Nom du plugin	onOffice for WP-Websites
Type of Vulnerability	Injection SQL
CVE Number	CVE-2025-10045
Urgence	Faible
CVE Publish Date	2025-10-15
Source URL	CVE-2025-10045

Authenticated (Editor+) SQL Injection in onOffice for WP-Websites (≤ 5.7) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Know and Do Now

On 15 October 2025 a confirmed SQL injection vulnerability affecting the onOffice for WP-Websites WordPress plugin (versions ≤ 5.7) was published and assigned CVE-2025-10045. The bug requires an authenticated user with at least Editor privileges to exploit, but — critically — it allows direct interaction with the WordPress database. The vulnerability has a CVSS-like score assessed in public reporting at 7.6, indicating it can be severe in practice.

This post is written from the perspective of a WordPress security team that operates a professional web application firewall and incident response capability. Our objective is to explain the risk, how this class of vulnerability works, how to detect exploitation, and how to defend your sites — including immediate steps you can take yourself and how WP-Firewall can protect you while an official upstream fix is not available.

Important note: a working official patch was not available at time of disclosure for the versions listed (≤ 5.7). If you run this plugin, act now.

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Executive summary (TL;DR)

• Vulnerability: Authenticated SQL injection in onOffice for WP-Websites plugin (≤ 5.7). CVE-2025-10045.
• Required privilege: Editor (or higher).
• Impact: Database disclosure, data manipulation, user account tampering, content changes, potential code injection via stored payloads — depending on the application’s database permissions and hosting environment.
• Official fix: Not available at the time of publication. That increases the need for defensive measures.
• Immediate mitigations: remove or deactivate the plugin, restrict Editor privileges, rotate credentials where applicable, implement virtual patching via WAF, monitor logs, review user accounts and content.
• Recommended protection: Deploy a WAF / virtual patching rule set, enforce least privilege, perform a targeted security review and backups before remediation.

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What is this vulnerability — an accessible explanation

SQL injection (SQLi) is a class of vulnerability where an attacker is able to inject SQL code into a query that the application sends to the database. If successful, it lets the attacker read, modify, or delete data, and in some configurations (rare in managed shared hosting) it can even be leveraged for command execution.

This specific issue is an “authenticated SQL injection.” That means an attacker cannot exploit the plugin unless they already have an account on the target WordPress site with at least Editor privileges. Many site attackers attempt to register accounts or compromise lower-privilege accounts to escalate later. On many publishing sites, multiple users have Editor (or higher) permissions — e.g., external contributors, contractors, or marketing staff.

Because the vulnerability is in a plugin component that builds SQL queries using unsanitized user input, an Editor account can pass crafted input to that component and cause the database to execute arbitrary SQL. Depending on your database user permissions, this could expose posts, user details, or other private data, and could in certain hosting setups be the first step of a full site takeover.

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Why an Editor-level flaw matters

It’s easy to assume that only Administrator-level issues are critical. That’s a dangerous assumption:

• Editor accounts are commonly shared or given to contractors and third parties. They often have capabilities to create, edit, and manage content — and they usually can interact with plugin admin screens.
• Attackers focus on the path of least resistance. If they can register a user account or compromise an Editor’s credentials via phishing, password reuse, or weak passwords, they can exploit this vulnerability.
• Even if privilege escalation is not directly possible from SQLi, database access enables user enumeration, password reset tampering, content manipulation, data exfiltration (email addresses, private fields), and often leads to chain exploits that result in remote code execution.

Treat Editor-level vulnerabilities seriously; they are a common stepping-stone for real-world compromises.

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Technical overview (non-exploitative)

I will not publish exploit payloads or step-by-step exploit code. Instead, here is a non-actionable technical description to help defenders:

• A plugin endpoint — typically an admin-side AJAX handler or a REST/controller action accessible to users with Editor privileges — accepts input from a form or request parameter.
• The plugin builds an SQL query by concatenating input values directly into the SQL statement without applying proper parameter binding or escaping.
• Because the input is not sanitized or bound, a crafted input can break out of the intended SQL context and change the executed SQL command, allowing retrieval or modification of arbitrary database rows.
• Depending on the query shape and the database schema, an attacker could extract user email addresses, password hashes (if stored), custom fields, and plugin configuration values. Stored replies or content fields could also be overwritten to include malicious scripts.

What makes this particularly troublesome is that many WordPress plugins assume that Editor or Administrator users are trusted; thus checks and sanitization may be lax.

