প্লাগইনের নাম	WP Google Map
Type of Vulnerability	Authenticated SQL Injection
CVE Number	CVE-2025-11365
জরুরি অবস্থা	কম
CVE Publish Date	2025-10-15
Source URL	CVE-2025-11365

Urgent: WP Google Map (<= 1.0) — Authenticated Contributor SQL Injection (CVE-2025-11365) — What Site Owners Must Do Now

A practical, expert-led breakdown of the WP Google Map plugin SQL Injection affecting versions <= 1.0. Learn exploit risk, how attackers can reach it, detection clues, immediate mitigations and long-term hardening. Includes actionable virtual-patching and WAF guidance from a WordPress firewall vendor perspective.

লেখক: WP-Firewall Security Team

তারিখ: 2025-10-16

ট্যাগ: WordPress, security, WAF, SQL Injection, plugins, incident response

সংক্ষিপ্ত বিবরণ

A new authenticated SQL Injection vulnerability has been disclosed in the "WP Google Map" WordPress plugin (versions <= 1.0). It is tracked as CVE-2025-11365. The issue allows a user with Contributor-level access (or higher) to craft a request that results in unsafe SQL being executed against the site's database. This makes the vulnerability especially serious for multi-author sites, membership sites, or any WordPress installation that grants writing privileges to non-trusted users.

As a WordPress firewall and security provider, I’ll walk you through:

• What this vulnerability is and why it matters
• Who is at risk and the required privileges for exploitation
• Practical, immediate actions you should take right now
• How to detect if you’ve been exploited
• Recommended short-term virtual patches/WAF rules to block exploitation
• Developer recommendations for a proper code fix
• Hardening advice and longer-term measures
• How our free protection can help you quickly mitigate risk

This guide is written in a practical, human tone — not a dry CVE dump. If you manage WordPress websites, take these steps now.

What happened (in plain language)

The plugin exposes an endpoint (typically an AJAX or admin-post handler) that accepts user-supplied input and uses it directly in a database query without proper sanitization or parameterization. Because contributors can submit content or interact with some plugin features, a malicious contributor can submit crafted input that alters the intended SQL query, enabling the attacker to read, modify or delete data from the database.

Important details:

• Vulnerable versions: WP Google Map <= 1.0
• CVE: CVE-2025-11365
• Required privilege: Contributor (authenticated user) or higher
• Official fix: Not available (as of the disclosure)
• Risk: Data theft, data manipulation, possible site takeover depending on data accessible through SQL (user table, option table, etc.)

Why Contributor-level exploitation is alarming

Many site owners assume only Administrator-level users are dangerous. That’s a false sense of security. Contributor privileges are commonly granted to blog writers, guest authors, moderators, neighborhood forum members, or other users who need to create content but not manage the site.

An authenticated Contributor can normally not create new users or change site code. But SQL Injection flips that model: with access to the database, attackers can extract hashed password fields, modify option values to insert backdoors, create new admin users directly in the database, or plant malicious scheduled tasks. Because the attacker is already authenticated, traditional account-locking measures or rate-limiting on anonymous traffic may miss the attack.

Immediate risk assessment (quick triage)

If you run a site with any of the following characteristics, consider this high priority:

• The plugin "WP Google Map" is installed and active (versions <= 1.0).
• You allow Contributors, Authors, or other non-admin authenticated roles to interact with plugin features.
• You have unreviewed or new users with writing permissions.
• You run multiple sites or a multisite network where this plugin is active.

Even if you don’t see evidence of compromise yet, the combination of a weaponizable vulnerability and authenticated user access makes fast mitigation essential.

Immediate actions — what you should do in the next hour (order matters)

