Plugin-Name	Wishlist and Save for later for Woocommerce
Art der Schwachstelle	IDOR
CVE-Nummer	CVE-2025-12087
Dringlichkeit	Niedrig
CVE-Veröffentlichungsdatum	2025-11-12
Quell-URL	CVE-2025-12087

Urgent: IDOR in “Wishlist and Save for later for WooCommerce” (≤ 1.1.22) — What WordPress Site Owners Need to Know

Veröffentlicht: 12 November 2025
CVE: CVE-2025-12087
Schwere: Low (CVSS 4.3)
Betroffene Versionen: ≤ 1.1.22
Behoben in: 1.1.23

As the security team behind WP-Firewall, we want to make sure site owners, developers and admins have a clear, actionable understanding of the recently disclosed insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the “Wishlist and Save for later for WooCommerce” plugin. This vulnerability allows an authenticated user with Subscriber-level privileges to delete wishlist items that do not belong to them.

Below you’ll find a plain-English explanation of the issue, practical impact for site owners, safe mitigation steps you can implement immediately, developer guidance to prevent similar issues, detection and incident response advice, and how WP-Firewall can help protect your site while you update.

This post is written from hands-on experience protecting WordPress sites under real attack conditions — no marketing fluff, just clear security guidance.

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Quick summary

• Was ist passiert: An IDOR exists in the wishlist deletion functionality of the plugin. An authenticated user (Subscriber or higher) can manipulate the wishlist item identifier and delete items from other users’ wishlists.
• Auswirkungen: Data integrity/privacy issue: other users’ wishlist items can be removed. This can be used for nuisance attacks, targeted sabotage (for stores relying on wishlist-based marketing), or as part of a larger chain of abuse.
• Exploitable by: Authenticated accounts with Subscriber privileges or higher.
• CVE: CVE-2025-12087
• Fix: Update the plugin to version 1.1.23 (or later) which includes proper authorization checks.
• WP-Firewall recommendation: Apply the plugin update immediately. If you can’t update right away, enable virtual patching rules (WAF), tighten logging, and implement temporary access controls on the affected endpoint.

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What is an IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) — simply explained

An IDOR is a type of broken access control where an application uses user-supplied input (an ID or key) to directly reference an internal object — such as a database record — without adequately checking whether the requesting user is actually allowed to access or modify that object.

Example (conceptual):

• A request to delete an item contains a parameter like item_id=123.
• The application deletes the record with ID 123 without confirming that item 123 belongs to the currently authenticated user.
• If the attacker can guess or enumerate valid IDs, the attacker can delete or modify other users’ items.

In this plugin’s case, the wishlist deletion endpoint accepted an identifier and deleted the wishlist item without verifying ownership. Since Subscriber-level accounts are common on many stores (e.g., account registrations, loyalty programs), this is a meaningful weakness even though it does not grant elevated privileges.

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Why this vulnerability matters

At first glance this may seem minor — a user can delete other users’ wishlist items. But practical concerns include:

• Customer experience and trust: Users may rely on wishlists to save items for later purchases. If items disappear unexpectedly, it undermines trust and can damage conversions.
• Abuse and sabotage: A malicious actor could repeatedly remove items for particular users to frustrate them or prevent them from purchasing.
• Chaining with other vulnerabilities: IDORs can be combined with other issues in multi-step attacks. For example, if wishlists link to personalized promotions or contain references to customer-specific data, the impact could escalate.
• Indicator of insecure development practices: If one capability check is missing, there may be other, more serious access control flaws.

The CVSS score assigned is relatively low (4.3) because the vulnerability requires an authenticated account and the direct impact is limited to wishlist deletion. However, “low” does not mean “ignore” — user experience, reputation and the potential for abuse are real risks.

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How an attacker could (and would not necessarily need to) exploit this

Attack characteristics:

• The attacker needs an account on the site. Subscriber-level (the lowest registered role) is sufficient.
• The attack consists of sending deletion requests with manipulated wishlist item identifiers to the endpoint handling wishlist removals.
• If identifiers are predictable or enumerable (e.g., incremental DB IDs), an attacker can iterate them and remove many items.
• Automated scripts can perform such actions at scale.

Wichtig: We will not publish exploit code or step-by-step PoCs. As security professionals we avoid publishing weaponized instructions that make exploitation easier. This guidance is focused on mitigation and detection.