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Risk assessment — what could go wrong on your site

Possible outcomes if an attacker successfully exploits this vulnerability:

• Data theft: extraction of user data, including email addresses, names, and possibly hashed passwords.
• Account tampering: modifying user metadata or creating new users with elevated roles.
• Content sabotage: changing or deleting posts and pages.
• Persistent backdoors: inserting malicious shortcodes, options, or posts that run JavaScript/PHP under certain conditions.
• Lateral movement: using exposed database credentials (if present in options) or data to escalate within the WordPress site or other services.
• Reputation damage and SEO impact — spam content and invisible redirects.
• In severe but rarer hosting cases, combined with server misconfiguration, further exploitation to achieve remote code execution.

The actual impact depends on the database privilege model, what data the plugin query touches, and the attacker’s skill. Given the CVSS-like score assigned publicly, this should be treated as high risk for sites that allow Editor accounts to be created by untrusted users or use the plugin in question.

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Immediate actions for site owners (within hours)

If you maintain a WordPress site with onOffice for WP-Websites installed and either run version ≤ 5.7 or cannot yet confirm a safe version, follow these steps immediately:

1. Put the site into maintenance/read-only mode where possible (if you expect active incoming traffic that could include exploitation attempts).
2. Deactivate the onOffice plugin temporarily. This is the simplest stop-gap if the plugin is not required for immediate site functionality.
   • Dashboard: Plugins → Installed Plugins → Deactivate onOffice for WP-Websites.
3. If you cannot deactivate (critical production dependency), restrict access to the plugin’s admin screens by IP using .htaccess/nginx rules or by limiting access to wp-admin to trusted IP ranges.
4. Audit all Editor and Administrator accounts:
   • Remove or disable accounts that are unused.
   • Reset passwords for Editors/Administrators, forcing strong, unique values.
   • Revoke access tokens or session cookies where possible (some security plugins can expire sessions).
5. Rotate any credentials stored as plugin options or transient data if you find them.
6. Ensure you have a tested backup of your database and files before making further changes.
7. Enable or update your web application firewall (WAF) rules or virtual patching to block exploitation patterns (details below).
8. Enable multi-factor authentication for all users with Editor level or above, if possible.
9. Add monitoring: enable file integrity monitoring, audit logging for user actions, and database query logging if your host supports it.
10. If you detect suspicious activity (new admin users, changed content, unexpected DB queries), isolate the site and proceed with incident response.

Deactivating the plugin is the fastest and most reliable mitigation while you evaluate impact and wait for an official fix. If you cannot take it offline, virtual patching (WAF) is your next-best defense.

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How to detect if you were targeted (indicators of compromise)

Look for signs that an Editor or internal endpoint was used in unusual ways:

• Unrecognized logins or logins from odd IPs for Editor/Administrator accounts.
• Sudden changes in posts/pages authored by users who did not make them.
• Creation of new administrator or editor accounts you did not authorize.
• Database anomalies: new options rows, modified usermeta, or unknown rows in wp_posts and wp_options.
• Unexpected outbound emails or large numbers of password reset/notification emails being triggered.
• Web server logs that show admin-ajax.php or plugin-specific admin endpoints being POSTed with unusually long parameters or with SQL punctuation (single quotes, comment markers) in parameter values. Note: logs themselves may not always be accessible on shared hosting.
• WAF alerts: look for rules triggered around parameter injection or SQLi signatures.

If you find clear signs of exploitation, treat the site as compromised and follow incident response: isolate, take backups for forensics, preserve logs, rotate credentials, and engage a trained incident response team if needed.

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Detection steps (practical, safe, non-exploitative)

To check if your site shows signs of attack without attempting exploitation:

• Export and review access logs and filter for requests to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php or plugin-specific admin endpoints. Look for abnormal parameters or long query strings.
• Check WordPress user list for new or unexpected users (especially with Editor/Administrator rights).
• Compare database dumps from a known-good backup to current database to find unexpected changes (new rows, modified options).
• Inspect recently modified files for unexpected changes (timestamps, unknown content).
• Enable WordPress debug logs temporarily if safe on your environment, and capture suspicious errors.

Do NOT attempt to probe the vulnerability yourself using exploit payloads. That is both risky and potentially unlawful on sites you don’t own.

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Mitigation options — short-term and long-term

Short-term mitigations (apply immediately):

• Deactivate the plugin (most effective).
• Restrict access to wp-admin and plugin endpoints by IP.
• Remove or limit Editor accounts and enforce password reset for all users with elevated privileges.
• Enable multi-factor authentication for Editors and Administrators.
• Deploy a WAF / virtual patch that blocks suspicious patterns targeted at the vulnerable plugin endpoints.

