Nom du plugin | Flexible Maps |
---|---|
Type of Vulnerability | XSS stocké |
CVE Number | CVE-2025-8622 |
Urgence | Faible |
CVE Publish Date | 2025-08-18 |
Source URL | CVE-2025-8622 |
Flexible Map plugin (≤ 1.18.0) — Contributor-authenticated Stored XSS (CVE-2025-8622)
A stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was disclosed in the Flexible Map WordPress plugin affecting versions up to and including 1.18.0. The issue allows an authenticated user with Contributor privileges to inject HTML/JavaScript into content that is later rendered to visitors, creating the potential for remote script execution in site visitors’ browsers. The issue is tracked as CVE-2025-8622 and the plugin author released a fix in version 1.19.0.
As the team behind WP‑Firewall (a WordPress web application firewall and managed security service), we treat XSS in shortcodes and front-end render paths seriously because they are often leveraged for persistent site compromise, SEO spam, and user session hijacking. This article explains the vulnerability, how it is typically exploited, how site owners can detect indicators of abuse, and a step-by-step remediation and hardening checklist — including virtual patching guidance for sites that cannot immediately update.
Note: this writeup is technical but intended for site owners, developers and administrators. If you manage multiple WordPress installs or run a hosting environment, treat contributor-level vulnerabilities as a priority even if score metrics label them “low” — a persistent XSS in user-submitted content can escalate quickly.
Executive summary (TL;DR)
- Vulnerability: Stored XSS in Flexible Map plugin shortcode rendering when untrusted input is not properly sanitized/escaped.
- Affected versions: Flexible Map ≤ 1.18.0
- Fixed in: Flexible Map 1.19.0
- CVE: CVE-2025-8622
- Required privilege to exploit: Contributor (authenticated)
- Impact: Persistent XSS on pages with vulnerable shortcode — can lead to cookie/session theft, admin takeover (via CSRF + credential theft), SEO spam, forced redirects and malware injection.
- Immediate action: Update the Flexible Map plugin to 1.19.0 or later. If you cannot update immediately, apply the temporary mitigations below (disallow shortcode usage by contributors, remove untrusted map shortcodes, enable virtual patching/WAF rules).
- Detection: search for shortcode occurrences and unescaped
<script>
or event attributes inside shortcode attributes or JSON fields stored in the DB; scan for new or suspicious contributor accounts and recently edited posts.
Why this is important
A contributor-level stored XSS is especially dangerous for these reasons:
- Contributor accounts exist on many sites (guest bloggers, community contributors) and are often not tightly monitored.
- Stored XSS persists in the site database and executes whenever the affected page is viewed by someone with a vulnerable rendering path — including admins and editors if they preview or view the post.
- Attackers use persistent XSS to plant backdoors, steal session cookies, escalate privileges (for example by making an admin import a backdoor plugin via fiddled UI), and distribute malware or SEO spam.
Even if the initial exploit requires only a contributor account, in a site with lax user management that’s enough foothold to escalate into a full compromise.
How the Flexible Map XSS works (technical overview)
Flexible Map provides a shortcode (for example: [flexible_map ...]
) that can accept a number of attributes and JSON-encoded fields to describe markers, popups and other map features. The vulnerability arises when the plugin stores user-supplied content (marker popups, labels, descriptions, etc.) without output-escaping when rendering the shortcode on the front end.
Typical vulnerable pattern:
- Input point: contributor creates a post or a custom post type and inserts the Flexible Map shortcode, or uses an editor field provided by the plugin to define markers/popups.
- Storage: the plugin saves the marker data (often JSON) into post content or postmeta.
- Output: when the page is rendered, the plugin echoes the stored content into the DOM without proper escaping or filtering, allowing embedded HTML and
<script>
tags to execute in visitors’ browsers.
Because the payload is stored and served to every visitor for that page, it is a “stored XSS” — more powerful than reflected XSS which requires an immediate trigger.
Safe example (non-executable) of what an attacker might attempt to store:
[flexible_map markers='[{"popup":"<script></script>"}]' ...]
In a vulnerable plugin version, if the plugin decodes and outputs this popup content directly into the DOM without escaping, the script will execute.
Real-world impact scenarios
- Theft of admin or editor session cookies — attacker can exfiltrate cookies to their server and attempt to hijack accounts.
- Create a fake admin UI to trick site admins into entering credentials or installing a backdoor plugin.
- Inject redirects to phishing pages or ad networks — damaging SEO and revenue.
- Add stealthy links and content to pages for long-term SEO poisoning.
- Create JavaScript-based backdoors that communicate with the attacker’s command-and-control server.
Because the vulnerability only requires contributor access, an attacker only needs to register (if registration is enabled), be invited as a contributor, or compromise a contributor account.
