of issues: an action that can be triggered across origins (CSRF) and a stored client-side injection (XSS) that runs in contexts with elevated privileges (admins or editors). An attacker who chains these two can potentially escalate to site takeover, persistent backdoors, or credential theft via session tokens.

This post explains, in plain language and in technical depth:

• how the vulnerability works and why the chain (CSRF → stored XSS) is dangerous;
• possible real-world exploitation scenarios;
• immediate mitigation steps for site owners and hosting providers;
• recommended WAF rules and virtual patching approaches you can deploy immediately;
• secure coding fixes plugin authors should apply;
• detection and incident response guidance;
• how WP-Firewall can help protect your site — and the details of our free plan for immediate coverage.

Note: the vulnerability is fixed in WordPress Automatic plugin version 3.119.0. If you can update, do that first. If you cannot, follow the mitigation guidance below.

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What exactly is CVE-2025-6247? (technical breakdown)

• Affected plugin: WordPress Automatic (plugin)
• Vulnerable versions: <= 3.118.0
• Fixed in: 3.119.0
• Vulnerability types: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) that results in Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• CVE: CVE-2025-6247

High-level chain:

1. The plugin exposes administrative endpoints or handlers that accept attacker-controlled input and store it in the site (database or options) without adequate server-side sanitization or output encoding.
2. Those endpoints lack proper request validation to ensure actions originate from a legitimate site user intent (missing or improper nonce/capability checks), meaning an attacker can trigger requests from another origin (CSRF).
3. By tricking a higher-privileged user (often an administrator) into visiting malicious content (or via an unauthenticated vector depending on the endpoint), the attacker can make the admin’s browser submit the crafted request, which stores malicious payloads on the site.
4. When an admin (or other privileged user) later views a page, post, or plugin UI where the stored payload appears, it executes in the admin context (stored XSS), enabling cookie theft, session hijacking, or execution of privileged actions.

Why this combination is serious:

• Stored XSS in admin pages often executes with the admin’s privileges in the browser, enabling actions that go beyond simple defacement.
• CSRF allows an attacker to cause privileged users to perform the dangerous store operation without needing those users to explicitly interact with the plugin UI.
• Even if the initial vulnerability entry requires low privileges, successful exploitation can lead to full site compromise.

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Realistic exploitation scenarios

Below are plausible attack paths you should consider:

1. Admin-targeted CSRF page
   Attacker crafts a page with a hidden form or an AJAX request that submits a malicious payload to the plugin endpoint.
   The site administrator, already authenticated on the target site, visits the attacker’s page (phishing, clicking a malicious link, or simply visiting a page with an embedded request).
   The admin’s browser sends the POST/GET request with cookies/session to the vulnerable endpoint; the payload is stored.
   Later, when an admin page or dashboard widget loads the stored data unsafely, the injected script runs inside the admin’s browser.
2. Unauthenticated HTTP endpoints (if present)
   If the plugin provides endpoints callable without authentication (some plugins do to accommodate external services), an attacker may directly call them to store payloads in posts, options, or other persistent storage. That reduces complexity and makes the vulnerability easier to exploit at scale.
3. Blind exploitation for mass infection
   An attacker ages to weaponize this vulnerability in an automated worm: scan for sites with the vulnerable plugin, send crafted requests to store backdoors or JavaScript dropper URLs, then trigger actions to loot or pivot.
4. Data exfiltration and persistent backdoors
   Using stored XSS, an attacker could add a backdoor admin user, install a PHP webshell via admin editor pages, or use transfer-of-trust to escalate to file write operations via integrated admin pages.

Given these realistic capabilities, treat the vulnerability as high risk for sites where administrators visit untrusted pages — which is, practically, almost every site.

