اسم البرنامج الإضافي	Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs
نوع الضعف	Local File Inclusion
رقم CVE	CVE-2025-13088
الاستعجال	قليل
تاريخ نشر CVE	2025-11-17
رابط المصدر	CVE-2025-13088

Local File Inclusion in “Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs” (<= 1.0) — What Every Site Owner Needs to Know

On 17 November 2025 a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability (CVE‑2025‑13088) was disclosed in the WordPress plugin “Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs” affecting versions <= 1.0. The issue allows an authenticated user with Contributor privileges or higher to trigger inclusion of arbitrary local files. This post explains what that means, why it’s dangerous, how attackers could leverage it, and—most importantly—how you can protect your sites now using practical hardening steps and WP‑Firewall protections.

This analysis is written from the perspective of experienced WordPress defenders at WP‑Firewall. The goal is to give clear, actionable guidance you can apply immediately, with detection and recovery steps if you suspect exposure.

Summary (TL;DR)

• Vulnerability: Local File Inclusion (LFI) in plugin versions <= 1.0. CVE‑2025‑13088.
• Required privilege: Contributor role or higher (authenticated).
• Immediate risk: Low to medium severity for most sites, but can escalate — potential exposure of sensitive files (wp-config.php, .env, log files), credential leakage, and (in some hosting environments) remote code execution.
• Immediate actions: Remove or disable the plugin, limit Contributor accounts, enforce least privilege, deploy WAF/virtual patching, rotate secrets if compromise suspected.
• Longer term: Harden upload and include usage, enforce safe coding practices, and use continuous monitoring.

Why this issue matters

Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities occur when an application’s input controls which file path is included, required, or read, without proper validation. If an attacker can control the path to a file that the application will include and display, they can often retrieve files containing secrets (database credentials, private keys), or in some cases chain to remote code execution depending on PHP configuration and the presence of writable web folders.

What makes this situation unique is the required privilege: an authenticated user with Contributor access can trigger it. Many sites allow contributors (authors, guest bloggers, some editors, third‑party content managers). If you host guest authors or allow contributors to upload or edit data via the admin area, this is a real risk.

Vulnerability details (high level)

• Affected software: WordPress plugin “Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs”
• Vulnerable versions: <= 1.0
• Vulnerability type: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑13088
• Required privileges: Contributor (authenticated)
• Reported by: security researcher (credited)
• Fix status (at disclosure): No official plugin fix available at time of disclosure

How LFI typically works (technical explanation, no exploit code)

A plugin endpoint may accept a parameter (e.g., tab parameter, template, file, path) and then include or require a file directly using that parameter. For example (pseudocode):

include plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) . $_GET['tab'] . '.php';

If the plugin does not validate or whitelist allowed values, an attacker can pass “../” sequences or absolute paths to read files outside the intended directory:

?tab=../../../../wp-config

Because the attacker is authenticated (Contributor or higher), they can reach admin endpoints and may bypass some public protections. If the web server returns file contents, an attacker can extract secrets such as DB credentials or API keys. On servers with poorly configured PHP (e.g., allow_url_include enabled, writable directories where attacker can upload PHP files), the chain may lead to code execution.

Possible impact and attack scenarios

• Disclosure of wp-config.php or other files that contain DB credentials. With DB credentials an attacker can extract user data, escalate privileges, or inject content.
• Disclosure of private keys, SMTP credentials, API keys, or backup files.
• Abusing LFI to include log files with attacker‑controlled payloads, possibly yielding code execution when combined with other weaknesses.
• Post‑exploitation, attackers may create admin users, install backdoors, or pivot to other sites on the same server.
• Supply‑chain risk: If you use this plugin across dozens or hundreds of sites, a single vector may cause widespread compromise for accounts that grant Contributor or higher access.

Why Contributor privilege is important

Contributors can often:

• Create and edit posts (which may include uploads depending on settings or plugin functionality).
• Access certain admin pages where the plugin hooks in.
• Trigger server interactions that an unauthenticated user cannot.

Many sites have multiple contributors, including external contractors and guest authors. Treat Contributor accounts as potentially dangerous and apply the principle of least privilege.

