Plugin-navn	DominoKit
Type af sårbarhed	Manglende autorisation
CVE-nummer	CVE-2025-12350
Hastighed	Lav
CVE-udgivelsesdato	2025-11-04
Kilde-URL	CVE-2025-12350

DominoKit <= 1.1.0 — Missing Authorization Allows Unauthenticated Settings Update (CVE-2025-12350)

As the WP‑Firewall security team, we’re sharing a practical, actionable breakdown of the DominoKit plugin vulnerability (CVE-2025-12350) so WordPress site owners, administrators and developers can understand the risk, verify exposure, and apply effective mitigations. This advisory explains the root cause, attacker impact, detection, short‑term mitigations and long‑term developer fixes — plus how WP‑Firewall can protect you immediately even when an official plugin patch is not yet available.

We write as practitioners who operate, tune and maintain production WordPress firewalls daily. We’ll avoid overly academic language and give clear code examples, configuration snippets and detection checks you can use right away.

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Resumé

• Vulnerability: Broken access control / missing authorization in DominoKit (plugin) versions <= 1.1.0.
• Identifier: CVE-2025-12350.
• Impact: An unauthenticated attacker can invoke a settings‑update function in the plugin and modify plugin configuration without valid authorization checks. This can lead to persistent site misconfiguration, malicious redirects, script injection, or enabling features that aid later exploitation.
• Severity: Medium/Low (CVSS 5.3 reported). While the direct technical impact varies by how the plugin uses settings, the risk is meaningful because the attacker needs no prior authentication.
• Official fix: Not available at time of this writing. Site owners must mitigate immediately.
• Immediate protective options: disable or remove plugin, block access to vulnerable endpoints, add WAF/virtual patch rules, restrict access via host rules, monitor logs, and follow developer patch guidance.

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What is the problem (plain English)

Certain DominoKit plugin functions that update plugin settings do not verify that the requester is properly authorized. In WordPress plugins this commonly happens when a developer exposes a handler — via admin AJAX, a REST route or direct POST target — that updates options but either:

• does not require a valid nonce, or
• does not check current_user_can() or capability checks, or
• has no REST permission_callback verifying authentication.

Because those checks are missing or incorrectly implemented, anyone — even visitors who are not logged in — can call that endpoint and change plugin settings.

Why that matters: plugin settings often control behavior that affects the entire site (redirect URLs, JavaScript snippets, content injections, third‑party integrations, file handling). An attacker who flips those settings can cause site defacement, phishing redirects, persistent XSS or backdoor persistence, and events that lead to a later privilege escalation or data exfiltration.

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Who should care

• Site owners using DominoKit plugin versions <= 1.1.0.
• Managed WordPress providers with DominoKit installed on customer sites.
• Developers maintaining themes or custom plugins that rely on DominoKit settings.
• Security teams monitoring for unauthenticated POSTs to sensitive endpoints.

If you run DominoKit and cannot immediately update (no official fix yet), treat this as urgent: the function is unauthenticated and can be triggered remotely.

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Technical details (what goes wrong)

In a vulnerable implementation, there is a path that:

1. Accepts a POST (or REST) request to update options.
2. Reads incoming parameters and writes to the database via update_option(), update_site_option() or similar.
3. Does not validate a WordPress nonce with check_admin_referer() / check_ajax_referer() or does not call current_user_can( ‘manage_options’ ) or an equivalent capability check.
4. Does not protect REST routes with a permission_callback that ensures the caller is authenticated and authorized.

Common vulnerable patterns:

• An admin‑ajax action defined without check_ajax_referer() and without current_user_can() validation.
• REST route created with permission_callback returning true or missing entirely.
• Direct endpoint (PHP file) included in plugin accessible publicly that calls update_option() without verification.

The effect: remote unauthenticated requests can run update_option() and change stored settings.