Who’s at risk
- Sites using Flexible Map plugin versions 1.18.0 or earlier.
- Sites that allow contributor-level users to submit content without manual review or that auto-publish contributor-submitted content.
- Multi-author blogs, community sites, and sites with open registrations where contributor accounts are common.
If you run a multi-site WordPress network (or host many clients), consider scanning all installations for the vulnerable plugin and for the presence of the Flexible Map shortcode.
Immediate mitigation steps (what to do in the next hour)
- Update the plugin
- The author fixed the issue in Flexible Map 1.19.0. Update the plugin to 1.19.0 or later on all sites immediately.
- If you use a managed update process, schedule the update immediately and monitor for success.
- If you cannot update immediately — temporary measures:
- Disable rendering of the Flexible Map shortcode for untrusted users. You can temporarily remove or neutralize the shortcode by adding a small snippet to your theme or a mu-plugin to short-circuit the shortcode handler for non-admin users:
// mu-plugin: disable-flexible-map-shortcode.php add_filter('pre_do_shortcode_tag', function($pre, $tag, $attr) { if ($tag === 'flexible_map' && ! current_user_can('manage_options')) { // return a safe placeholder or empty string for visitors return '<!-- flexible_map disabled temporarily for security -->'; } return $pre; }, 10, 3);
Note: test on a staging site first. This approach prevents vulnerable rendering for visitors but still allows admins to view the real output if required.
- Disable creator-contributed shortcodes in posts: instruct editors to remove flexible_map shortcodes from posts that came from contributors until plugin is updated.
- Require manual moderation of any content that includes the flexible_map shortcode: set posts to pending review and audit contributor submissions.
- Disable rendering of the Flexible Map shortcode for untrusted users. You can temporarily remove or neutralize the shortcode by adding a small snippet to your theme or a mu-plugin to short-circuit the shortcode handler for non-admin users:
- Tighten user management:
- Temporarily restrict registration or reduce contributor privileges.
- Review all contributor accounts and recent edits from contributors in the last 30–60 days.
- Block obvious exploit vectors at the web application firewall level:
- Add WAF rules to block requests that contain suspicious payload patterns in fields used by the plugin — for example
"<script"
,onerror=
,onload=
, or base64-encoded script patterns inside JSON fields associated with the map. See “WAF guidance” below.
- Add WAF rules to block requests that contain suspicious payload patterns in fields used by the plugin — for example
Detection — how to find if you were targeted
If you suspect abuse, use the following checks. Always take a backup before making bulk changes.
- Search posts for flexible_map usage
- Search for script tags or suspicious HTML inside posts or postmeta that relate to the map plugin
- Search JSON fields in postmeta for suspicious content
- Use file and database scanners
- Look for suspicious recent admin actions
- Check
utilisateurs_wp
for recently created contributed accounts. - Review
wp_posts.post_modified
timestamps and user IDs. - Inspect
options_wp
for unfamiliar siteurl/home changes or rogue entries. - Take the site into maintenance mode or temporarily restrict public access to prevent further impact to visitors and stop the attacker’s payload from executing.
- Create a full backup (files + DB) before doing destructive clean-up. Preserve evidence.
- Search for and remove malicious scripts in posts/metadata, focusing on posts that include the flexible map shortcode.
- Rotate credentials:
- Reset passwords for all administrator and editor accounts.
- Force password resets for all users (invalidate sessions).
- Rotate API keys, OAuth tokens and any credentials stored in wp-config or the database.
- Inspect plugins and themes for recently modified files:
find . -type f -mtime -30
to list files modified in the last 30 days (adjust as needed).
- Check for newly installed or modified plugins and unknown scheduled events.
- If you detect persistent backdoors (PHP files, modified theme files, cron jobs), restore from a clean backup or rebuild the site from known-good sources.
- After cleanup, update WordPress core, all plugins and themes, and ensure Flexible Map is upgraded to 1.19.0 or later.
- Re-run scans and monitor webserver logs for suspicious requests.
- If you suspect data theft or account compromise, inform affected users and, where required by policy/regulation, follow disclosure and breach notification rules.
- Principle of least privilege
- Limit the number of contributor accounts and review user roles periodically.
- Prefer editorial workflows where contributor submissions go to “pending review” and are reviewed by editors.
- Content sanitization and output escaping (developer guidance)
- Plugin authors must validate and sanitize on input and escape on output.
- For HTML-like content, use
wp_kses()
ouwp_kses_post()
with a tight allowed tags/attributes set. For URLs useesc_url_raw()
etesc_url()
. For attributes useesc_attr()
. - When storing JSON data, validate types and values server-side and treat it as untrusted input.