Long-term hardening:

• Establish a strict provisioning workflow for Editor-level accounts: approvals, periodic reviews, and expiration for temporary accounts.
• Limit plugin usage to supported, actively maintained plugins. Avoid plugins that are no longer updated.
• Maintain regular backups and test restores frequently.
• Keep WordPress core, themes, and plugins up-to-date on a staging environment before production rollout.
• Harden hosting: restrict database user privileges where feasible (though note WordPress core typically requires the DB user to be able to read/write many tables).
• Implement centralized logging and alerting for suspicious user actions or unusual SQL queries.

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Virtual patching and how WP-Firewall helps

When an official patch is not yet available, virtual patching via a web application firewall (WAF) is the recommended protective measure. Virtual patching doesn’t change the plugin code; instead, it blocks malicious requests that attempt to exploit the vulnerability while allowing legitimate traffic to continue.

WP-Firewall provides layered protection mechanisms designed to mitigate authenticated SQL injection attempts like CVE-2025-10045:

• Behavioral rules: block requests that contain SQL meta-characters in parameters when the request targets plugin admin endpoints, especially when the request is authenticated but from unexpected sources or patterns.
• Parameter whitelisting: validate expected parameter types and lengths for known plugin endpoints and reject requests that fail validation.
• Session/role anomaly detection: detect unusual activity from Editor accounts (e.g., bulk content updates or repeated admin endpoint hits) and elevate scrutiny or block.
• Rate-limiting: prevent automated exploitation attempts by limiting request rates to sensitive endpoints.
• Automatic virtual patch rules are deployed centrally when a new vulnerability is disclosed; active WP-Firewall users are protected immediately through our managed rule updates.
• Audit logging and real-time alerts when suspicious patterns matching the vulnerability are observed.

If you run WP-Firewall, our free Basic plan includes managed firewall rules and protection against OWASP Top 10 risks that help mitigate this exact class of attack. For sites that require faster incident response and mitigation, our paid plans add deeper automation and reporting.

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Safe configuration guidance for WAF rules (for administrators)

Below are defensive concepts that should be implemented in a WAF. Do not use these as exploit instructions — they are intended for defenders:

• Block or sanitize requests to plugin admin endpoints where parameters contain SQL syntax sequences (e.g., unescaped single quotes followed by SQL keywords or comment tokens), unless the input has been validated server-side.
• Enforce expected parameter type checking: numeric-only fields reject non-numeric input; fields with known allowed characters reject special punctuation.
• Limit the reach of plugin endpoints to users with specific capabilities and only from known origins (e.g., restrict AJAX handlers that are only needed in certain admin screens).
• Implement role-based anomaly detection: an Editor making large numbers of direct admin endpoint calls or repeated calls with long parameter strings should be throttled or temporarily blocked pending review.
• Log and alert on repeated SQLi signature matches or probing attempts.

If you are not comfortable creating WAF rules, engage your hosting provider or a security vendor, or consider upgrading to a plan that includes managed virtual patching.

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How to respond if you believe you were compromised

1. Put the site into a maintenance state / disconnect from networks if needed.
2. Preserve evidence:
   • Download and preserve current logs (webserver, database, application).
   • Make offline backups of files and database for forensic analysis.
3. Rotate credentials:
   • Reset all admin/editor passwords and any API keys stored in the database or plugin options.
   • Rotate database credentials if you suspect they were exposed (careful: site will need updated wp-config.php).
4. Restore from a clean backup if you cannot confidently identify and remove the compromise.
5. If malware or backdoors are present, perform a full cleanup:
   • Remove unauthorized users.
   • Remove unknown plugins/themes or files.
   • Reinstall core, themes, and plugins from official sources.
6. After remediation, re-enable protections (WAF, MFA) and monitor logs for a period.
7. Engage a professional incident response service if you are unsure how to proceed or if the compromise is broad.

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Practical example — what a safe audit might look like

• Review wp_users and wp_usermeta for recently created users with elevated roles.
• Check wp_posts for content changes in the last 30 days and filter by unexpected authors.
• Inspect wp_options for unknown serialized entries; many attackers hide data in options records.
• Search logs for requests to admin-ajax.php or to plugin-specific admin paths with suspicious parameter lengths.
• If you find suspicious items, snapshot the database and files and escalate to incident response.

