প্লাগইনের নাম	External Login
Type of Vulnerability	অননুমোদিত এসকিউএল ইনজেকশন
CVE Number	CVE-2025-11177
জরুরি অবস্থা	উচ্চ
CVE Publish Date	2025-10-15
Source URL	CVE-2025-11177

External Login (<= 1.11.2) — Unauthenticated SQL Injection (CVE-2025-11177): What WordPress Owners Must Do Right Now

লেখক: WP-Firewall Security Team
তারিখ: 2025-10-15

Executive summary

On 15 October 2025 a serious unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2025-11177) affecting the External Login WordPress plugin (versions <= 1.11.2) was publicly disclosed. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to inject SQL through the plugin’s logging functionality, potentially enabling disclosure or modification of database contents and full site compromise. The vulnerability is rated high (CVSS 9.3) and is exploitable without valid credentials.

As the team behind WP-Firewall (a professional WordPress Web Application Firewall and security service), we prepared this breakdown to help WordPress site owners, administrators and developers understand the risk, detect signs of exploitation, and apply immediate mitigation and remediation steps — including safe workarounds and long-term hardening. We also explain what can and cannot be done via virtual patching and how a WAF can help reduce risk until an official fix is available.

This article is written by real WordPress security practitioners and engineers with hands-on experience protecting sites during active vulnerability disclosure windows. The language below aims to be actionable and clear — not academic.

Quick facts

• Vulnerability: Una​uthenticated SQL Injection via plugin logging functionality
• Affected plugin: External Login (WordPress plugin)
• Vulnerable versions: <= 1.11.2
• CVE: CVE-2025-11177
• Risk level: High (CVSS 9.3)
• Privilege required: None (Unauthenticated)
• Public disclosure: 15 October 2025
• Official patch: Not available (as of disclosure)
• Recommended immediate action: Mitigate now — isolate or disable the plugin where possible

Why this matters

SQL injection is one of the most dangerous web vulnerabilities because it allows an attacker to manipulate backend database queries. On WordPress, the database holds everything that makes your site unique — user accounts, session tokens, post content, plugin settings, API keys and more. An unauthenticated SQL injection means an attacker needs no login to start probing and potentially extract or modify data.

This specific bug arises in the plugin’s logging code. The plugin accepts external input intended for logs but fails to sanitize or parameterize it before incorporating it into an SQL query. In short: untrusted data reaches an SQL context. That situation is exploitable in many ways (data theft, privilege escalation, site takeover).

High-level technical overview (non-exploitative)

• The plugin exposes a path/endpoint that accepts input intended to be written to a plugin-managed logging table or to a WP option row.
• The logging handler constructs an SQL statement containing the user-supplied input without proper parameterization or escaping.
• Because there is no authentication gate on the endpoint, any remote attacker can send crafted input to influence the SQL query.
• The result: arbitrary SQL commands can be injected and executed in the context of the WordPress database user.

I am intentionally not publishing full PoC exploit strings here — this post’s purpose is to help site owners protect themselves and respond responsibly.

Exploitation scenarios

An attacker could leverage the vulnerability to:

• Read sensitive data: extract user hashed passwords, email addresses, API tokens and plugin settings from wp_users, wp_options and other tables.
• Modify data: change administrator email addresses, create an admin account, or inject code references (e.g., change option values to include a backdoor URL).
• Drop or corrupt tables: disable key plugin or site functionality.
• Achieve code execution: by modifying option values to inject PHP when combined with vulnerable theme/plugin code (indirect but common chaining path).
• Pivot to server-level compromise: if database credentials are reused, attacker may escalate beyond WordPress.

Because this is unauthenticated and the attack surface is web-accessible, automated mass scanning and exploitation is likely. Assume exploitation attempts will appear in logs quickly after public disclosure.

Detection: what to look for (indicators of exploitation)

If you run a site with the External Login plugin (<=1.11.2), proactively search for these indicators:

1. Unusual database queries and slow queries
   • Sudden increase in SQL queries containing suspicious sequences: SQL keywords in logging fields (SELECT, UNION, INTO OUTFILE, –, /*), or excessive comment markers.
   • Check DB slow query logs for abnormal long-running or malformed queries.
2. Anomalous log entries
   • Log rows that contain SQL keywords or obviously encoded/obfuscated data.
   • Long, single-column strings in plugin log tables that look like payloads.
3. New or modified administrative users
   • Use: SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered FROM wp_users ORDER BY user_registered DESC LIMIT 10; (Run on a safe copy or read-only credentials.)
   • Look for accounts created outside normal windows.
4. Unexpected option changes
   • Check wp_options for recent edits to options you didn’t perform (siteurl, home, active_plugins).
   • Look for suspicious autoloaded options containing external URLs or base64 strings.
5. Unexpected file changes
   • File integrity failures, new PHP files in uploads, wp-content/mu-plugins, or theme/plugin directories.
6. Webserver logs
   • Requests to plugin endpoints with unusual GET/POST payloads, particularly containing SQL tokens, percent-encoding of quotes or comment markers.
7. Outbound network activity
   • If attackers exfiltrate data, you might see outbound HTTP/S connections to suspicious domains triggered by modified theme/plugin code.

If you find any of the above, assume compromise and follow incident response steps (see Recovery & remediation).

Immediate mitigation — do this right now (prioritized list)

1. Put the site into maintenance/limited access mode
   • Limit traffic with your hosting control panel, .htaccess/NGINX rules or WAF while you assess.
2. Disable or remove the External Login plugin
   • The fastest, most reliable mitigation is to deactivate and, if you can, delete the plugin until a fixed version is released.
   • If you cannot access the admin dashboard, rename the plugin directory via SFTP/SSH: wp-content/plugins/external-login -> external-login.disabled
3. Block the plugin endpoints with server rules
   • Add .htaccess (Apache) or server-level rules to block requests to plugin paths used for logging.
   • Example (Apache) to block a plugin file path:

     # Block access to a known vulnerable plugin file
     <Files "external-login-handler.php">
       Require all denied
     </Files>
     

   • Note: Replace “external-login-handler.php” with the specific filename if you know it. Do not expose or rely on obscurity — prefer temporary plugin deactivation.
4. Use a WAF rule to block malicious payload patterns
   • Block requests that include SQL tokens in parameters to the plugin endpoint (see WAF section for example rules).
   • A WAF is highly effective at stopping mass automated probes and common injection payloads while you take further action.
5. Rotate database credentials and secrets if you suspect compromise
   • If you see evidence of data extraction or suspect the attacker accessed sensitive values, change the DB password and update wp-config.php accordingly.
   • Note: Rotation only helps if the attacker hasn’t already gained file access; if files are modified, do a full forensic review before rotating credentials.
6. Audit access logs and isolate suspicious IPs
   • Identify and block IPs that are clearly malicious — add to hosts.deny, firewall rules, or a WAF blocklist.
7. Back up the site now
   • Make a full site and database backup (preserve the possibly-compromised state for later forensic analysis), then take a clean offline copy for restoration if needed.

Virtual patching: what a WAF can and cannot do in this case

A WAF (web application firewall) can help mitigate the risk by intercepting and blocking malicious requests before they reach PHP/WordPress, but it has limits:

What a WAF can do:

• Block common SQL injection payloads and patterns targeting the vulnerable endpoint.
• Rate-limit and geo-block suspicious traffic to slow down automated attacks.
• Block known IOCs and exploit signatures.
• Provide logging and alerts when probes are attempted.

What a WAF cannot fully guarantee:

• Highly targeted or obfuscated attacks that carefully craft payloads to bypass generic SQLi filters may still reach the vulnerable code.
• If exploitation has already occurred, a WAF cannot repair modified database entries or backdoored files.
• For logging-based SQLi, if the attacker supplies input that looks benign but influences SQL structure downstream, pure signature-based WAFs may miss it.

Important: some disclosure notes indicate “no virtual patch can be assigned” for this issue. That usually means the vulnerability is triggered in a context where straightforward request filtering is impractical (for example, the endpoint expects a wide range of input or the logging path is used by normal, variable input). Even so, a carefully crafted WAF rule set combined with endpoint blocking and plugin deactivation provides strong risk reduction.

Recommended WAF rule examples (generic patterns)

Below are sanitized, generic rule examples that you can adapt in your WAF management UI or server (ModSecurity-style or as part of our WP-Firewall rule editor). These are defensive patterns — they aim to reduce noise and block obvious malicious attempts without breaking legitimate usage. Test rules in monitoring mode before enforcing.