- Shortcode security best practices
- Sanitize shortcode attributes with appropriate functions (
assainir_champ_texte()
,wp_kses_post()
, custom validators). - Escape all data before printing in JavaScript contexts and HTML attributes.
- When injecting data into JS templates, pass sanitized JSON through
wp_localize_script()
ouwp_add_inline_script()
with proper escaping patterns.
- Sanitize shortcode attributes with appropriate functions (
- Test with unit and integration tests for injection attacks
- Add tests that simulate contributor-submitted content containing markup, event handlers and encoded payloads. Ensure rendering escapes or strips malicious content.
- Content moderation controls
- Provide plugin settings to disable rendering of widgets/shortcodes from non-trusted roles.
- Add admin options to whitelist allowed HTML tags for popups and marker descriptions.
- Monitoring & logging
- Add logging for content changes by contributors and alert admins when contributions include HTML/script tags or encoded scripts.
- Monitor for increases in requests to pages with map shortcodes.
- Block POSTs that attempt to save flexible map data containing script tags
- Generic pattern: block requests where payloads contain
<script
or event handlers (onerror=
,onload=
) inside fields commonly used by the plugin (for example, request parameters namedmarkers
,popup
,description
,content
related to map, or AJAX endpoints used by the plugin).
- Generic pattern: block requests where payloads contain
- Block JSON payloads containing
<script
in POST bodies to editor endpoints- Many editors send JSON with metadata; a WAF can inspect request body for
"<script"
and block or sanitize requests from low‑privilege sessions.
- Many editors send JSON with metadata; a WAF can inspect request body for
- Pattern detect encoded payloads
- Attackers often encode malicious content. Rules should also look for
<script
or base64 blocks containingscript
oujavascript:
.
- Attackers often encode malicious content. Rules should also look for
- Prevent immediate execution on front-end by filtering responses (response body rewrite)
- If your WAF supports response scanning, create a rule to neutralize
<script>
tags inside portions of the page that match the flexible_map shortcode output. For example, rewrite<script
à<script
for content areas that match theflexible_map
container.
- If your WAF supports response scanning, create a rule to neutralize
- Rate-limit contributor actions
- Add throttling on content submissions from the same account/IP to reduce risk of automated exploitation attempts.
- Sanitize input on save
- Validate JSON and expected data types when saving markers/popups.
- Strip or escape HTML from fields that should be plain text (titles, labels).
- For fields that legitimately allow HTML (rich content), use
wp_kses_post()
and a whitelist of allowed tags/attributes.
- Escape on output
- Always escape attributes with
esc_attr()
and HTML content withesc_html()
unlesswp_kses()
has been applied. - For data passed into JavaScript
wp_json_encode()
+wp_add_inline_script()
and thenesc_js()
or used viadata-*
attributes withesc_attr()
.
- Always escape attributes with
- Capability checks and nonce validation
- When saving via AJAX or admin endpoints, ensure
current_user_can()
is validated and use nonces for protection.
- When saving via AJAX or admin endpoints, ensure
- Limit allowed tags in popup content
- Provide a plugin setting where site owners can select allowed tags for popup HTML, defaulting to a tight-safe set or plain text.
- Add regression tests
- Unit tests should include attempts to save strings like
<script></script>
and assert that output is sanitized.
- Unit tests should include attempts to save strings like
- Confirm plugin Flexible Map version; upgrade to 1.19.0 or later.
- Review posts with
[flexible_map
shortcodes and manually inspect marker/popups for suspicious HTML/JS content. - Audit contributor accounts and recent activity (last 90 days).
- Force password resets for admin/editor accounts if you find suspicious scripts.
- Run a full site malware scan (file + DB).
- Check for unknown scheduled events (wp_cron) and remove unauthorized ones.
- Purge caching layers and CDN to ensure removal of cached malicious content.
- Add WAF rules to block request patterns described above until plugin is patched.
- Implement content moderation (pending review) for contributor submissions going forward.
- Document the incident and, if necessary, prepare communications to affected stakeholders.
- Deploy virtual patch rules to block the exploit patterns until customers can update.
- Flag vulnerable installations and provide step-by-step remediation guidance.
- Offer scanning and cleanup for impacted customers and provide advice on locking down contributor workflows.
- Never trust what comes from the editor or from postmeta. Assume anything submitted by a contributor is attacker-controlled.
- Avoid echoing JSON blobs into the DOM without encoding. If you must include JSON in HTML, use
wp_json_encode()
and put it into a safe data attribute or a script block where it is passed through JSON encoding and not interpreted as HTML. - Don’t use
écho
ouprint
on user-supplied markup without escaping. - Monitor access logs and web application firewall logs for repeated attempts to inject similar payloads.
- Keep an eye on Google Search Console (for any SEO spam warnings).