Risk rating notes

The published CVSS score for this entry is 7.5 (High). That score approximates technical impact (confidentiality, integrity) and the conditions (authentication required). On typical shared‑hosted WordPress installations the immediate business risk may be lower (no direct RCE), but disclosure of wp-config may immediately escalate to full site takeover. Treat LFI as a high priority to mitigate despite the “authenticated” requirement.

Immediate, step‑by‑step mitigation (what to do right now)

If you manage WordPress sites that use this plugin, follow this emergency checklist:

1. Identify affected sites
   • Search your network and single‑site installations for plugin slug “category-and-product-woocommerce-tabs” or plugin folder name.
   • Use your staging and production inventories and management tools to locate the plugin across environments.
2. Take the plugin offline
   • If you can’t immediately patch, deactivate the plugin across all impacted sites. Deactivation prevents the vulnerable code from executing.
   • If deactivation isn’t feasible (business reasons), consider renaming the plugin folder via SFTP (adds an extra safety step) or restrict access to the plugin pages using a web server rule.
3. Restrict/Review Contributor Accounts
   • Temporarily lock down Contributor roles: reset passwords, confirm 2FA (if available), and remove any unknown or suspicious contributor accounts.
   • Review the list of Contributors. If you can reduce the count to the minimal number necessary, do so.
4. Add virtual patching via WAF
   • Deploy a WAF rule that blocks attempts to include local files or prevents access to the plugin’s admin endpoints for low‑privilege roles. If you use WP‑Firewall, enable our managed rules and ensure the plugin endpoint is covered by a rule that detects include‑style parameters and directory traversal patterns.
   • Example detection patterns to block (implement via your WAF):
     • Any request containing encoded or decoded ../ (e.g., ../, %2e%2e%2f, %252e%252e%252f)
     • Parameters containing “wp-config”, “.env”, “/etc/passwd”, or file extensions such as .php when they are not expected.
     • Requests to plugin endpoints from users who are not admin but attempt file path style parameters.
5. Block file reads of critical system files on server (hardening)
   • Enforce safe PHP config: disable allow_url_include, and if possible enable open_basedir restrictions to limit which directories PHP scripts may access.
   • Restrict read access to wp-config.php and other sensitive files at the filesystem level (e.g., 640 permissions, owned by web user where feasible).
   • Configure the webserver to deny direct access to files like .env or config backups.
6. Rotate secrets if you suspect exposure
   • If you suspect any exposure or see suspicious requests that read wp-config or logs, rotate your DB password and any exposed API keys or application credentials.
   • After rotation, update wp-config.php or use environment variables as appropriate.
7. Full scan and forensic snapshot
   • Run a thorough malware scan. The plugin exposure could have been used previously.
   • Take file system and DB snapshots for forensic analysis before making further changes.
   • If you detect backdoors or unknown users, restore from a clean backup or rebuild.
8. Monitor logs for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
   • Look for requests to plugin endpoints carrying parameters labeled “file”, “tab”, “template”, or other suspicious keys.
   • Detect requests with traversal sequences or base64 strings being included.

Recommended virtual patch/WAF rules (examples)

Below are safe, high‑level examples you can convert to your WAF syntax or provide to your hosting provider. These examples are intentionally generic — adjust to your environment.

• Block requests containing directory traversal:
  • Pattern: (%2e%2e|../|%c0%ae%c0%ae|..%5c)
  • Action: Block or challenge
• Block attempts to read wp-config.php or /etc/passwd:
  • Pattern: (wp-config\.php|/etc/passwd|\.env|\.git)
  • Action: Block and log
• Disallow “.php” in query parameters for plugin endpoints:
  • Pattern: ([\?&][^=]+=.*\.php)
  • If request path matches /wp-admin/*plugin-slug* and parameter contains “.php” → block
• Require CSRF nonce: If plugin admin endpoints expect nonces and capability checks, enforce presence of a valid nonce for POST/GET administrative operations; treat admin pages as requiring a valid logged‑in session and nonce.
• Rate limit authenticated users accessing plugin pages:
  • If a Contributor triggers unusually frequent include attempts, throttle or block.