1. Pause risky functionality
   • If possible, temporarily disable the WP Google Map plugin from the Plugins page. This stops any exploitation attempts immediately. If you cannot access the dashboard, rename the plugin folder via SFTP/SSH (wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map => wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map.disabled).
2. Privilege lockdown
   • Remove or temporarily downgrade Contributor/Author roles if you can’t fully trust users right now. Replace Contributor accounts with a “staging” role with no write privileges until you finish triage.
   • Audit recently added users (last 30 days). Suspend any accounts you can’t verify.
3. Activate WAF protections (virtual patching)
   • If you use a firewall/WAF, enable protective rules that target SQL injection attempts against plugin endpoints. See the WAF section below for rule guidance.
   • If you don’t have a WAF active, consider deploying one or enabling a plugin-based firewall immediately.
4. Back up everything
   • Take an immediate full backup (files + database) and store it off-site or in a location immutable to the server. You may need to analyze a pristine copy.
5. Rotate sensitive secrets
   • If you suspect compromise (see detection section), rotate database credentials, WordPress salts, API keys, and any third-party service keys stored on the site.
6. Monitor and log
   • Increase logging for admin-ajax.php, requests to plugin endpoints, and WordPress login events. Capture request bodies if possible (respect privacy/compliance constraints).
   • Note IP addresses and timestamps of suspicious activity.
7. Communicate internally
   • Inform your internal ops/dev/security team and, if applicable, your hosting provider. They may have additional tools to triage or isolate the site.

How to check if you were exploited (evidence to look for)

SQL Injection can be silent. Look for these indicators:

• Unexpected new administrator users in the wp_users table.
• Modified wp_options entries — common keys to check: active_plugins, siteurl, home, widget_* options.
• Suspicious content or files added to wp-content/uploads or wp-content/mu-plugins.
• Unknown scheduled tasks (wp_cron entries), new themes or plugins installed without your knowledge.
• Modified usermeta entries for existing users (capabilities, roles).
• Access logs showing contributor session IPs making POST requests to admin-ajax.php or plugin endpoints with unusual parameters.
• Outbound connections from your server to unknown IPs/domains (possible exfiltration or command-and-control).

Recommended quick database checks (read-only queries — do not modify):

• List recently added users:
  SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered FROM wp_users WHERE user_registered > (NOW() - INTERVAL 30 DAY);
• Inspect options changed in recent days (if you have a last_modified field or backups to compare):
  SELECT option_name, option_value FROM wp_options WHERE option_name IN ('active_plugins','siteurl','home');
• Look for unusual scheduled tasks:
  SELECT option_value FROM wp_options WHERE option_name = 'cron';

If you see anything unexpected, preserve logs and contact an incident response team.

Longer-term mitigation and secure development recommendations (for developers)

If you are a plugin developer or manage the plugin, the correct fix is to patch the code — not rely on WAF forever. The root causes to address:

1. Input validation and escaping
   • Never concatenate unchecked user input into SQL.
   • Use parameterized queries. In WordPress, prefer $wpdb->প্রস্তুত করুন() for dynamic SQL.
   • Escape values properly (esc_sql for safe string insertion where parameterization is not viable).

   Example (safe pattern):

   global $wpdb;
   $search = $_POST['search_term'] ?? '';
   $search = sanitize_text_field( $search );
   $sql = $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}your_table WHERE title LIKE %s", '%' . $wpdb->esc_like( $search ) . '%' );
   $results = $wpdb->get_results( $sql );

2. Capability checks
   • Verify current_user_can(...) before processing any action that affects data.
   • Do not assume that authenticated means authorized. For example:

   if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_posts' ) ) {
       wp_die( 'Insufficient privileges' );
   }

3. Nonce verification
   • Protect form submission endpoints and AJAX handlers with nonces (wp_create_nonce, check_admin_referer, wp_verify_nonce).
   • Deny requests missing valid nonces.
4. Least privilege design
   • Avoid exposing database or administrative features to contributor-level actions. If a feature truly requires elevated privileges, enforce that server-side.
5. Output escaping
   • Escape all outputs to prevent cross-site scripting or other injection chains.
6. Logging and alerting
   • Implement server-side logging for suspicious parameter values and invalid nonce attempts.

Recommended virtual-patching / WAF rules (for WP-Firewall and other WAFs)

When an official patch is not yet available, virtual patching via a WAF can buy time and block exploits. The goal is to prevent malicious payloads that attempt SQL injection from reaching the vulnerable code path while preserving legitimate contributor usage.

Below are high-level rule suggestions. These are intentionally descriptive rather than copy/paste payloads, so they are safe to publish and can be tuned to your environment.