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Impact scenarios (realistic abuse examples)

Below are realistic ways an attacker could use this capability. The specific impact depends on what settings DominoKit stores, but these are plausible, high‑impact outcomes:

• Change a redirect URL used by the plugin to send visitors to phishing or malware sites.
• Inject or enable untrusted JavaScript snippets (if plugin allows adding custom scripts).
• Turn on debug logging or file upload features in an insecure mode to aid future file injection or persistence.
• Add attacker‑controlled tracking or analytics IDs to capture visitor data.
• Modify content generation templates to include attacker content (phishing pages, coinminer scripts).
• Configure integrations (Webhooks, API keys) to exfiltrate data or accept attacker commands.

Even if each change alone is not catastrophic, these changes enable further stages of a multi‑stage attack. Because an attacker needs no credentials, automation is simple and fast.

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How to check if your site is vulnerable (quick checklist)

1. Confirm the plugin version: on the Dashboard -> Plugins page, check DominoKit version. If <= 1.1.0 — assume vulnerable.
2. Inspect site access logs for unusual POST/PUT requests:
   • POSTs to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with parameters referencing the plugin (e.g., action parameter containing “domino”, “dominokit”, or plugin-specific action name).
   • POSTs to plugin PHP files under /wp-content/plugins/dominokit/ (or similar) coming from external IPs and not originating from administrative accounts.
   • REST API calls (POST/PATCH) to endpoints like /wp-json/<plugin-namespace>/…
3. Look for recent changes in options related to DominoKit:
   • Query options table: SELECT option_name, option_value FROM wp_options WHERE option_name LIKE ‘%dominokit%’;
   • Compare with backups / snapshots to spot unexpected changes.
4. Search server error and access logs for requests that coincide with a change or suspicious traffic spikes.
5. If you have filesystem snapshots or backups, check timestamps for unexpected file modifications.

Note: absence of obvious evidence does not guarantee safety. The vulnerability is unauthenticated; attackers may test silently.

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Immediate mitigations you can apply right now

If a vendor patch is not available, apply one or more of the following mitigations. These reduce the risk while awaiting an official plugin update:

1. Deactivate or remove DominoKit
   • Simplest and most surefire mitigation: deactivate the plugin in WordPress and remove it if the site does not strictly require it.
   • If you must keep it active, apply the mitigations below.
2. Use a managed WAF or virtual patching
   • Add a rule that blocks unauthenticated POST requests targeting DominoKit endpoints (admin‑ajax actions, plugin-specific REST routes, or plugin PHP files).
   • WP‑Firewall can push a virtual patch to customers that blocks exploitation attempts instantly.
3. Restrict access to plugin paths via webserver rules
   • Apache (.htaccess) — block direct public POSTs to plugin files:

     <IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
       RewriteEngine On
       # Block all requests that attempt to call plugin update endpoints from external sources
       RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} POST
       RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} ^/wp-content/plugins/dominokit/ [NC]
       RewriteRule ^ - [F,L]
     </IfModule>
     

   • Nginx — return 403 for POSTs to plugin folder:

     location ~* ^/wp-content/plugins/dominokit/ {
       if ($request_method = POST) {
         return 403;
       }
     }
     

   • Note: these rules are blunt and may break legitimate plugin behavior. Use with caution; test on staging.
4. Block or validate specific AJAX/REST actions
   • If you can identify the specific action parameter used by the plugin (e.g., action=dominokit_save), add WAF or webserver rules that deny requests with that action value unless a logged‑in cookie is present.
   • Apache example to block admin-ajax calls with a given action:

     <If "%{REQUEST_METHOD} == 'POST' && %{REQUEST_URI} =~ m#/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php# && %{QUERY_STRING} =~ /action=dominokit_save/">
       Require all denied
     </If>
     

     (Adjust to your server syntax.)

