اسم البرنامج الإضافي	Anber Elementor Addon
Type of Vulnerability	XSS مخزنة
CVE Number	CVE-2025-7440
الاستعجال	قليل
CVE Publish Date	2025-08-16
Source URL	CVE-2025-7440

Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS in “Anber Elementor Addon” (≤ 1.0.1) — What Site Owners and Developers Must Do Today

نُشرت: 16 August 2025
مؤلف: WP‑Firewall Security Team

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ملخص: a stored cross‑site scripting (XSS) vulnerability (CVE‑2025‑7440) was discovered in the Anber Elementor Addon plugin (versions ≤ 1.0.1). An authenticated user with Contributor privileges can inject JavaScript into a carousel button link that becomes persistent and executes in visitors’ browsers when the carousel is viewed. This is a stored XSS issue that enables client‑side attacks including session theft, redirecting visitors, injecting malware, and running actions in the context of the site. There is currently no official plugin update available to fully remediate the vulnerability for the affected versions. In this post we explain the risk, practical exploitation scenarios, and a prioritized, pragmatic mitigation and cleanup plan you can apply immediately — whether you run one site or a fleet.

This guidance comes from the WP‑Firewall security team and assumes you manage WordPress sites or write/maintain plugins or themes that integrate with page builders.

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Quick facts

• Affected plugin: Anber Elementor Addon
• Vulnerable versions: ≤ 1.0.1
• Vulnerability type: Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS)
• Privilege required: Contributor (authenticated)
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑7440
• Reported: 16 Aug 2025
• Official patch: Not available (at time of writing)
• Practical impact: Arbitrary JavaScript execution in visitors’ browsers when they view an affected carousel element

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Why this matters — short technical explanation

Stored XSS occurs when an attacker can place (store) malicious HTML or JavaScript into a data store (database, postmeta, widget settings) and that content is later output to other users’ browsers without proper escaping or sanitization.

In this case, the plugin exposes a button link field on a carousel widget (or equivalent element) that is stored and later rendered into the page. The plugin fails to properly validate and escape the button link input, allowing an authenticated Contributor to save a crafted value that includes executable script content. When a site visitor or admin views the page with this carousel, the stored payload executes in the context of the site.

Because the payload is persistent and served from your site’s origin, it inherits same‑origin privileges in the browser (cookies, local storage, DOM). This makes stored XSS more serious than reflected XSS in many contexts.

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Who is at risk?

• Sites using the vulnerable plugin version (≤ 1.0.1) and that expose the carousel widget on any page.
• Sites that allow Contributor accounts (or similar low‑privileged accounts) to create or edit content that includes Elementor widgets or to use the plugin’s widget GUI.
• Visitors, editors, and administrators of the site — depending on where the carousel is shown and which accounts view it.

Contributor privilege is commonly granted on publications and community blogs. Many sites rely on Contributors to create content; this is exactly the risk vector: a low‑trusted user being able to insert persisted client‑side payloads.

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Realistic attack scenarios

• Malicious Contributor writes a post that includes a page or template with the vulnerable carousel widget and injects payload into the button link field. Every visitor to that page receives the malicious script.
• The script performs silent redirections to phishing pages, injects form overlays to harvest credentials, or drops a drive‑by malware loader.
• The script steals session cookies or authentication tokens for logged‑in users and sends them to a remote server under attacker control.
• The script can perform actions in the browser on behalf of an authenticated user (e.g., trigger requests that execute privileged actions if CSRF protections are absent).
• The attacker uses the carousel payload to display malicious content or ads, monetizing the compromise.

Because the vulnerability is stored, the attacker only needs to place the payload once; the damage multiplies with page traffic.

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Immediate mitigations — prioritized steps for site owners (apply now)

If you manage a WordPress site that uses this plugin, follow these steps in the order listed:

1. Inventory and isolation
   • Identify whether the plugin is installed and its version. From WP‑admin go to Plugins > Installed Plugins and check the Anber Elementor Addon version.
   • If the plugin is installed and the version is ≤ 1.0.1, treat the site as exposed.
2. Reduce attack surface (fast, reversible)
   • Temporarily deactivate the plugin until a safe update or patch is released. Deactivation is the simplest, lowest‑risk action.
   • If you cannot deactivate immediately (site depends on the plugin), restrict or temporarily remove Contributor role capabilities:
     • Convert Contributor accounts to Subscriber, or create a review/publishing workflow that prevents unreviewed content from being published or used in page templates.
   • If your site allows user registration with Contributor by default, disable new registrations or change default role to Subscriber.
3. Block the vector with a Web Application Firewall (WAF)
   • If you run a WAF (server, reverse proxy, or plugin‑based), create a rule to block submissions that include suspicious payloads in widget fields or POSTs that include <script, javascript:, onerror=, onload=, or other inline event handlers in link fields.
   • As a practical rule: inspect and block POST payloads that include <script or HTML tags as values for parameters used to store widget settings.
   • Note: a WAF is a temporary mitigation — it reduces exposure while you apply full remediation and cleanup.
4. Search and remove existing stored payloads
   • Inspect post content and widget settings stored in wp_posts (post_content) and wp_postmeta (meta_value) for suspicious script tags and JavaScript URIs.
   • Useful WP‑CLI commands:
     • Search for script tags in postmeta:
       wp db query "SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"
     • Search in posts:
       wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';"
   • Remove or sanitize any hits you don’t recognize. If you are unsure, copy the raw content offline, then remove it from the site.
5. Audit recent changes by Contributor accounts
   • Query for posts or templates modified or created recently by Contributor users. Look for new pages, templates, or reusable blocks containing Elementor content.
   • Lock or delete suspicious accounts pending investigation.
6. Monitor and scan
   • Run a malware scan across the site files and database. Check for newly created admin users, unexpected files in wp‑uploads, or modified core/plugin/theme files.
   • Check web server logs for unusual POSTs, and look at outgoing network traffic from your site if you have egress logging.
7. Communication and rollback plan
   • If you identify a compromise, act as you would for any incident: isolate the site (maintenance mode), take a full backup for forensic review, and restore from a known‑good backup if necessary.
   • Rotate credentials for Administrator and Editor accounts and any third‑party API keys that may have been leaked.

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How to detect if your site has been exploited

• Look for pages with embedded <script> tags in carousel areas, button links that contain javascript: URIs, or onerror attribute values in image/link HTML.
• Browser console errors and unexpected redirects when visiting pages with carousels.
• Web server/access logs showing suspicious POSTs submitting HTML or javascript: URIs to endpoints used by the page builder or plugin.
• Unusual outgoing requests in server side logs pointing to attacker domains (data exfiltration).
• Suspicious content added by Contributor accounts in recent days or weeks.

A thorough detection approach combines content checks (DB), user auditing, and log review.

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Cleaning up stored XSS safely

1. Create a full site backup (files + database). Preserve it offline for investigation.
2. Use the DB queries above to find injected content. Export suspicious entries for offline review.
3. Sanitize or remove malicious meta values and post content. Replace injected HTML with safe placeholders or remove the widget instance entirely.
4. Rotate passwords and invalidate sessions for all users who viewed or edited the page while the payload was live (use a plugin or run SQL to expire sessions).
5. Re‑scan the site after cleanup and re‑enable the plugin only when you are confident there is no further stored content.
6. If in doubt, restore the site from a backup taken prior to the injection date and then apply compensating controls (WAF) and role hardening before reintroducing user content.

If you are operating many sites, automate scanning of postmeta for script markers and escalate any findings.

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Developer guidance — how to fix the plugin code (high level)

If you maintain code that handles user input for widget link fields, follow these secure coding practices:

• Sanitize on input, escape on output:
  • يستخدم esc_url_raw() when storing URLs.
  • Validate URLs using wp_http_validate_url() أو parse_url() to ensure allowed schemes (http, https, mailto if necessary).
  • When outputting content to HTML attributes, use esc_attr() و esc_url() for href values.
  • If user input must contain limited HTML, whitelist allowed tags with wp_kses() and a strict allowed list.
• Capability checks:
  • Verify يمكن للمستخدم الحالي for the appropriate capability before allowing content to be saved or rendered in admin templates.
• Avoid storing raw HTML or script in link fields. Link fields should be treated as plain text values and validated as URLs.
• When rendering developer content that originates from postmeta or widget settings, escape everything: esc_html(), esc_attr(), esc_url() depending on context.
• Reject or sanitize javascript: URIs and data URIs on input — only allow http و https by default.
• Add server‑side validation for all widget settings submitted via AJAX endpoints or form POSTs.

Suggested pseudo‑patch for a button link field (conceptual):

• On save:

  $link_raw = isset( $data['button_link'] ) ? $data['button_link'] : '';
  if ( ! empty( $link_raw ) ) {
    $link = esc_url_raw( $link_raw );
    if ( ! wp_http_validate_url( $link ) ) {
      $link = '';
    }
  }
  store $link (not $link_raw)
  

• On render:

  echo '<a href="/ar/' . esc_url( $link ) . '/" rel="noopener noreferrer">' . esc_html( $button_text ) . '</a>';
  

This ensures only sanitized URLs are stored and rendered.