1. Block requests to plugin endpoints from contributors that contain SQL control patterns
   • Identify the plugin’s admin/AJAX endpoints (e.g., admin-ajax.php actions specific to the plugin or plugin file paths).
   • Filter or block requests containing:
     • SQL meta-characters in parameters (e.g., unescaped quotes combined with SQL keywords)
     • SQL comment sequences (/* */ বা --)
     • UNION SELECT or stacked queries patterns
   • Example rule logic:
     • If POST to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php এবং কর্ম parameter matches known plugin action AND contributor-level session cookie present AND request body contains SQL-keyword patterns (e.g., "UNION", "SELECT", "INSERT", "UPDATE", "DELETE") combined with punctuation => block.
2. Enforce a strict whitelist for expected parameter formats
   • If a parameter should be numeric, only allow digits.
   • If a parameter is a short string (like a label), limit length and character set (alphanumerics, dashes, underscores).
   • Example: param "map_id" => only digits up to 10 characters.
3. Verify referer and nonce presence for admin requests
   • Drop or challenge requests to admin endpoints lacking a valid nonce or a valid referer header from your site.
4. Behavior-based rules
   • Throttle contributors who perform many POST requests in a short time frame.
   • Flag or challenge POSTs from contributor accounts originating from new/unusual IPs or IPs with poor reputation.
5. Block suspicious encoding/obfuscation attempts
   • Block or challenge unusual encodings (double-encoded payloads, nested URL encoding) to reduce bypass attempts.
6. Response-based mitigation
   • If an unusual database error string is returned in a response to a contributor request, block subsequent requests from that session/IP and notify administrators.

Practical note: virtual patching should be tuned to avoid false positives. Start in alert/logging mode, review hits for a short period, then switch to blocking once you’re confident.

Incident response: a step-by-step playbook

If you confirm exploitation or strong indicators:

1. Isolate the site
   • Put the site into maintenance mode or isolate from the network if possible. Prevent further access to limit damage.
2. Preserve evidence
   • Copy logs, database, and files. Do not make destructive changes before you have good copies.
3. Rotate credentials
   • Database user password, WordPress salts, administrator passwords, API keys. Rotate credentials only after you have remediation steps planned — rotating prematurely may disrupt triage if backups are not in place.
4. Remove backdoors
   • Scan for malicious PHP files, unknown admin users, scheduled tasks, and rogue plugins/themes. Use a reputable scanner or manual inspection.
5. Restore from a known good backup
   • If you have a confirmed clean backup from before the compromise, consider restoring. Then re-apply safe versions of plugins/themes and apply WAF rules.
6. Post-mortem and hardening
   • Fix the root cause (update/patch code), apply principle of least privilege, enable stronger logging and automated WAF protections, and educate users.
7. Communicate
   • If user data may have been exposed, comply with local breach notification laws and communicate transparently with stakeholders.

Detection rules and logging recommendations

• Log every POST to admin-ajax.php and the plugin’s AJAX endpoints with:
  • Timestamp
  • User ID (if authenticated)
  • IP address
  • User agent
  • Request parameters (mask sensitive fields)
• Set an alert threshold for:
  • Repeated invalid nonce attempts
  • Requests containing SQL-related tokens
  • A single contributor account performing high-volume POSTs in a short window

Tip: correlate webserver logs with WordPress logs and hosting-level logs to detect lateral movement and coordinated attempts.

Why the database matters and when to rotate DB credentials

An attacker who successfully performs SQL injection can read the wp_users table and exfiltrate password hashes. While modern WordPress hashes are salted and slow, once an attacker exfiltrates the table, they can attempt offline cracking, and if users re-use passwords elsewhere, broader compromise can occur.

If you see signs of data exfiltration or unknown DB queries, rotate the database user password and ensure the database user has only minimal privileges required by WordPress (avoid giving superuser privileges to the WordPress DB user). Consider rotating any third-party service keys stored in the database (APIs, SMTP credentials, etc.).

Developer checklist for a secure fix (summary)

• Parameterize every database query using $wpdb->prepare
• Sanitize inputs with sanitize_text_field, intval, esc_attr, esc_url, as appropriate
• Enforce capability checks: বর্তমান_ব্যবহারকারী_ক্যান()
• Protect endpoints with nonces and validate them server-side
• Limit input length and character sets
• Log and alert on unexpected parameter contents and repeated failures

Why WAF/virtual patching matters when patches aren’t available

When a plugin maintainer hasn’t released a patch, a virtual patch implemented by a Web Application Firewall protects the site by blocking the exploit chain before it reaches the site code. Virtual patches are not a permanent substitute for a proper code fix, but they are the fastest way to reduce risk and buy time until an official patch or safe update is available.