5. Restrict REST route exposure
   • If the plugin exposes REST endpoints, block them via webserver or WAF rules until a patch is available:
     • Block /wp-json/<domino-namespace>/* for unauthenticated users.
   • Alternatively, implement an allowlist so only requests with a specific token or from your administration IPs succeed.
6. Tighten admin access
   • Restrict wp-admin access to known IPs if feasible (via hosting or firewall).
   • Enforce strong admin passwords and two‑factor authentication to limit lateral movement in case of partial compromise.
7. Overvåg og advarsel
   • Set up logs/alerts for:
     • POSTs to admin-ajax.php and plugin php files from unknown IPs.
     • Changes to options with names that include the plugin slug.
     • New files added to plugin folder or uploads around the time of suspicious requests.
   • Keep a forensic snapshot of logs for investigation if suspicious activity is observed.

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Example WAF rule ideas (conceptual)

Below are pattern ideas for WAF rules. Adapt to your WAF engine. These are conceptual and meant to help defenders create signatures:

• Block unauthenticated POSTs where:
  • URI contains /wp-content/plugins/dominokit/ AND request method POST
  • AND request does not carry a logged-in WordPress cookie (absence of wordpress_logged_in_*)
• Block admin-ajax.php requests with action parameter matching plugin action names (after you inspect plugin code for action names).
• Block REST calls to /wp-json/domino*/ or /wp-json/<plugin-namespace>/* for unauthenticated users.

If you use WP‑Firewall, we provide prebuilt rules and virtual patches to customers for vulnerabilities like this, minimizing the chance of false positives while stopping exploit attempts.

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Developer guidance: how to fix this correctly

If you are a plugin developer or responsible for DominoKit code, the correct fix is to add proper authorization and nonce checks and to follow WordPress security best practices.

1. For admin‑ajax handlers:
   • Verify nonces with check_ajax_referer()
   • Verify capability with current_user_can()
   • Eksempel:

     add_action('wp_ajax_domino_save_settings', 'domino_save_settings_handler');
     
     function domino_save_settings_handler() {
         // Verify nonce (sent by admin UI)
         check_ajax_referer('domino_settings_nonce', 'security');
     
         // Verify capability - only admin users can update settings
         if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
             wp_send_json_error( 'Unauthorized', 403 );
         }
     
         // Sanitize input and update options
         $val = isset( $_POST['some_setting'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['some_setting'] ) ) : '';
         update_option( 'domino_some_setting', $val );
     
         wp_send_json_success( 'Settings updated' );
     }
     

2. For REST API endpoints:
   • Provide a permission_callback that validates current_user_can() or custom capability.
   • Eksempel:

     register_rest_route( 'domino/v1', '/settings', array(
         'methods'  => 'POST',
         'callback' => 'domino_rest_update_settings',
         'permission_callback' => function() {
             return current_user_can( 'manage_options' );
         }
     ) );
     

3. For direct POST handlers (non REST/AJAX):
   • Use check_admin_referer() in admin forms and check current_user_can() before processing.
   • Do not rely on is_admin() alone for security.
4. Sanitize and validate all input before saving to the database and escape outputs when rendering.
5. Store sensitive and configurable HTML snippets in a way that the plugin sanitizes and filters them (avoid direct unescaped output).
6. Add logging for administrative changes so that site owners can audit setting changes.

Implementing these fixes provides correct, long‑term protection.

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How to verify a fix

1. After applying code changes, test the endpoints:
   • Attempt an unauthenticated POST to the endpoint — it should return 403 or an authorization error.
   • Use curl or a REST client from an unauthenticated context and confirm the handler denies the request.
2. Confirm the admin interface still works for authorized administrators.
3. Review logs for attempts and ensure the plugin logs unauthorized attempts.
4. Add unit/integration tests for permission checks and nonces to prevent regressions.

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Detection, logging and forensic guidance

• Enable WP‑DEBUG_LOG only on staging; on production, send logs to your centralized logging (syslog/ELK).
• Log the following details for suspicious requests:
  • Timestamp, source IP, HTTP method, URI, headers, user agent, request body summary (avoid storing raw secrets).
• Snapshot wp_options and relevant plugin database keys periodically so configuration drift is detectable.
• If you detect evidence of exploitation, preserve logs and take site offline for investigation. Consider an incident response provider if you find persistent backdoors.