- Check for unusual spikes in outbound traffic (malware may be exfiltrating).
- Re-run malware scans weekly for the first month after remediation.
- Essential protection: managed firewall, unlimited bandwidth, web application firewall (WAF), malware scanner.
- Mitigation against OWASP Top 10 risks.
- Easy setup and auto-updates for security rules.
WP‑CLI (fast):
wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%[flexible_map%';"
SQL (phpMyAdmin or custom tool):
SELECT ID, post_title, post_content
FROM wp_posts
WHERE post_content LIKE '%[flexible_map%';
wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';"
Note: this query returns many false positives (themes, widgets might legitimately have scripts). Focus review on posts that include [flexible_map
or mention map data in postmeta.
Many plugins store map markers in wp_postmeta
. Example queries:
SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value
FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%flexible_map%' OR meta_value LIKE '%marker%' OR meta_value LIKE '%popup%';
Search the meta_value
for <script
, javascript:
, onerror=
, onload=
or encoded equivalents.
Run a full site malware scan (preferably offline or via a well-maintained scanner). Look for scheduled tasks (wp_cron) created by unknown users, new plugins, or modified theme files.
If you find suspicious scripts encoded in the database, do not immediately “replace all occurrences” unless you have a tested recovery plan — it’s better to export suspect rows and manually review.
Forensic & incident response steps (if you find signs of exploitation)
If you need professional incident response, engage a security provider experienced in WordPress. (WP‑Firewall offers managed services and virtual patching to help with response and protection.)
Long-term hardening recommendations
WAF guidance (practical virtual patching)
If you cannot immediately update the plugin on a production site, virtual patching via a WAF can buy time. Below are conceptual rules you can implement. Test rules carefully to avoid breaking legitimate functionality.
Example (conceptual) ModSecurity-like pseudo-rule:
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx (wp-admin/post.php|admin-ajax\.php)" \
"chain,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Block potential flexible_map XSS payload from contributor'"
SecRule ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (<script|onerror=|onload=|javascript:|data:text/html)" \
"t:none,ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly"
Important: these examples are conceptual. Tailor regexes to your environment and test on staging. False positives in WAF rules can break legitimate functionality.
Recommendations for plugin authors (how Flexible Map should be fixed)
Sample remediation checklist (for site owners / admins)
Example safe code snippets for developers
1. Sanitize marker popup before saving (server-side):
$popup_raw = isset($_POST['marker_popup']) ? wp_unslash($_POST['marker_popup']) : '';
// allow only a conservative set of tags, if any
$allowed_tags = array(
'a' => array('href' => true, 'title' => true, 'rel' => true),
'strong' => array(),
'em' => array(),
'br' => array(),
'p' => array(),
);
$popup_safe = wp_kses($popup_raw, $allowed_tags);
// store $popup_safe to DB
update_post_meta($post_id, '_marker_popup', $popup_safe);
2. Escape when outputting:
$popup = get_post_meta($post_id, '_marker_popup', true);
// If stored as safe HTML via wp_kses, output directly. Otherwise escape:
echo '<div class="marker-popup">' . $popup . '</div>';
(Where $popup
has been passed through a strict wp_kses
filter during save.)
Why updating is still the single best step
Virtual patching and short-term hardening reduce risk but do not remove the underlying bug. Updating to the fixed plugin version removes the vulnerable code-path and prevents future attempts that target the same vulnerability. Always prioritize a timely plugin update as the primary remediation. Where updates are delayed (compatibility concerns, staging testing), apply the temporary mitigations outlined earlier.
Our approach at WP‑Firewall
At WP‑Firewall we combine automatic detection rules, virtual patching and customer alerts to reduce the window of exposure for vulnerabilities like this. When verified vulnerabilities like this are disclosed, we:
If you use WP‑Firewall, enable auto-protect features and apply virtual patches when advised to minimize exposure while you perform full updates and forensic checks.
Additional developer notes — patterns to avoid
Recovery timeline and monitoring after remediation
After updating and cleaning:
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Final words — treat contributor-facing inputs as a critical attack surface
Stored XSS in shortcodes and plugin-rendered front-end content is a recurring cause of site compromise. The Flexible Map vulnerability allowed contributor users to persist payloads that could be executed in visitors’ browsers. The fix (plugin 1.19.0) should be applied immediately on every affected site. Where updates are delayed, implement the temporary mitigations above: disable shortcode rendering for untrusted users, add WAF protections, and review recent contributor submissions.
If you need assistance scanning, virtual-patching or incident response, WP‑Firewall provides managed services and virtual patches that can be deployed while you update and clean up.
If you’d like hands-on help, sign up for WP‑Firewall Basic and enable managed protection and virtual patching today:
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Stay secure,
The WP‑Firewall Security Team