Example 1 — Block requests that include high-risk SQL metacharacters combined with SQL keywords:

SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx (?i)(\b(select|union|insert|update|delete|drop|concat|into)\b).*(--|/\*|\#|;)"
    "id:1002001,phase:1,deny,log,msg:'Block probable SQLi payload',severity:2"

Example 2 — Block requests with SQL comment sequences in parameters:

SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS "@rx (?i)(\-\-|/\*|\#)"
    "id:1002002,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Block SQL comment markers in parameters',severity:2"

Example 3 — Limit request size and parameter length to reduce attack space:

SecRule ARGS "@validateByteRange 0-4096" "id:1002003,phase:2,pass,log,msg:'Large parameter blocked'"

Example 4 — Whitelist-only approach for plugin endpoint (recommended if endpoint is not publicly required)

# If your plugin endpoint is at /wp-json/external-login/log or /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=external_log
# Block POSTs unless they come from internal IPs or known application servers:
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-json/external-login/" "phase:1,pass,ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly"
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "!@ipMatch 192.0.2.0/24 203.0.113.0/24" "phase:1,deny,msg:'Block external access to external-login API'"

Important: Do not deploy aggressive blocking about database-related terms site-wide — false positives can break legitimate functionality. Test and tune rules in staging or detection mode first.

Safe code-level mitigations (temporary mu-plugin)

If you cannot remove the plugin (e.g., a large number of sites depend on its functionality and removing would break users) you can create a mu-plugin that disables the plugin’s vulnerable logging handler or filters input before processing. A mu-plugin (must-use plugin) runs earlier and cannot be easily deactivated through the WordPress admin, so it is often used for emergency overrides.

Below is a safe example that attempts to remove an action or filter used by the plugin to write logs. This mu-plugin does not modify the plugin files directly and is reversible:

Create file: wp-content/mu-plugins/disable-external-login-logging.php

<?php
/**
 * Emergency mitigation: disable External Login logging handlers
 * Place this file in wp-content/mu-plugins/
 */

add_action( 'plugins_loaded', function() {
    // Attempt to remove the known hook name if the plugin registers it
    // Replace 'external_login_log_event' with the actual hook name if you know it.
    if ( has_action( 'external_login_log_event' ) ) {
        remove_action( 'external_login_log_event', 'external_login_handle_log', 10 );
    }

    // If the plugin uses an object instance:
    if ( class_exists( 'External_Login_Main' ) ) {
        global $external_login;
        if ( isset( $external_login ) && is_object( $external_login ) ) {
            // Attempt to replace the logging method with a safe stub
            if ( method_exists( $external_login, 'write_log' ) ) {
                // Create a safe stub that does nothing
                $external_login->write_log = function() { return true; };
            }
        }
    }
}, 1 );

Notes:

• The mu-plugin approach needs the correct hook/method names to be effective. The names above are placeholders and must be adjusted to match the plugin’s implementation.
• Always test on a staging server first.
• If you cannot safely disable the logging function via hooks, prefer disabling the plugin entirely.

For hosts and managed providers — network-level mitigations

• Add a network WAF rule to block requests that look like attempts to write payloads to the plugin logging endpoint.
• Globally block payloads with SQL comments and common injection patterns aimed at plugin endpoints.
• Coordinate with customers: notify sites running the plugin and provide instructions to remove or mitigate.

Recovery and remediation checklist (if you suspect compromise)

If you detect signs of exploitation or cannot confirm the site is clean, follow these steps:

1. Isolate the site: restrict incoming connections and suspend services if needed.
2. Preserve forensic evidence: take server images, export database dumps and logs to a secure, offline location.
3. Restore from a known clean backup: only if you can verify the backup predates the compromise and does not contain injected code.
4. Rotate all credentials: database, FTP/SFTP, control panel, cloud provider API keys, and any other secrets stored in the site.
5. Reinstall WordPress core, themes and plugins from original sources after cleanup, not from backups that may contain backdoors.
6. Scan for web shells and modified PHP files: check wp-content, wp-includes, wp-config.php and upload directories for unfamiliar PHP files or modified timestamps.
7. Run a database audit: check wp_options, wp_users and active_plugins for tampering. Look for serialized values with external URLs or base64-encoded payloads.
8. Notify affected users and stakeholders: if user data may have been exposed, follow applicable notification rules and privacy regulations.
9. Conduct a full post-mortem: how did the attacker get in, what was changed, and how can you prevent reoccurrence?

Long-term hardening recommendations

• Principle of least privilege for DB user
  • Ensure the DB user used by wp-config.php has only the necessary privileges. For example, avoid granting FILE privilege unless absolutely needed.
• Keep plugins and themes updated
  • Update promptly and monitor multiple sources for vulnerability advisories. Subscribe to security newsletters or monitoring.
• Use a managed Web Application Firewall
  • WAFs that inspect requests and apply behavior-based rules reduce exposure to zero-day attacks.
• Audit plugins before installing
  • Favor plugins with active maintainers and a history of security responsiveness.
• Implement file integrity monitoring
  • Track changes to core PHP files and alert on unexpected modifications.
• Apply secure coding practices for site customizations
  • Sanitize, validate and parameterize any external input before passing it to SQL queries.