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Immediate actions for site owners (priority checklist)

If you run WordPress and the WordPress Automatic plugin:

1. Update the plugin to version 3.119.0 or later immediately.
   This is the recommended and definitive fix.
2. If you cannot update right now, implement the WAF mitigations below immediately (either at host, reverse proxy, or via a plugin-based WAF).
3. Rotate administrator and high-privilege user passwords after cleanup — especially if you detect suspicious activity.
4. Scan your site for malicious content:
   • Search posts, pages, and plugin settings for unexpected <script>, onerror=, javascript:, data: URIs, and encoded payloads.
   • Inspect recent plugin or theme option changes and look for unexpected administrator accounts.
5. Check server and WordPress logs for suspicious POST/GET to plugin-related endpoints.
6. If compromise is suspected, isolate the site, take a forensic snapshot, and engage an incident response provider if needed.

When the patch is available, the single safest step is to update. However, many organizations cannot update immediately (compatibility testing, staged release cycles); for those, deploying virtual patches on the WAF is critical.

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Recommended WAF / virtual patching rules (practical, deployable right now)

If you operate a WAF (server-level, host-level, or plugin-level) and cannot update the plugin instantly, create rules that block the most likely exploit patterns and the vulnerable endpoints associated with the plugin.

General rule guidance:

• Block unauthenticated calls to plugin administrative endpoints.
• Enforce presence of expected nonce or referrer headers for requests that perform state-changing operations.
• Block payloads containing suspicious script patterns.

Example ModSecurity-style rules (adapt to your WAF language and test before production):

# Block obvious stored XSS payloads in POST bodies
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "phase:2,chain,rev:'1',msg:'Block suspicious script content in POST',id:100001,log,deny,status:403"
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "(?i)(<script\b|</script>|onerror\s*=|onload\s*=|javascript:|data:text/html|document\.cookie|window\.location)" "t:none,t:lowercase"

# Enforce referer for admin post requests to plugin endpoints
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-admin/admin-post.php" "phase:1,chain,id:100002,log,deny,msg:'Missing/referrer or invalid referer for admin-post operations'"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "!@beginsWith https://yourdomain.com" "t:none"

(Adjust domain to your site and the exact plugin endpoint paths seen in logs; some plugins use custom admin-ajax endpoints.)

# Block POSTs to plugin-specific endpoint with script payloads
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-content/plugins/wp-automatic/" "phase:2,chain,id:100003,deny,log,msg:'Block WP-Automatic endpoint misuse'"
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "(?i)(<script\b|onerror=|javascript:|document\.cookie|eval\()" "t:none,t:lowercase"

4) Rate-limit or block requests from suspicious IPs or user agents that target plugin endpoints.

Notes:

• Always test rules with non-production traffic first to avoid false positives.
• Use logging mode (no deny) initially to tune rules and identify false positives.
• Implement a short term whitelist for trusted automation and monitoring services to avoid breaking integrations.

Why these rules help:

• They block the most obvious stored XSS payloads and stop requests missing legitimate referers/nonce flows from completing.
• They give you time to safely update the plugin while preventing blind mass exploitation.

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Example server-level mitigation checklist (for hosts and managed providers)

• Patch the plugin on all hosted sites to 3.119.0.
• Deploy WAF rules above at the edge (CDN or reverse proxy).
• Monitor logs for POST/GET to plugin endpoints and scan bodies for script patterns.
• Notify customers who have the vulnerable plugin and offer one-click update or virtual patching.
• If you provide managed WordPress security, enable automatic virtual patching for vulnerable plugins and schedule updates.

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For plugin developers: secure coding fixes (what to change in your code)

Plugin maintainers should ensure the following are applied to any endpoint that modifies persistent state or stores user-supplied data:

1. Capability checks:

   if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
       wp_die( __( 'Insufficient permissions' ) );
   }
   

2. Nonce enforcement:
   Use WordPress nonces and verify them server-side:
   Output nonce in the admin form:

   wp_nonce_field( 'my_plugin_action', 'my_plugin_nonce' );
   

   Verify nonce in request handler:

   if ( ! isset( $_POST['my_plugin_nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['my_plugin_nonce'], 'my_plugin_action' ) ) {
       wp_die( __( 'Invalid request' ) );
   }
   

3. Sanitation on input:
   Use appropriate sanitization functions before saving to the database:
   • For textual HTML that may be allowed: use wp_kses_post() with a safe set of allowed tags/attributes.
   • For plain text: sanitizar_campo_de_texto().