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Immediate mitigation steps for site owners (what to do now)

1. Aktualisieren Sie das Plugin.
   • The vendor released version 1.1.23 which fixes the issue. Update to 1.1.23 or later as soon as possible.
   • Always test updates in a staging environment when feasible, but for access-control fixes prioritize security and update quickly if you’re comfortable.
2. If you cannot update immediately — apply temporary protections:
   • Enable WP-Firewall virtual patching (WAF) rules that block or rate-limit suspicious deletion requests to the affected endpoint.
   • Block or challenge requests that come from newly registered accounts, suspicious IPs, or show parameter tampering patterns.
   • Restrict access to the wishlist deletion endpoint to authenticated users with a nonce or to roles higher than Subscriber until the update can be applied (if your business processes allow it).
3. Harden authentication and registration
   • Add email verification, captcha or human verification on account registration to raise the cost for attackers spinning up many Subscriber accounts.
   • Consider temporary review/approval of new accounts in high-risk situations.
4. Improve logging and monitoring
   • Log all wishlist deletion requests (endpoint, user ID, target item ID, IP address, user agent).
   • Monitor for spikes in deletion requests, repeated 4xx/5xx responses, or patterns of different user IDs deleting the same target items.
5. Communicate with customers
   • If you detect abuse, notify affected users, explain the remediation steps taken, and offer reassurance and any available restoration options (if wishlist data can be restored).
   • Be transparent but avoid alarmist language.
6. Restore data if needed
   • If customer wishlists are stored in backups, you may be able to restore to a recent known-good state. Balance data loss vs. re-introduction of changes that might include legitimate updates.
   • Consider exporting wishlists regularly or retaining change history for recovery.
7. Rotate relevant keys and credentials
   • If you suspect wider compromise, rotate API keys, reset admin sessions, and force-password resets as needed.

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How WP-Firewall protects you (practical value while you update)

As a WordPress firewall provider, we focus on multiple, layered protections that reduce risk while you update:

• Virtual patching (immediate WAF rules): We can implement signature-based and behavior-based rules that block attempts to access the vulnerable deletion handler or tamper with wishlist IDs. This prevents exploitation even when the vulnerable plugin is still present.
• Behavioral rate-limiting: Detect and throttle accounts making unusually high numbers of wishlist operations from one IP or across many accounts.
• Bot and registration protections: Block or challenge automated account creation and suspicious registration flows that many attackers use.
• Anomaly detection and alerting: We monitor for mass deletion patterns and notify you when suspicious activity is detected.
• Malware scanning and cleanup: After an incident, malware scanning helps ensure no persistent backdoors or additional malicious payloads exist.

If you’re not ready to update, enabling our managed rules can drastically reduce practical exploitability while you schedule and test the plugin update.

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Detection: signs you may have been targeted or exploited

• Sudden disappearance of wishlist items for multiple users in a short time frame.
• Deletion requests in logs where the acting user ID is not the owner of the deleted item.
• Large volumes of deletion requests originating from one IP or a small set of IP addresses.
• Numerous new subscriber accounts being created and immediately issuing deletion requests.
• Elevated error responses from wishlist endpoints (e.g., multiple failed deletes due to invalid IDs) — could indicate scanning/enumeration.

Where to look:

• Webserver logs (access logs) — look for POST/GET requests to the wishlist deletion route and examine parameters.
• Application logs — many plugins log operations; check for delete operations and mismatched ownership.
• Database audit (if available) — check deleted records and timestamps.
• WAF logs — look for blocked attempts and anomalies.

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Checkliste für die Reaktion auf Zwischenfälle

1. Apply the plugin update immediately.
2. Implement or enable virtual patching rules (WAF) to stop further exploitation.
3. Collect logs (webserver, WP, WAF) for forensic analysis — copy them to a secure location.
4. Identify affected user accounts and determine scope (who lost wishlist items, timeframe).
5. Restore data if feasible.
6. Inform affected users and provide steps for remediation and reassurance.
7. Rotate site admin credentials and invalidate sessions if a broader compromise is suspected.
8. Perform a full site scan for malware/backdoors.
9. Review account creation flows and tighten anti-bot protections if necessary.
10. Document the incident, timeline, and lessons learned.

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Practical developer guidance — avoid repeating this mistake

If you maintain plugins or custom code, follow these secure coding practices to prevent IDORs:

1. Enforce ownership checks on every object-modifying operation
   • Example pattern: fetch the object by ID, verify object.owner_id == current_user_id (or verify capability on that object) before performing modifications or deletion.
   • Never rely only on client-supplied user identifiers.
2. Use non-predictable identifiers when appropriate
   • Avoid exposing auto-incrementing database IDs in public endpoints when not necessary. Consider using non-guessable UUIDs or opaque tokens for public references (though this is not a substitute for authorization checks).
3. Use WordPress capabilities and nonces
   • Verify current_user_can() for operations that logically require more than basic subscriber access.
   • Verwenden wp_verify_nonce for CSRF protection and verify the nonce server-side.
4. Follow the principle of least privilege
   • Only allow operations needed for the role; do not elevate privileges implicitly through endpoints.
5. Centralize authorization logic
   • Implement reusable authorization functions to reduce the risk of missed checks across multiple endpoints.
6. Log sensitive operations
   • Log deletions/updates with the acting user, target object, timestamp and request origin — this assists detection and investigation.
7. Test with role-based testing
   • During QA, test operations as each role (Subscriber, Contributor, Editor, Admin) and verify intended permissions.
8. Threat modeling
   • Consider how public endpoints could be abused if only a low-privilege account can hit them; include IDORs in your threat models.