These are investigative steps; if you find clear evidence of exploitation, preserve evidence for later analysis.

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Communication to stakeholders (how to explain this to non-technical people)

If you need to inform a manager or client, use plain language:

• “A security issue was found in a plugin used on our site that could allow someone with an Editor-level account to access or change the site’s database. While this requires someone to have an Editor account, it is still a serious issue. We recommend temporarily disabling the plugin and enabling additional protections while we investigate.”
• Explain actions taken: plugin deactivated (if applicable), password resets, WAF rules applied, backups secured, monitoring enabled.
• Provide a timeline for ongoing work: detection, containment, detailed audit, recovery, and ongoing monitoring.

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Why this vulnerability is a good reminder about security hygiene

This incident underscores recurring themes in WordPress security:

• Principle of least privilege: minimize Editor accounts; give elevated capabilities only when needed.
• Plugin hygiene: prefer actively maintained plugins with a track record of timely security updates.
• Defense in depth: rely on more than one control (MFA, WAF, logging) — if one fails, others can prevent exploitation.
• Backup and restore readiness: tested backups allow cleaner recovery in the event of a compromise.
• Rapid virtual patching capability: when no official fix exists yet, quick WAF rule deployment can dramatically reduce risk.

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Practical checklist — what to do in the next 72 hours

• Identify if onOffice for WP-Websites is installed and confirm version.
• If version ≤ 5.7: deactivate the plugin immediately if possible.
• Force password resets for all users with Editor or higher privileges.
• Enable or enforce multi-factor authentication for Editors and Admins.
• Put a managed WAF or virtual patch in front of the site to block SQLi patterns and sensitive endpoint access.
• Review user accounts and remove any that are unnecessary.
• Perform a backup of files and database and preserve it offline.
• Search logs for signs of suspicious activity and preserve them.
• If suspicious activity is found, follow incident response steps or engage a professional service.

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How WP-Firewall protects your site (and what plan suits you)

We build WP-Firewall to protect WordPress sites from exactly this kind of scenario: a plugin vulnerability with no immediate official fix.

• Basic (Free) plan features:
  • Managed firewall rules that protect against OWASP Top 10 risks, including SQL injection patterns.
  • Unlimited bandwidth, WAF defenses, and a malware scanner to detect suspicious artifacts.
  • This plan offers immediate virtual patching coverage for many known attacks, providing a fast first line of defense while you assess or patch plugins.
• Standard plan:
  • All Basic features plus automatic malware removal and the ability to maintain IP blacklists/whitelists (up to 20 entries) — helpful to block known malicious IPs targeting admin endpoints.
• Pro plan:
  • Adds monthly security reports, auto vulnerability virtual patching that speeds up mitigation for new public issues, and access to premium add-ons such as a Dedicated Account Manager and managed services.

If you want immediate managed protection and a straightforward way to mitigate the current risk while you follow the steps above, WP-Firewall provides virtual patching and managed firewall rules that will block known exploitation attempts against vulnerable plugin endpoints.

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Get instant baseline protection with WP-Firewall Free Plan

If you’re worried about this onOffice SQL injection or simply want a stronger first line of defense for your WordPress sites, our Basic (Free) plan provides essential managed protections at no cost. It includes a managed WAF with rules that block common SQL injection payloads, a malware scanner, unlimited bandwidth, and mitigation for the OWASP Top 10. These protections help reduce the likelihood of exploitation while you apply longer-term fixes. Start free protection now: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

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Final recommendations

1. Treat Editor-level vulnerabilities with urgency. They are frequently exploited via compromised or social-engineered accounts.
2. If the onOffice plugin is not necessary to run your site, remove it. Less installed code means fewer attack surfaces.
3. If you must keep the plugin active, restrict access to the plugin admin screens and deploy a WAF with virtual patching rules.
4. Maintain good operational hygiene: backups, least privilege, logging, MFA, and rapid vulnerability response plans.
5. Consider managed protection that offers virtual patching to shield your site when plugins don’t have immediate fixes.

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Need help?

If you would like assistance assessing your WordPress site, implementing virtual patching rules, or performing an incident response, WP-Firewall’s security team offers guidance and managed services. Our free plan provides immediate baseline protections while you sort out plugin updates and audits.

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Disclaimer: This post is intended to help defenders. It deliberately avoids publishing exploit code or step-by-step attack instructions. If you operate a WordPress site that you do not own, do not attempt to test this vulnerability without explicit permission. Unauthorized testing or exploitation is illegal and unethical.