   Exemplo:

   $safe_content = wp_kses( $_POST['custom_html'], array(
       'p' => array(),
       'a' => array( 'href' => array(), 'title' => array() ),
       'strong' => array(),
       // allow only necessary tags
   ) );
   update_option( 'my_plugin_option', $safe_content );
   

4. Proper escaping on output:
   Escape when rendering:

   echo wp_kses_post( get_option( 'my_plugin_option' ) );
   // or for attributes:
   echo esc_attr( get_option( 'my_plugin_attr' ) );
   

5. Avoid echoing raw request data:
   Never echo raw $_POST/$_GET input; always sanitize and escape.
6. Prefer REST-based endpoints with permission callbacks:
   When using the WP REST API, include permission_callback that verifies capabilities and nonces:

   register_rest_route( 'my-plugin/v1', '/save', array(
       'methods' => 'POST',
       'callback' => 'my_plugin_save_callback',
       'permission_callback' => function() {
           return current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) && check_ajax_referer( 'my-plugin-nonce', '_wpnonce', false );
       }
   ) );
   

Applying these changes will ensure the plugin validates intent (via nonces/capabilities) and sanitizes user-supplied content before storage and output, preventing stored XSS even if requests are forged.

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Detecting an exploit: signs and indicators of compromise

Review logs and content for these indicators:

• Unexpected POST or GET requests to plugin endpoints (admin-ajax.php, admin-post.php, or custom plugin routes) from unrecognized origins.
• New administrative options, widgets, or posts containing JavaScript, iframes, or obfuscated strings (base64 blobs).
• Unexpected new administrator accounts created around the same timestamps as suspicious HTTP requests.
• Modified theme or plugin files with injected malicious code or dropper scripts.
• Outbound network calls to malicious or unfamiliar domains originating from the site.
• Alerts from malware scanners showing injected JavaScript in database rows or theme/plugin files.

Search patterns to assist detection (database and file searches):

• “<script”
• “document.cookie”
• “eval(“
• “onerror=”
• “src="http”
• “data:text/html”
• “base64_decode(“

If you find evidence of stored malicious payloads, remove them carefully after taking a backup snapshot for forensic purposes.

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Incident response and clean-up steps (recommended sequence)

1. Snapshot and isolate:
   Take a full backup (files + DB). Move site to maintenance mode if possible.
2. Preserve logs:
   Preserve access and error logs to help determine the timeline and scope.
3. Scan for persistence:
   Use both file scanners and database checks to locate injected scripts and backdoors.
4. Remove malicious content:
   Remove infected files and database rows. Replace core/plugin/theme files with clean copies from trusted sources.
5. Rotate secrets:
   Reset admin passwords, API keys, and any other credentials potentially exposed.
6. Re-install/patch:
   Update the vulnerable plugin to 3.119.0 or later and ensure core & PHP versions are supported.
7. Harden:
   Enforce 2FA on admin accounts, restrict admin access by IP where practical, and implement principle of least privilege.
8. Monitor:
   Raise monitoring for unusual admin activity and network connections.
9. Post-incident review:
   Document how the compromise occurred and what controls will prevent recurrence.

If you lack internal resources, consider hiring a professional incident response team with WordPress experience.

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Prevention: hardening and best practices

• Keep WordPress core, themes, and plugins updated on a tested cadence. Test in staging first for complex sites.
• Limit admin accounts and run audits of user roles and capabilities.
• Enforce strong password policies and multi-factor authentication (MFA) for administrators.
• Use a quality WAF that can be tuned and rapidly updated with virtual patches when zero-days are discovered.
• Monitor logs and implement alerting for suspicious POST/GET to admin endpoints.
• Back up frequently and verify backup integrity.
• Apply least-privilege principles to all plugins: avoid giving plugins more capabilities than needed.