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Example virtual patching/WAF guidance (conceptual, safe)

Below is a conceptual example of the types of protections you can apply in a WAF. This is generic guidance — do not copy exploit payloads or expose details that would ease misuse.

• Block or challenge requests to the wishlist deletion endpoint that:
  • Are missing a valid nonce or referer header.
  • Contain numeric-only incremental IDs patterns with no ownership validation (common sign of enumeration).
  • Originate from IPs with high registration-to-action ratios (many new subscribers performing deletions).
• Rate-limit deletion operations per account and per IP (e.g., max 5 delete actions per 10 minutes).
• Challenge requests from newly created accounts (less than X hours old) that attempt deletion actions (present CAPTCHA).
• Monitor and alert on patterns: many different accounts deleting the same target item IDs.

A managed firewall will be able to deploy such protections centrally and tune rules with minimal false positives.

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Why this is fixed in 1.1.23 — what a correct fix looks like

A proper fix for this class of bug typically includes:

• Server-side verification that the wishlist item belongs to the requesting user before deletion.
• Use of WordPress user capabilities (current_user_can) or explicit owner checks.
• CSRF protections (wp_verify_nonce) for any state-changing requests.
• Logging of the action for auditability.

The plugin vendor’s update (1.1.23) contains such checks; update to it as the definitive corrective action.

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Recommendations for hosting providers and agencies

• Push critical security updates through reliable processes and notify customers about the risk and remediation steps.
• Offer temporary virtual patching or WAF rules for clients who cannot update immediately.
• Provide remediation support: scanning, restoration, and communication templates to help site owners notify their customers if needed.
• Enforce rate limits at the web server or edge layer to reduce automated enumeration.

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Long-term hardening roadmap (for stores with many plugins/custom code)

• Implement a centralized WAF and virtual patching program to block exploitation of known vulnerabilities until plugins are safely updated.
• Maintain a risk register of plugins and their update status.
• Automate staging updates: test plugin updates in staging and then allow scheduled push to production with a brief maintenance window.
• Use role-based access control and minimize the number of users with administrative access.
• Keep backups and a tested restore process in place.
• Regularly audit custom endpoints and third-party integrations for access control issues.

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Häufig gestellte Fragen

Q: Is this vulnerability remote-code execution or site takeover?
A: No. This is an access-control (IDOR) issue allowing deletion of wishlist items. It does not directly allow remote code execution or full site takeover. However, it can be abused for nuisance and as part of chained attacks.

Q: Do attackers need to be logged in?
A: Yes. An authenticated account at Subscriber level or higher is required.

Q: Will updating automatically restore deleted wishlist items?
A: No. Updates fix the vulnerability going forward, but they do not automatically restore deleted data. Restoration requires backups or manual reconstruction.

Q: Can I detect if someone misused the vulnerability in the past?
A: Look for unusual deletion patterns in logs, or sudden drops in wishlist counts for specific users. If you have comprehensive application or DB logs, you can trace deletion events and the acting user IDs.

Q: I manage many client sites — how should I prioritize this?
A: Prioritize public-facing e-commerce and high-traffic stores. The risk is moderate because it requires an authenticated account, but the business impact can be real. Deploy WAF rules while scheduling updates.

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Closing thoughts from WP-Firewall’s security team

Access control weaknesses like IDORs are among the most common yet avoidable security mistakes in web applications. They often arise from assumptions (e.g., “only the owner will ever call this endpoint”) that are invalid in the real world where attackers automate requests and register accounts in bulk.

If you run a WooCommerce store, have custom account flows, or rely on user data (like wishlists) for marketing and conversions, don’t discount this issue. Update the plugin now. Enable layered protections (WAF, rate-limiting, bot controls). Improve logging and detection. And review your plugin and custom-code access checks while you have the momentum.

If you’d like a hand protecting your site while you update, we provide managed virtual patching and layered WordPress security tailored to e-commerce and multi-site environments. Our goal is to stop attackers from reaching vulnerable code paths before those paths are patched.

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Start protecting your site now — free Managed Firewall plan for WordPress sites

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If you want help implementing any of the above mitigations, or would like us to assess your site and deploy virtual patches while you test plugin updates, reach out to our support team through the WP-Firewall dashboard. Keep your site safe, and update today.