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Risk evaluation — why CVSS 5.3 but still important

The reported CVSS 5.3 score reflects a moderate impact because:

• The vulnerability is remote and unauthenticated (increasing severity).
• The direct technical action is a settings update, not an immediate code execution or database dump.
• However, settings updates can be leveraged to cause further exploits (redirects, code inclusion, script injection) — raising practical risk.

We recommend treating this vulnerability with urgency proportional to the plugin’s role on your site and whether it stores or controls anything that can alter front‑end behavior.

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Example detection queries (log/host)

• Search Apache/Nginx access logs:
  • admin-ajax attempts:
    grep "admin-ajax.php" access.log | grep -i "POST" | grep -i "dominokit"
  • plugin folder POSTs:
    grep "/wp-content/plugins/dominokit" access.log | grep "POST"
• Search database for recent option changes:
  • MySQL: SELECT option_name, option_value, option_id FROM wp_options WHERE option_name LIKE '%domino%' ORDER BY option_id DESC LIMIT 50;
• WP‑CLI to get plugin version:
  • wp plugin get dominokit --field=version

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Coordinated response and responsible disclosure

If you discover signs of exploitation:

• Preserve logs and backups immediately.
• Isolate the site if you see active malicious payloads or unknown admin users.
• Consider rolling back to a known good backup.
• If you host multiple sites with DominoKit, treat this as a high priority across all customers.

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How WP‑Firewall helps (practical protection)

As a WordPress firewall and security provider, our role is to give site owners time and protection when official patches are not yet released. Here’s how we help in cases like this:

• Rapid virtual patching: we can craft and deploy a targeted WAF signature that blocks unauthenticated requests to the vulnerable plugin functions without requiring plugin changes.
• Managed rule tuning: we tune rules to avoid false positives while blocking malicious payloads and exploitation attempts.
• Monitoring and alerting: real‑time alerts if an attacker attempts exploitation against protected endpoints.
• Remediation guidance: step‑by‑step instructions to harden the site and remediate damage if exploitation occurred.

If you prefer to protect your sites proactively rather than waiting for a plugin update or manual configuration changes, a managed firewall with virtual patching can reduce exposure window drastically.

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Recommended action checklist (what to do right now)

1. Check DominoKit version. If <= 1.1.0 — assume vulnerable.
2. If you can, deactivate and remove DominoKit until a patched release is available.
3. If removal is not possible:
   • Apply webserver rules to block unauthenticated POSTs to plugin files.
   • Add WAF rules or enable virtual patch signatures to deny likely exploit requests.
   • Restrict wp-admin and REST endpoints to trusted IPs where feasible.
4. Review logs and options for signs of changes and preserve logs for any investigation.
5. Monitor plugin vendor communications for an official patch. Once a patch is available, apply immediately and re‑enable plugin only after verification.
6. Consider signing up for WP‑Firewall Free plan to get immediate managed WAF protection and scanning.

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Final notes from the WP‑Firewall team

We understand plugin vulnerabilities that allow unauthenticated configuration changes are particularly unnerving because they remove the protection of credentials. Our practical recommendation: reduce attack surface first with containment (disable plugin or block endpoints), then move to prevention and monitoring (WAF, logging). Finally, fix the source by ensuring authorization checks (nonces and capability checks) and testing.

If you need assistance implementing the server rules, creating targeted WAF signatures, or performing forensic checks, our team can help guide or take action to secure your WordPress site. Prioritize safety: an unauthenticated endpoint that updates settings should be treated as critical until proven otherwise.

Stay secure,
The WP‑Firewall Security Team

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Resources & references

• CVE identifier: CVE-2025-12350
• WordPress developer guide for secure AJAX and REST implementations:
  • Use current_user_can(), check_ajax_referer(), check_admin_referer(), and REST permission_callback.
• WP‑CLI and database checks described above for rapid verification.