Note on ModSecurity (generic rule example):
(Do not copy verbatim to production without testing — adapt to your ruleset and test on staging.)

SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx \.\./|\%2e\%2e|wp-config\.php|/etc/passwd|\.env" "id:100001,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'LFI Attempt - blocked'"

Again, test before deploying to avoid false positives that may break legitimate admin actions.

Detection: what to look for in logs and site behavior

• Requests to the plugin admin pages containing parameters like file, template, tab, path with traversal sequences (%2e%2e/ or ../).
• Unexpected content being output in the browser (e.g., system file contents).
• New admin accounts, changed user roles, or posts containing injected code.
• Unexpected outgoing connections from the site (sign of data exfiltration or backdoor).
• Modified core files or newly created PHP files where they shouldn’t exist (wp-includes, uploads).
• Crons or scheduled tasks added by non‑admin users.

If you find evidence of compromise

1. Isolate the site: take it offline or block public access.
2. Preserve evidence: save logs, file snapshots, DB exports.
3. Rotate all secrets: database, API keys, third‑party credentials, and any SMTP credentials stored on the site.
4. Rebuild or restore from a known‑good backup after thorough cleanup.
5. Re‑scan for persistence/backdoors.
6. Notify stakeholders and, if necessary, customers about the incident.

Developer guidance: how this should have been coded

From a secure‑coding perspective the plugin should have avoided dynamic file includes based on user input. For file/path includes there are three main mitigations:

1. Whitelist allowed values

   If the plugin allows a set of tabs/templates, maintain a server‑side whitelist (an array) of allowed slugs. Only include files when the input matches the whitelist.

   $allowed_tabs = array( 'description', 'additional_info', 'reviews' );
   $tab = sanitize_text_field( $_GET['tab'] );
   if ( in_array( $tab, $allowed_tabs, true ) ) {
       include plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) . 'tabs/' . $tab . '.php';
   } else {
       // safe fallback
   }

2. Sanitize and normalize input

   Use WordPress sanitization functions (sanitize_text_field, sanitize_key) and validate that the resulting string contains only expected characters (alphanumeric, dashes, underscores). Never allow slashes or dots.

3. Avoid including files by path where possible

   Use callbacks, handlers, or load templates via wp_safe_redirect to a known file that then loads content using safe logic, rather than direct include of user‑controlled paths.

Hardening WordPress hosting environment (recommended)

• Disable PHP execution in the uploads directory:
  • Place an .htaccess or webserver rule to deny .php execution in wp-content/uploads.
• Restrict file system permissions to least privilege (files 640/644, directories 750/755 depending on host).
• Use open_basedir to constrain PHP file access to your WordPress directory.
• Keep PHP and the webserver patched.
• Enforce 2FA for users with elevated privileges (Editor, Author, Contributor if possible).
• Limit plugin installation and editing to admin only. Disable file editing in WP admin (DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT constant).
• Use role management plugins cautiously — avoid granting file/system capabilities to Contributor.

Why a managed WAF and virtual patching matter

When a plugin vulnerability is discovered and an official fix isn’t available, a managed WAF can provide virtual patching: a protective rule set that blocks exploit attempts before they reach the vulnerable code. Benefits:

• Immediate protection across many sites
• No code changes required on the site
• Central rule updates when new exploitation patterns appear

WP‑Firewall’s managed rules include signatures for LFI patterns, directory traversal attempts, and specific plugin endpoint protections. For sites where deactivation isn’t immediately possible for business reasons, virtual patching buys time to plan remediation and coordinate updates.

Detection & logging best practices

• Centralize logs: Use a hosted log aggregator or SIEM to capture webserver, PHP, and WAF logs.
• Alert on suspicious admin requests: trigger alerts for any non‑admin user hitting plugin admin endpoints with potential include parameters.
• File integrity monitoring: detect changes to core files, plugins, and uploads.
• Periodic scanning: schedule automated malware and vulnerability scans to catch issues early.

Recovery checklist (if you suspect a breach)

• Isolate the site, preserve evidence.
• Restore from a clean backup if persistence or backdoors are found.
• Thorough scan for backdoors and malicious scheduled tasks.
• Reissue credentials and keys.
• Review user accounts and reset passwords including key service accounts.
• Hardening: ensure WAF rules, server restrictions (open_basedir), and file permission adjustments are in place.
• After recovery, conduct a post‑incident review and implement mitigations to prevent recurrence (reduce Contributor access, better plugin vetting).