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WAF rule examples (conceptual, non‑executable guidance)

A WAF is a useful layer while a plugin fix is pending. Rules should be crafted to reduce false positives while blocking obvious malicious payloads. Example high‑level checks:

• Block POSTs to widget save endpoints that include <script أو onerror in values intended to be URLs.
• Block values for link fields containing the javascript: scheme or data: URIs.
• Flag (log + hold for review) any admin AJAX requests that include HTML tags in URL fields.

Avoid overly broad rules that block legitimate use cases. Tune logs and whitelist legitimate integrations after testing.

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Hardening checklist for site owners

• Limit roles and capabilities: avoid giving Contributor accounts unnecessary access to page builders or template editors.
• Enforce content moderation: require Author/Editor review before content with page‑builder widgets goes live.
• Keep all plugins, themes, and WordPress core up to date. Patch promptly when vendor updates are published.
• Implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) header to reduce the impact of injected scripts (CSP can block inline script execution and external script loads if configured correctly).
• Use HTTP security headers: CSP, X‑Content‑Type‑Options, X‑Frame‑Options, Referrer‑Policy.
• Regularly scan posts and postmeta for unexpected HTML tags or javascript: URIs.
• Maintain activity logging (user actions, page publications) and monitor for atypical behavior.

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For hosts and agencies — operational response at scale

• Run automated scans across client databases to search for script tags in postmeta and post_content.
• Implement global WAF rules that block obvious stored XSS payloads for endpoints associated with the page builder, but allow for tuning per site.
• Notify affected clients with clear remediation steps and assistance options.
• Offer an emergency hardening service: temporarily suspend the vulnerable plugin across client sites or apply a virtual patch in the WAF until plugin updates are available.
• Use role audits and ensure onboarding documents discourage giving low‑trust contributors access to page builders.

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Why stored XSS from low‑privileged users is dangerous

Many operators assume that Contributors are safe because they cannot publish. But in environments where page builder content, reusable blocks, templates, or certain plugin widgets are editable by Contributors (or where a Contributor can create content that later an Editor/Publisher uses), the ability to persist JavaScript into a widget can give attackers a persistent foothold.

Stored XSS scales: a single successful injection can affect every site visitor, including administrators who view the page while logged in. That means session tokens, cookies, and admin UX can be impacted.

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What we at WP‑Firewall recommend, in short

1. If the plugin is present in your environment and version ≤ 1.0.1, assume exposure.
2. Deactivate the plugin or restrict Contributor access immediately.
3. Scan your database for script tags and javascript: URIs in postmeta and post_content and remove any malicious content.
4. Use a WAF to block further exploit attempts while you clean and wait for an official plugin update.
5. If you are a developer for this plugin (or a similar widget), apply strict input validation and escaping: sanitize on input, escape on output, disallow dangerous schemes in link fields.

We are available to help site owners with triage, virtual patching, and cleanup options. Our managed firewall product includes scanning and mitigation rules that can reduce exposure while a developer patch is being prepared.

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Secure‑by‑design checklist for plugin/theme authors

• Always sanitize and validate all user inputs, even from authenticated users.
• Treat URL fields as URLs — use esc_url_raw و wp_http_validate_url.
• Never output untrusted values without escaping.
• Prefer storing structured data (IDs, slugs) over raw HTML where possible.
• Add unit and integration tests that include malicious inputs to ensure sanitization logic holds.
• Document required capability levels and ensure your admin forms and AJAX endpoints require the correct permissions.

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Example of targeted searches for benign discovery (use with care)

• Search the DB for <script in postmeta:
  wp db query "SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"
• Search posts for javascript: links:
  wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%javascript:%';"

Always backup the DB before making changes.

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What to expect next

• Monitor your plugin author’s channel for an official security release. When a vendor publishes an update, review the changelog and upgrade promptly on a staging environment first.
• If the vendor does not publish an update in a reasonable timeframe, you will need to continue using compensating controls (WAF, role hardening, disabling plugin) until a safe patch is available.

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Protect your site starting with WP‑Firewall Basic (Free)

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Final notes and resources

• Treat this vulnerability seriously if you host user‑generated content or allow Contributors to interact with page builder widgets. Even low‑privileged accounts can be an entry point for persistent client‑side attacks.
• Immediate mitigation is feasible and should be prioritized: plugin deactivation or role restriction + DB cleanup and WAF rules will prevent further exploitation while you work toward a full fix.
• Developers should apply strict URL validation and escaping logic to avoid similar issues in their own code.

If you would like assistance with scanning, adding temporary rules to block the exploit vector, or help with cleanup and incident response, our security team at WP‑Firewall can perform triage and remediation. The Basic free plan provides immediate protection and is an easy way to reduce exposure while you implement more permanent fixes.

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If you want a step‑by‑step checklist exported for your team (including exact WP‑CLI queries and sample WAF rule templates), let us know and we’ll provide a downloadable remediation playbook tailored to your hosting environment.