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Recommendations for managed hosting providers and agencies

• Scan hosted customer sites for known vulnerable plugin versions and notify customers immediately.
• Offer one-click updates and virtual patching options.
• Deploy server-side WAF rules to block exploit payloads at the edge.
• Provide breach detection services and post-incident remediation.

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How WP-Firewall helps (practical offering)

As a dedicated WordPress firewall and security service provider, we approach situations like CVE-2025-6247 with a layered response:

• Rapid virtual patching: We create WAF signatures specific to the vulnerability and can deploy rules across protected sites within hours to block exploitation attempts while administrators plan updates.
• Managed firewall + WAF: Our firewall inspects requests for suspicious payloads and enforces expected request patterns for admin endpoints.
• Malware scanning and mitigation: Our automated scanners locate stored XSS payloads, suspicious options, and malicious files; managed plans include automated cleanup and guided remediation.
• Continuous monitoring and reporting: We provide activity logs and alerts so you can see attempted exploitation attempts and respond quickly.

If you want immediate baseline protection without changing plugins or waiting for staged updates, WP-Firewall’s free plan provides essential protections (managed firewall, unlimited bandwidth, a WAF, malware scanner, and mitigation of OWASP Top 10 risks). For teams that need automated removal, IP allow/deny controls, or monthly security reporting, our paid tiers add those capabilities.

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Protect Your Site Today — Start with the WP-Firewall Free Plan

If you’re responsible for one or more WordPress sites and want immediate, no-cost baseline security to reduce the risk from vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-6247, consider starting with our free plan. It includes:

• Essential managed firewall and WAF rules
• Unlimited bandwidth and basic malware scanning
• Automated mitigation of common OWASP Top 10 threats

Start here: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

(Free plan is an easy way to get foundational protections in place while you plan updates and deeper remediation.)

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Sample detection and hunting queries (for logs and SIEM)

Use these starting points for hunting in logs or SIEM:

1. Detect POSTs to plugin directories:
   path contains "/wp-content/plugins/wp-automatic/" AND method == POST
2. Detect requests that contain potential XSS payloads:
   request_body matches regex "(?i)<script\b|document\.cookie|onerror\s*="
3. Detect suspicious referer-less admin requests:
   path contains "/wp-admin/" AND headers.referer is null AND method == POST
4. Detect new admin user creation via POST:
   path contains "user-new.php" or action == "create_user" AND timestamp >= [suspect_time_window]

Tune and adjust these queries to your environment.

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Guidance for security teams: triage checklist

• Identify all sites running WordPress Automatic and log their plugin versions.
• Verify each site’s exposure (is the plugin publicly enabled? Is the relevant endpoint reachable over the web?).
• Prioritize high-impact sites (e-commerce, high-traffic, or sites with many admin users).
• Deploy virtual patching rules at the edge for high-priority sites.
• Schedule updates and validate on staging before push to production.
• Communicate to stakeholders (site owners, administrators) about the risk and remediation timeline.

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Closing thoughts from a WP security expert

CSRF combined with stored XSS is deceptively powerful. Alone, CSRF may only trigger an action; alone, a stored XSS payload may sit dormant. But chained together — and especially when the stored payload runs in an administrative context — they become a vehicle for significant and persistent compromise. The most straightforward remedy is to keep plugins updated. Next in line is a properly configured WAF that can buy you time and prevent automated exploitation while your update process runs.

If your organization has change control or staging constraints, protect production with virtual patching and monitoring before you push plugin upgrades. If you manage many sites, proactive detection and centralized WAF management are game changers.

Finally — if you haven’t yet — consider putting a managed WAF and malware scanner in front of your WordPress installations. Our free plan is designed to give you immediate baseline protections so you’re not fully exposed while you plan remediation.

Stay safe, and act quickly.

— WP-Firewall Research Team