Long‑term defense-in-depth recommendations

1. Plugin governance
   • Only install plugins from reputable sources, and keep an inventory of plugins and versions.
   • Monitor plugin activity and changelogs for security fixes.
   • Remove unused or abandoned plugins.
2. مبدأ الحد الأدنى من الامتياز
   • Only grant contributor/editor/admin access when necessary.
   • Revoke rights for inactive users promptly.
3. Automated patching and monitoring
   • Apply security updates for WordPress core, themes, and plugins promptly in test/staging, then in production.
   • Use pipeline/CD processes for updates, and run automated tests before production deployment.
4. Deploy layered protections
   • Host level hardening (file permissions, PHP config)
   • Application WAF and managed rules (virtual patching)
   • File integrity monitoring and malware scanning
   • Regular backups with retention policy
5. Developer training & secure coding
   • Train plugin developers on secure coding: whitelist inputs, avoid dynamic includes, use nonce checks, capability checks, and sanitize input.

Signs you may have been exploited via LFI

• Unexpected disclosure of file contents in the browser.
• Strange new files under the uploads directory (.php files, webshells).
• Newly created admin users or unexpected DB changes.
• Outbound network connections initiated by the site to unknown C2 servers.
• Unusual spikes in traffic to plugin endpoints.

A practical sample detection query (logs)

Search access logs for requests to the plugin path that include suspicious characters:

GET /wp-admin/admin.php?page=category-and-product-tabs&tab=../../wp-config.php HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: ...

Look for encoded traversal:

%2e%2e%2f, %252e%252e%252f, %2e%2e%5c

If you see these, escalate to incident response immediately.

Get Immediate, Continuous Protection with WP‑Firewall (Free Plan)

Whether you already use a web application firewall or are just starting to harden your WordPress fleet, WP‑Firewall’s Free plan offers a quick, no-cost way to raise the baseline of security for vulnerable plugins and common attack patterns. The Free plan includes a managed firewall, unlimited bandwidth, WAF coverage for OWASP Top 10 risks, and a malware scanner—ideal for small teams and sites that need immediate protection while they patch or remove vulnerable plugins.

Try the WP‑Firewall Basic (Free) plan here

Why this matters: WP‑Firewall provides managed rule sets and virtual patching that can block LFI attempts and directory traversal traffic patterns in real time, giving you breathing room to carry out secure remediation without risking live exploit attempts.

Frequently asked questions (short)

Q: If my site uses this plugin, do I need to panic?

A: No panic, but act quickly. Take the plugin offline if possible, or deploy a virtual patch rule. Review Contributor accounts and rotate credentials if you suspect a read of sensitive files.

Q: Can a Contributor actually take over my site?

A: Direct takeover from LFI alone is not guaranteed, but disclosure of wp-config.php could allow an attacker to take over the database and then the site. Combined with insecure host settings or writeable upload directories, the risk increases.

Q: Is there an official plugin update?

A: At the time of disclosure an official fix may not be available. If and when a vendor supplies a fix, apply it after testing. Until then rely on virtual patching and the mitigations described above.

أفكار ختامية

Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities continue to be one of the most impactful classes of weaknesses in PHP applications. The combination of authenticated access (Contributor) plus vulnerable plugin logic creates an attractive attack vector for threat actors. The good news is that defenders can mitigate these risks quickly by removing the vulnerable plugin, applying virtual patches via a WAF, restricting contributor privileges, locking down server configs (open_basedir), and monitoring for suspicious activity.

If you need help applying virtual patching across multiple sites, configuring WAF rules, or running incident response following suspected abuse, WP‑Firewall’s team has experience responding to these exact scenarios. Start by deploying the free plan to gain immediate perimeter protection and move to a managed plan when your environment requires advanced features like auto virtual patching and monthly security reporting.

Stay safe and treat plugin attacks as a priority—today’s benign contributor account could be tomorrow’s exploited access vector.