How to safely remove / replace the plugin

If the plugin is not business critical:

1. Deactivate the plugin from the WordPress admin (Plugins -> Installed Plugins -> Deactivate). If you cannot access the admin:
2. Rename the plugin directory via SFTP or SSH:
   mv wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map.disabled
3. After deactivation, search for leftover plugin-created database tables or options and clean them if necessary and if you are confident they aren’t needed.

If the plugin is essential, apply WAF protections and carefully audit plugin code.

Post-incident hardening checklist

• Apply the principle of least privilege to user roles.
• Use two-factor authentication (2FA) for administrator and privileged roles.
• Limit plugin access to trusted accounts; for content contributors, use forms or editorial workflows that sanitize input.
• Keep WordPress core, plugins, and themes updated on a safe schedule; test updates in staging.
• Implement automated backups with immutable retention.
• Run scheduled malware scans and integrity checks.
• Use a reliable WAF or virtual-patching layer to block emerging threats.

Practical examples of logging and alert thresholds

• Alert when contributor accounts generate more than 5 POST requests to admin endpoints within 1 minute.
• Alert on repeated POST requests that include SQL-metacharacters and a referer mismatch.
• Log and review any large data exports or long-running DB queries triggered from plugin-specific endpoints.

সচরাচর জিজ্ঞাস্য

Q: Can a Contributor exploit this remotely?
A: No — the attacker must be authenticated with Contributor privileges or higher. The exploitation is performed through normal authenticated requests (e.g., via admin-ajax or plugin admin pages).

Q: Is there a released patch?
A: As of disclosure, there was no official fix available. (If a vendor release appears, update immediately.)

Q: Will a firewall prevent the vulnerability forever?
A: Virtual patching is a mitigation layer. It blocks known exploitation patterns but is not a substitute for secure code. Always apply official patches when released.

Example incident timeline (what typical exploitation looks like)

1. Malicious contributor crafts a payload and submits via the plugin UI or a direct POST to a plugin endpoint.
2. The plugin constructs a SQL query using the payload and the database executes it.
3. Depending on the attacker’s goal, they may:
   • Retrieve rows from wp_users or wp_options
   • Insert a new admin record directly into the table
   • Modify plugin settings to load a remote file or trigger a backdoor
4. The attacker may then create a persistent foothold via files or scheduled tasks.
5. If left undetected, the attacker may exfiltrate credentials or use the site to pivot to other systems.

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Why you should consider WAF + secure coding together

Relying solely on either secure code or WAF is insufficient. Secure code eliminates vulnerabilities at the source; a WAF provides layered protection and rapid mitigation when a vulnerability is discovered or before the vendor provides a patch. Together they reduce both the probability of exploitation and the potential impact if one layer fails.

Final recommendations — what I would do as your security partner

1. Immediately disable or isolate the vulnerable plugin.
2. Put a WAF rule set in place that blocks SQLi attempts against plugin endpoints. Enable it in blocking mode after short tuning.
3. Audit and harden user roles — remove or isolate contributor privileges if unnecessary.
4. Take immutable backups and preserve logs for analysis.
5. If you manage development, don’t deploy to production until the plugin is patched or the code is corrected to use parameterized queries and proper capability/nonce checks.
6. Consider the Basic free plan for fast managed WAF protection while you work through remediation so you can triage without panic.

Closing notes

SQL Injection remains one of the most damaging vulnerability classes because it directly interacts with your data store. The combination of authentication-level access (Contributor) and an exploitable code path means this issue should be treated with urgency even if an official patch is not yet available.

If you’d like assistance implementing the mitigations above, or you want us to deploy virtual patching to your site while you perform a full fix, we provide managed firewall services designed specifically for WordPress. For fast, free protection, sign up for our Basic plan here: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

Stay safe, keep backups, and treat authenticated plugin vulnerabilities as high priority — attackers often target the weakest link: human workflows and assumed-trust accounts.

— WP-Firewall Security Team