How to safely test whether your site is targeted

• Do not run exploit code on production systems.
• Use a read-only copy of your site (database and files) in an isolated lab/staging environment to experiment and analyze.
• Reproduce only in a safe environment and avoid publicly posting exploit details.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q: Is an official patch available?
A: At the time of public disclosure, no official fixed version was available. Monitor the official plugin page and WordPress.org for a patched release. When a security update is published, apply it immediately.

Q: Can I “virtual patch” this in all cases?
A: Virtual patching can reduce risk but is not a guaranteed fix for logging-based SQLi. The most reliable step is to deactivate the plugin until a proper code-level fix is released.

Q: My host offers a WAF — is that enough?
A: A quality WAF provides meaningful protection while you patch. However, combined mitigations (plugin removal + WAF + monitoring + credential rotation) provide best protection.

Q: Should I change my DB password immediately?
A: If you suspect a compromise or find evidence of extraction, yes — rotate DB and other credentials after a clean backup is taken and you have snapshots for forensic preservation.

Example detection queries (for forensic teams)

Use these queries carefully and on a read-only database copy or with proper backups:

1. Check for recently registered users:

   SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered
   FROM wp_users
   ORDER BY user_registered DESC
   LIMIT 20;
   

2. Check for suspicious options (recently modified autoloaded options):

   SELECT option_name, option_value, autoload
   FROM wp_options
   WHERE autoload = 'yes'
   ORDER BY LENGTH(option_value) DESC
   LIMIT 50;
   

3. Search for SQL keywords in plugin-managed log tables:

   SELECT * FROM wp_external_login_log
   WHERE message REGEXP '(SELECT|UNION|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|INTO|--|/\\*)'
   LIMIT 200;
   

   Note: Replace wp_external_login_log with the plugin’s log table name if different.

Communications guidance (what to tell stakeholders)

• Be transparent with internal teams: explain that a high-severity unauthenticated SQLi exists in a plugin the site uses and that you are taking immediate action to mitigate risk.
• If user data might have been exposed, follow legal requirements and notify affected users as necessary — consult legal counsel if unsure.
• Keep customers updated on remediation progress and provide guidance to change passwords if there is confirmed exposure.

What we (WP-Firewall) recommend right now

1. Immediately disable the External Login plugin on all sites running vulnerable versions.
2. If you cannot disable it, deploy strict WAF rules and block the plugin’s logging endpoints.
3. Back up your site now and collect logs for forensic review.
4. Monitor for suspicious signs and contact your hosting provider for support if signs of compromise exist.
5. When an official patch is released, apply it ASAP and verify integrity post-update.

Recovering from confirmed compromise — high-level plan

• Triage and isolate affected site(s).
• Engage an incident response provider if the compromise is extensive or if sensitive user data was exposed.
• Rebuild affected sites from clean source backups and reinstall plugins from official repositories.
• Harden the environment (WAF, monitoring, monitor file integrity).
• Perform a root-cause analysis and document lessons learned.

A practical, friendly reminder from a WordPress security team

Security often feels like a chore until something goes wrong. Vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-11177 highlight the importance of defense in depth — reliable WAF rules, prompt patching, and an incident response plan can make the difference between a blocked probe and a full breach. If you manage multiple sites or host client sites, treat this as a priority and apply the steps above across your estate.

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Final checklist — immediate next steps (copy-paste)

• Back up full site & DB now (preserve copies offline)
• Deactivate External Login plugin (versions <= 1.11.2)
• If you cannot remove it: place a server rule to block the plugin endpoint and enable WAF rules
• Scan for indicators of compromise (logs, users, options, files)
• Rotate credentials if compromise suspected (DB, SFTP, control panel)
• Keep monitoring for updates from the plugin developer and apply official patch when released
• Consider adding WP-Firewall Basic (free) protection: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

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If you want, we can produce:

• A tailored step-by-step runbook for your site (with exact plugin file paths and rule examples based on your environment).
• A staged WAF ruleset to deploy in detection-only mode, then enforce mode.
• A mu-plugin customized to safely disable the exact logging function used by the plugin (requires knowledge of the plugin’s hook/method names).

Contact our security operations team (via your WP-Firewall dashboard) and we’ll prioritize assistance.